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ABSTRACT 
Disaster relief operations, such as the 2005 Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina, and 
wartime operations, such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
have identified the need for a standardized command and control system interoperable 
among Joint, Coalition, and Interagency entities.  The Systems Engineering Analysis 
Cohort 9 (SEA-9) Rapid Response Command and Control (R2C2) integrated project 
team completed a systems engineering (SE) process to address the military’s command 
and control capability gap.  During the process, the R2C2 team conducted mission 
analysis, generated requirements, developed and modeled architectures, and analyzed and 
compared current operational systems versus the team’s R2C2 system.  The R2C2 system 
provided a reachback capability to the Regional Combatant Commander’s (RCC) 
headquarters, a local communications network for situational assessments, and Internet 
access for civilian counterparts participating in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
operations.  Because the team designed the R2C2 system to be modular, analysis 
concluded that the R2C2 system was the preferred method to provide the RCC with the 
required flexibility and scalability to deliver a rapidly deployable command and control 
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 The Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering and the Deployable Joint 
Command and Control (DJC2) Joint Program Office (JPO) sponsored a  
Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort Nine (SEA-9) capstone project to develop and 
analyze architectures for a rapidly deployable command and control system to support the 
Regional Combatant Commanders (RCCs) in austere environments.  The U.S. military 
responded quickly to recent natural disasters, such as the 2004 Tsunami,  
Hurricane Katrina, and the Pakistan earthquakes, but lessons learned have emphasized 
the need for interoperable command and control systems to effectively coordinate 
between the military, local governments, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in 
order to help the region(s) return to normalcy.  In addition to disaster relief lessons 
learned, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stated the need for improved joint 
command and control capabilities to combat terrorism and defend the homeland. 
The Rapid Response Command and Control (R2C2) integrated project team, 
consisting of six SEA-9 students and nine Temasek Defense Systems Institute (TDSI) 
students, completed a rigorous systems engineering (SE) process to address the command 
and control needs stated in the disaster relief lessons learned and the capability gaps 
outlined in the QDR.  The team’s problem statement was to develop and analyze 
architectures, and design systems for a rapidly deployable command and control system 
to provide RCCs with an initial situational assessment and communications capability 
through the range of military operations.  During this process, the team conducted 
mission analysis, generated requirements, developed and modeled architectures, and 
analyzed the team-developed architectures and legacy architectures.  Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) students and faculty from numerous academic and research departments, 
such as Information Sciences, Computer Science, Defense Analysis, Space Engineering, 
and Operational Research, provided additional technical and operational expertise needed 
to design the R2C2 system architectures. 
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Systems Engineering Approach 
The DJC2 JPO is developing a Rapid Response Kit (RRK) “to provide  
state-of-the-art, agile, self-contained mobile quick response capability with a small 
footprint and secure access to mission critical information.”1  Other key requirements 
outlined in the Capability Production Document (CPD) include access of up to two data 
networks, such as Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), SECRET 
IPRNET (SIPRNET), and Combined ENTerprise Regional Information eXchange 
System (CENTRIXS), and transportable by two persons via ground, commercial, or 
military air.  The R2C2 team reviewed all requirements in the CPD and Broad Area 
Announcement (BAA) to understand RRK functionality, but did not strictly use these 
requirements to determine the functionality of the R2C2 system.  An additional top-down 
SE approach was conducted to generate R2C2 requirements and to evaluate the validity 
of the requirements for the RRK. 
The process started by researching Joint Publications, the 2006 QDR, and recent 
peacetime and wartime operational lessons learned to determine command and control 
doctrine, procedures, and capability gaps.  From this research, the team determined that 
the military needed a standardized command and control system that is:  interoperable 
with joint, coalition, and interagency entities; modular and scalable; rapidly deployable; 
and maintains a small operational footprint.  Once the capability gaps were identified, the 
team sought user guidance to determine the missions of the R2C2 and concepts of 
operations to help develop requirements.  Due to the volume of potential users who 
would be receiving the system in European Command (EUCOM), Pacific Command 
(PACOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and Central Command (CENTCOM), 
and the different environments in which they operate, the team developed five different 
scenarios in an effort to address the broad spectrum of military operations and vetted 
them through the DJC2 JPO, requirements offices, and RCC representatives.  The five 
scenarios included:  1) a humanitarian assistance operation to support Singapore during a 
pandemic, such as the avian influenza,; 2) a disaster relief operation to locate  
U.S. personnel and assist El Salvador after a devastating earthquake; 3) a 
                                                 
1 DJC2, Capability Production Document, OPNAV n71C2-688(1)-71-05, 30 November 2005, p. 2. 
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counterterrorism operation to help the Philippine government locate a high value terrorist 
target; 4) a civil unrest operation in Ivory Coast to support the United Nations and 
conduct Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO); and 5) a deployment scenario in 
Iran to conduct Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and determine the staging area for a 
larger command and control system for continuous operations. 
The five approved scenarios were developed into concepts of operations to 
determine the functionality of the R2C2 system.  The team conducted a functional 
analysis from both a user’s and system’s perspective to determine what the system does 
and how the system will be used.  The functions identified by the team translated into 
operational and system requirements and were mapped to the Chairman of the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Universal Joint Task List to ensure that the requirements traced to 
strategic guidance. 
The operational and system requirements were used to develop multiple R2C2 
architectures.  By conducting market surveys for over 40 communications, sensors, 
information management, and power alternatives to determine technology availability 
and feasibility, the team reduced the selection to 8 potential architectures and 3 modular 
suites.  The Primary, Local, and Civilian (Civil)/Military Suites allow the RCCs 
flexibility to operate in many different missions.  The Primary Suite provides reachback 
to RCC headquarters and to the Global Information Grid and includes components such 
as routers, switches, laptops, satellite terminals, phones, encryption devices, and a 
generator.  For architecture analysis, the team investigated alternatives for satellite 
terminals and determined total system weight.  To provide a situational assessment of the 
operating area to the RCC, the Local Suite provides communications and data transfer 
capability within the local area and includes components such as satellite phones or 
military radios, cameras, personal digital assistants, and wireless networks (802.11 Wi-Fi 
and 802.16 Wi-Max).  Modeling and analysis was used to compared data transfer rates 
and system weight for Local Suite architectures that included a data link and voice 
network versus a voice only alternative.  Because humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief (HA/DR) operations occur more frequently, the RCCs need to be prepared to work 
with their civilian counterparts and the Civil/Military Suite provides Internet access for 
the Civil/Military Operating Centers in the devastated region.  The Civil/Military Suite 
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includes components such as satellite terminals, laptops, and a generator or, depending on 
the available bandwidth, the Civil/Military Suite could be integrated into the  
Primary Suite to reduce size, weight, and footprint.  Modeling and analysis was used to 
calculate the bandwidth availability throughout the operation at the Primary Suite and to 
determine if enough bandwidth remained for Civil/Military Suite use.  System weight 
with and without a dedicated Civil/Military Suite was also calculated. 
Modeling the different alternatives for the Primary, Local, and Civil/Military 
Suite helped the team select an architecture that could best fulfill the range of military 
operations.  The final architecture, that included a Primary Suite with a generator,  
a Local Suite with a data link, and an integrated Civil/Military Suite, was compared to 
current operational systems and a proposed system submitted by a contractor in response 
to the BAA.  The team used multiple decision aids, including an Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) and a requirements stoplight comparison, to rate the different systems.  
The AHP utilized weighted decision criteria collected from a robust mix of academic and 
operational NPS users with experience in communications, information systems, 
logistics, networks, and tactical operations.  The stoplight comparison rated each system 
on whether it met the requirements stated in the CPD, BAA, and the team-generated list. 
Project Conclusions 
The team generated additional requirements from mission analysis that were not 
identified in either the CPD or the BAA.  The R2C2 system included organic power to 
ensure that constant power was available.  Over 60% of the scenarios were in austere 
environments where the local infrastructure could not support continuous power or was 
devastated by natural disasters or war.  In order to provide a situational assessment to the 
RCCs, a local communications network, to include scouts and equipment, was required to 
collect and pass situational reports.  Since the Primary Suite was stationary, the team 
captured this requirement by designing a Local Suite.  RCCs have responded to all the 
recent natural disasters and lessons learned from these operations have highlighted the 
need to improve coordination and cooperation between military and civilian counterparts.  
The team included a Civil/Military Suite to address this capability gap by providing 
Internet access to civilian counterparts in regions where all local and global 
communications have been severely damaged. 
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From the development and analysis of multiple models, the team selected two 
final Local Suite architectures.  These two architectures were dependent on whether the 
mission was considered time-critical and a data link was required to improve data transfer 
rates, or if the mission was considered a normal operation and only a voice report was 
required.  The results of the model indicated that having a voice-only link would not meet 
the 30-minute window between observation and action for time-critical operations.  Since 
over 60% of the scenarios were considered time-critical, the Local Suite with a data link 
was used for system comparison and the R2C2 system’s scout team incurs an additional 
50 pounds of equipment. 
The team evaluated Primary Suite bandwidth availability based on concepts of 
operations and varying data rates.  The team modeled data rates ranging from 512 kilobits 
per second (kbps) to 4,096 kbps, and the results concluded that there was enough excess 
bandwidth (over 50%) to allow an integrated Civil/Military Suite, significantly reducing 
system size and weight. 
The team performed additional weight trade-offs on the Primary Suite to better 
comply with the two-person transportable requirement.  If lightweight packaging is used 
(vice heavy plastic cases) to transport the system, the weight can be reduced by  
27 pounds, but is less robust and durable.  A Norsat Globetrekker (note the use of the 
term Globetrekker in Chapter 5.0) satellite terminal weighs 36 pounds less than the 
proposed SWE-DISH system, but is not licensed on as many constellations as  
SWE-DISH.  If the RCC determines from mission planning that the operating area has 
reliable power, then the generator can be left behind for a savings of 50 pounds.  The 
combined weight trade-offs reduced the Primary Suite from 340 pounds to 227 pounds. 
The results from comparing current operating systems, the proposed system, and 
the R2C2 system, using the AHP and the stoplight matrix decision-making tools, were 
consistent.  Both tools identified the R2C2 system as the preferred system to perform the 
range of military operations.  R2C2 ranked highest in the AHP at 43% compared to the 
current and proposed system at 29%.  R2C2 also captured 27 of 28 requirements in the 
stoplight matrix compared to the proposed system at 22 and current system at 16.  From 
this analysis, the team concluded that the R2C2 system delivers increased capabilities 
over current and proposed systems, while still meeting the requirements outlined in the 
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CPD and BAA, and provides the RCCs with required flexibility and scalability to deliver 
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1.0 BACKGROUND OF SEA 
 This capstone project report and a formal presentation are requirements to earn a 
Masters degree in Systems Engineering and Analysis (SEA) at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) in Monterey, California.  The report captures the key systems engineering 
(SE) products and design analysis used during the six-month project and provides the 
stakeholders with system design recommendations for the Rapid Response Command and 
Control (R2C2) system.  The capstone project team itself was comprised of the following 
U.S. Navy members from SEA-9:  LCDR Lisa Sullivan, LT Ronel Reyes,  
LT Lennard Cannon, ENS Kitan Bae, ENS Jim Colgary, and ENS Nick Minerowicz, as 
well as students representing the Temasek Defense Systems Institute (TDSI) from 
Singapore:  Major Chris Leong, Major Harry Lim, Mr. Hang Sheng Lim,  
Ms. Chin Chin Ng, Captain Tiong Tien Neo, Mr. Guan Chye Tan, Major Yu Loon Ng, 
Major Eric Wong, and Mr. Heng Yue Wong.  In addition to the primary team, consisting 
of the six SEA students as well as the nine TDSI students who have backgrounds in 
communications, information assurance, sensors, and operational research, students from 
the Information Sciences, Defense Analysis, and Computer Science Departments also 
contributed to the project as Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The SEA curriculum, with support from the Wayne E. Meyer Institute of  
Systems Engineering, incorporates a capstone project that integrates the efforts of 
multiple disciplines at NPS and TDSI.  The purposes of the capstone project are: 
• To understand the concept of System of Systems 
• To understand problem solving using the SE thought process 
• To understand customer needs and translate them to operational 
requirements 
• To design and develop architectures 
• To model and analyze architectures 
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• To effectively communicate results and provide recommendations to  
the customer 
1.2 TASKING 
 The current tasking statement, as outlined by the Meyer Institute and the 
Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) Joint Program Office (JPO), is to design 
and analyze architectures using SE principles and products to aid in the development of a 
Rapid Response Kit (RRK).  The R2C2 team will provide the following products to  
the JPO: 
• Mission Analysis 
• Scenarios and Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) 
• Refinement of Operational and System Requirements 
• Conceptual Architectures 
• Models of the Architectures 
• Analysis of Architectures and Recommendations 
To facilitate the tasking goals, the R2C2 team has applied a systems engineering process. 
1.2.1 R2C2 Problem Statement and Constraints 
The problem statement for the R2C2 team was to develop and analyze 
architectures and design systems for a rapidly deployable, Command and Control (C2) 
system to provide Regional Combatant Commanders (RCCs) with initial situational 
awareness and communication capabilities through the range of military operations.  This 
analysis will be provided to the DJC2 JPO to aid in the development of a RRK.  To help 
meet the JPO’s short schedule requirement to start prototyping in October 2006, the 
designs and architectures are predominantly commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products 
that are readily available. 
1.2.2 Current Needs and Capability Gaps 
The current need for R2C2, as outlined by the JPO, requires a system that can be 
quickly deployed into theater to facilitate C2 without requiring a large physical presence 
or logistic trail.  The system should be flexible enough to handle most mission 
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requirements, while allowing for the possibility of modularity to allow for changes in 
functionality, as necessary. 
While the JPO is aware that systems such as this presently exist throughout the 
U.S. military, the vast majority of them are cobbled together on an ad-hoc basis at the 
discretion of the commanding officer.  While these ad-hoc systems likely meet the needs 
of the command, their interoperability and logistic support is inadequate.  The JPO 
envisions a lightweight C2 system that can be standardized and logistically supported 
throughout all branches of the military to minimize the creation of multiple  
ad-hoc systems. 
1.2.3 Relationship with DJC2 JPO 
The DJC2 JPO vision is to 
. . . create a more cost-effective, superior means to deploy, furnish, install, 
operate, and maintain a symbiotic C2 Combat Operations Center (COC) 
infused with the latest advanced technology and collaboration toolsets, 
providing a unique capability for a Joint Task Force Headquarters or a 
Standing Joint Force Headquarters—allowing a Joint Force Commander to 
conduct JTF operations better with each spiral delivery.2 
 
Therefore, the JPO initiated the creation of multiple system architectures to meet 
this need, depending on the level of C2 necessary.  Even though this system was planned 
to be sizeable depending on need, it was noted that there may be several situations where 
the setup of even the “small” DJC2 would be infeasible. 
 The JPO identified a need for a smaller system that could both fulfill basic  
C2 operations in a standalone configuration, as well as serve as an interim C2 node if the 
situation warrants the setup of a DJC2 system.  This RRK is envisioned to be a 
lightweight, man-portable system that can be transported by two personnel, operated by 
4-10 personnel, and functional in-theater within days.  The RRK would then be able to 
provide reachback and C2 functionality in a region that previously had none.  The goal of 
this capstone project is to explore the RRK concept and provide the JPO with a series of 
architectures (known as R2C2) designed to meet those needs. 
                                                 
2 Briefing given by Steve Grant, DJC2 Chief Engineer, NSWC, Panama City, FL, 21 August 2005. 
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1.2.4 Project Goals 
To satisfy the requirements of the Meyer Institute and DJC2 JPO, R2C2 is 
developing the following products: 
• Mission Analysis:  To get a consistent understanding of the mission 
requirements for the proposed system between the system architects 
(R2C2) and the primary stakeholders (DJC2 JPO), a series of missions and 
scenarios were developed to highlight what the R2C2 team determined to 
be key attributes of the system.  These missions were then presented to the 
stakeholder for review and input.  Once the stakeholder and designers both 
agreed that the proposed missions indicated a need for an R2C2 
architecture due to a capability gap, the missions were detailed out into 
specific scenarios. 
• Scenarios and CONOPS:  Starting with the proposed missions for the 
R2C2 system, the R2C2 team then further decomposed the missions into 
specific scenarios, as well as laid out the preliminary CONOPS necessary 
for the employment of the system architecture. 
• Refined Operational and System Requirements:  Through 
communications with the DJC2 JPO, SMEs, and RCC representatives, as 
well as analysis of team-developed scenarios, a series of operational 
technical requirements were created to help guide the creation of  
system architectures. 
• Conceptual Architectures:  Once there was a consistent understanding 
about what the requirements are for the system, system architecture 
alternatives and variants were designed to fulfill the developed operational 
requirements.  These architectures were then modeled and evaluated  
for effectiveness. 
• Models of the Architectures:  As the different architectures for the 
system were developed, executable or numeric models were created to 
assess and estimate the performance of the proposed alternatives.  
Additionally, models of missions and scenarios were used to more closely 
evaluate the system from an “operational” perspective. 
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• Analysis of Architectures and Recommendations:  Once the models of 
the design architectures were complete, the results were analyzed to 
determine how they relate to each other in terms of overall performance.  
Key conclusions and recommendations will be presented to DJC2 JPO and 
forwarded to the RCCs. 
1.2.5 Important Dates 
The duration of the R2C2 project was approximately five months beginning in 
January 2006.  This is in line with the DJC2 JPO’s schedule, which requires that the SE 
effort of this capstone project be completed by September 2006.  The R2C2 project has 
had three reviews, as well as a paper and final presentation.  The dates for each major 
phase of this capstone project are listed below: 
• Conceptual Design Review (CoDR) (2/06/06):  The CoDR presented the 
initial capstone project’s research to NPS faculty for critique and 
dscussion.  At this phase, the R2C2 team had a solid understanding of the 
tasking statement and determined the project’s direction and scope.  This 
included an early understanding of operational requirements, as primarily 
outlined through developed scenarios discussed with the JPO. 
• Preliminary Design Review (PDR) (3/21/06):  During the PDR, the 
R2C2 team presented refined mission and scenarios and functional 
analysis diagrams to highlight some of the critical requirements and 
aspects of the R2C2 system.  The team covered proposed architecture 
designs, as well as preliminary methods of comparison to  
analyze architectures. 
• Critical Design Review (CDR) (5/01/06):  The CDR was the third major 
capstone project review.  By this point, the R2C2 team had fully 
determined system architectures as well as developed methods or models 
to analyze the proposed architectures.  Modeling and analysis results were 
presented to the DJC2 JPO and NPS faculty. 
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• Paper Draft Due to Editor (5/08/06):  The final paper was submitted to 
the editor approximately one month before graduation to allow for a 
proper amount to time to edit and format the document to NPS standards. 
• Final Presentation (6/05/06):  Prior to graduation, the R2C2 team briefed 
the integrated capstone project to the DJC2 JPO and NPS faculty.  This 
cumulative brief included highlights of the previous three design reviews 
as well as any final analysis that occurred after the CDR. 
1.3 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (SE) METHODOLOGY 
The SE approach to architecture design is a modern method of analyzing the 
management and engineering practices necessary to produce positive results by giving 
the development process a consistent structure or methodology. 
1.3.1 What is SE and Why is it Important? 
SE is a discipline that seeks to look at the system as a whole and lead the design 
process toward a product that meets the qualities and requirements desired by the 
customer.  In general, SE is a practical approach to organizing both the technical and 
managerial aspects normally associated with a project.  Following a well-defined SE 
process helps ensure that a project meets essential requirements and milestones as it 
moves toward completion. 
1.3.2 SE Approaches 
The SE process has several well-known examples.  One such example is the 
“Waterfall Model.”3  It is a series of steps starting at requirements analysis and ending at 
system support.  As the project “falls” down the waterfall, each step brings it closer to 
completion.  The “Spiral Model”4 is a different approach that breaks the SE process into a 
long series of smaller increments.  Each “revolution” around the spiral is then iteratively 
checked to ensure that work does not proceed until known risks have been mitigated. 
                                                 
3 Kevin Forsberg and Hal Mooz, Visualizing Project Management, 3rd ed., Hoboken, NJ:  John Wiley 
& Sons, 2005, pp. 104-106. 
4 Ibid., pp. 107-108. 
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Both approaches focus on the entire life-cycle of actual systems.  A modified SE 
approach that used aspects of both the “Waterfall Model” and the “Spiral Model” was 
developed to fit the needs of our capstone project. 
1.3.3 Our Process 
The R2C2 team developed a modified SE approach that included a series of steps, 
like the “Waterfall,” to allow movement from phase to phase, and feedback loops to 
encourage product refinement based on stakeholders’ inputs.  The major phases include 





• Determine     
Customers/Stakeholders
• Determine Problem 
Statement and Scope
Conceptual Design
• Conduct Mission Analysis
• Determine Capability Gaps
• Develop Scenarios and 
Concept of Operations
• Develop Operational 
Requirements
Preliminary Design
• Perform Functional 
Analysis




• Build Models of 
Architectures
• Develop Test and 
Evaluation Parameters
• Test Architectures
• Conduct Analysis and 
Recommendations
 
Figure 1:  Systems Engineering Approach 
1.3.3.1 Research 
• Determine Customers and Stakeholders:  The first step in the process 
was to find which entities may have an interest in the proposed capstone 
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project.  These stakeholders were able to provide valuable input and 
direction for the R2C2 team. 
• Discuss with the Customers and Stakeholders:  The problem statement 
was discussed with the relevant stakeholders to get an understanding of 
their view of the problem.  As the capstone project research is largely 
academic in nature, an emphasis was placed on how the SE process can be 
used to explore the problems of the stakeholder. 
• Determine Problem and Scope:  Before proceeding to system design, the 
R2C2 team first examined the full breadth of the possible topics and the 
depth of research conducted.  At this point, the team determined what 
portion of the “overall” problem could be accomplished in the given  
time frame. 
1.3.3.2 Conceptual Design 
• Conduct Mission Analysis:  Once the problem statement was well 
defined, a series of proposed missions was developed to analyze the 
manners in which the system may be employed.  These missions helped to 
ensure that the R2C2 team and stakeholders had a similar vision for  
the system. 
• Determine Capability Gaps:  After analyzing the missions and 
environments in which the system must operate, the R2C2 team 
determined capability gaps between preliminary architectures (or existing 
systems) and the proposed mission profiles. 
• Develop Scenarios and CONOPS:  Once the mission analysis was 
complete, a more detailed set of scenarios was developed to highlight the 
manners in which the system will be used.  The R2C2 team then checked 
with relevant stakeholders to ensure that the group’s vision for the system 
was consistent with the stakeholders’ requirements. 
• Develop Operational Requirements:  After developing the mission 
scenarios, the R2C2 team determined operational requirements for system 
(and mission) success. 
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1.3.3.3 Preliminary Design 
• Perform Functional Analysis:  Knowing the operational requirements for 
the system, it was then possible to perform a functional analysis on the 
design.  This analysis is important to the SE process because it determines 
system interactions (i.e., people, hardware, and software), helps define 
requirements, and provides necessary feedback to improve scenarios. 
• Develop System Requirements:  Drawing on the results of the functional 
analysis, as well as any customer input, the R2C2 team determined the 
detailed system requirements that must be present in all of the  
design alternatives. 
• Develop Architectures:  With the system requirements fully explored, the 
R2C2 team designed several systems to fulfill those needs.  While each 
system may not necessarily be similar in design or mission capability, they 
were all evaluated against each other using stochastic or  
executable models. 
1.3.3.4 Design Evaluation 
• Build Models:  Once architectures were designed to meet the system 
requirements, software models were developed to evaluate the different 
design alternatives against each other or existing systems. 
• Develop Test and Evaluation Parameters:  Concurrent to the 
development of models was the creation of test and evaluation parameters.  
As important test criteria were identified, they were integrated into 
developed models and simulations. 
• Test Architectures:  Once the architectures and test criteria were 
finalized, the developed models and simulation were used to evaluate the 
level of performance for each alternative. 
• Conduct Analysis and Recommendations:  The results of the testing and 
evaluation phase were then analyzed to determine the effectiveness of 
each architecture design.  Based on this analysis, the R2C2 team will 
provide recommendations to the JPO. 
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1.3.3.5 Project Organization 
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Figure 2:  R2C2 Organizational Chart 
Each member of the NPS SEA program was given a “group lead” position for essential 
elements of the R2C2 design effort.  The specifics for each position are as follows: 
• Team Lead:  The project’s Chief Systems Engineer; plans, organizes, and 
manages team functions and provides an interface between the project 
team and outside entities.  Responsible for quality assurance of  
team products. 
• Mission Analysis:  Responsible for leading the group in conducting 
mission analysis and developing scenarios, CONOPS, and scenario 
timelines. 
• Requirements:  Responsible for leading the group in developing a 
functional analysis to determine operational and system requirements 
based on mission analysis and scenario development. 
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• Architecture:  Responsible for leading the group in researching and 
developing architectures and processes necessary to design the system. 
• Modeling:  Oversees the development of system modeling efforts and is 
responsible for coordinating with the Requirement group to ensure that the 
models measure desired system requirements. 
• Test and Evaluation:  Manages and organizes the overall process of  
Test and Evaluation of the conceptual architectures including development 
of Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Measures of Performance 
(MOP). 
• Configuration Management:  The configuration management role is an 
additional duty assigned to the Design Analysis group and they will ensure 
the integrity of project files and records, as well as taking an active role in 
the creation and editing of new project documentation. 
• Advisors:  The project advisor will guide and assist project members in 
order to keep project efforts working toward project and educational goals. 
• SMEs:  While not explicitly members of the R2C2 team, SMEs may be 
used as consultants in specific fields. 
Each working group was responsible for leading the R2C2 team during their 
phase of the project.  All R2C2 team members were required to participate in every phase 
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2.0 MISSION ANALYSIS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 The next phase completed in the R2C2 team’s SE process was the mission 
analysis, which encompassed multiple iterative steps in order to reach the objective of 
implementing the system into a range of scenarios.  First, to fully grasp the potential of 
the R2C2, an understanding of what an R2C2 is, along with what it is tasked to do was 
needed.  As a group, the R2C2 team had limited experience with C2 doctrine, equipment, 
and application.  With only a general knowledge of C2, the intricacies of an effective and 
efficient system needed to be explored. 
The need for the R2C2 was researched to gain a deeper understanding of what a 
C2 system entails.  Documents provided by the DJC2 JPO included requirements for the 
RRK, which gave a basis for searching for a system need.  The R2C2 team was faced 
with defining the reason or need for such requirements.  Derivation of a need for the 
R2C2 led to the research and identification of capability gaps between the R2C2 and 
current C2 systems employed by the military.  These gaps provided a foundation for 
requirements development and refinement more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3.0. 
To further clarify the use of the R2C2, the end users of the system had to be 
identified.  Ultimately, the RCCs represented the stakeholders of the system.  Along with 
having many RCCs as users, the number of region-specific missions had to be 
investigated.  For analytical purposes, determining the mission types and different 
scenarios that would meet these missions was the next challenge.  Developing five 
scenarios that catered to the number of users and environments displayed the capability 
of the R2C2 to operate in a wide spectrum of missions. 
Finally, these scenarios were sent out to our stakeholders for feedback to 
determine the realism of the missions depicted.  As part of the SE process, input from the 
customer was critical and proved to be essential in updating the scenarios and reducing 
the scope of R2C2 operations.  Confirmation of the validity of the scenarios by 
representatives from the requirements offices, RCCs, and the JPO helped to complete 
task of mission analysis. 
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2.1.1 Characteristics of an R2C2 
 The approach to define the R2C2 system requirement was to articulate the 
demands and limitations from each system perspective, in the context of R2C2, and 
address their interdependencies.  We defined these system perspectives broadly as:  User, 
Mission, Environment, and Technology perspectives.  A fifth perspective of (budgetary) 
Resource, as well as the related lifecycle management, was investigated for the purpose 
of this project.  Figure 3 visually depicts the relationship between the five perspectives.  
The intent of this approach was to provide a balanced perspective during the front-end 
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Figure 3:  Characteristics of an R2C2 
2.1.2 User Perspective 
The user perspective would be segregated into two broad categories, namely the 
system owner and the system operator.  The R2C2 system stems from a need to bridge 
information capability gaps, as determined by the system owner.  These capability gaps 
formed the basis of the system owner perspective.  The system owner had articulated the 
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capability gap as information requirement.  In order for exchanges of meaningful 
information, the attributes and conduit of the information had to be defined.  In addition, 
the system owner needed to define the information security policies that could be 
implemented to mitigate the risk associated with the exchanges of information.  The 
system owner had the social responsibility to ensure that the system would not cause 
harm to the operators and the environment in the course of operation.  The design of the 
system had to take into consideration the quantity and relevant operational and technical 
experience of the operator.  This would subsequently affect the logistics support concept 
for the system.  The classification of the operator (military or nonmilitary and level of 
security clearance) would similarly impact the design considerations.  Well-designed 
interfaces between the system and the operator greatly enhance the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the operator in deployment. 
2.1.3 Mission Perspective 
 The developer had to understand the covertness and hostility of potential 
operations.  In addition, the nature of the operation, be it U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD), U.S. Government, or Coalition, would impact the solution for physical and 
information security.  The clarity of the mission’s objectives (explicitly stated objectives 
or sense and response objectives) would determine the decision support system 
requirement.  System risk management included the frequency of system failure and the 
impact of system failure for analysis.  The logistics support required to sustain the 
R2C2’s mission would be greatly determined by the duration of the operation. 
2.1.4 Environmental Perspective 
 The developers also had to understand the location of the deployment in order to 
determine the environmental factors.  With this knowledge, they could design the 
necessary protection against the effect of these environmental factors (e.g., rain, sand, 
dust, mud, snow, and extreme temperatures).  The environment might offer dependable 
solutions to the infrastructure and logistics support issues, e.g., replacement parts and 
accessories, power supply and communication network, and the local political and social 
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climate.  The trafficability of the environment would dictate the portability and packing 
configuration (shock and water proof), with consideration of the physical carrying limits. 
2.1.5 Technology Perspective 
 The project strategically employed existing technology to bridge the capability 
gaps.  Given the constraint of existing technology, the R2C2 team addressed two key 
issues, namely: 
• What would be the technology requirements? 
• What would be the technology available for deployment? 
The information requirement would need some form of database (DB) to contain the data.  
A DB template would be required to define the attribute of the information and 
information management suite would be needed to facilitate the operator to receive, store, 
process, and transmit information.  This suite, in addition to other physical security 
mechanisms, had to implement the necessary security policies.  The conduit for 
information transfer depended on the availability of communication means vis-à-vis the 
frequency and bandwidth requirement.  The user determined if the site dependent 
communication network (e.g., Global System for Mobile (GSM) Communication, Wi-Fi 
(IEEE 802.11), Wi-Max (IEEE 802.16)) was adequate or if a nonsite-dependent 
communication network (e.g., satellite communication such as Iridium phones or 
SATCOM radios) was necessary.  The network topology and footprint would determine 
the type of technology or protocol required.  The amalgamation of the above 
requirements translated to hardware requirements in terms of battery and power as well 
as the size of storage and speed of the processor.  An R2C2 team market survey was 
conducted on COTS technology to determine the current state of technology for 
immediate implementation. 
2.2 RESEARCH PHASE 
 To begin the capstone project, the team developed many questions to determine 
the purpose and functions of an R2C2.  The most important questions that the team had to 
address early were: why do we need an R2C2 and does a capability gap exist?  To answer 
these questions, the R2C2 team researched multiple articles from recent military 
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operations, military doctrinal and policy documents, and DJC2 JPO documents; 
interviewed SMEs and stakeholders; and observed on-going C2 exercises and 
demonstrations at NPS.  Journal articles, magazines, TV reports, and recent military 
documents provided many C2 lessons learned from the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami and 
Hurricane Katrina of 2005.  The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006 and Joint 
Publications captured strategic and operational C2 recommendations.  To understand C2 
concerns at the tactical level, the team interviewed stakeholders; SMEs in operations, 
networks, and communications; and NPS faculty and students who developed rapidly 
deployable Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) for Humanitarian Assistance and  
Disaster Relief (HA/DR).  The R2C2 team observed Tactical Network Topologies (TNT) 
and Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System (COASTS) exercises to 
learn about new technology and their limitations when employed.  Documents from the 
DJC2 JPO, such as the Capability Production Document (CPD) and the Broad Area 
Announcement (BAA), provided background and requirements for the DJC2 systems and 
initial requirements for the RRK. 
2.2.1 Lessons Learned 
The type of scenario, whether it is peacetime, tension, or war, dictates how the 
U.S. military, foreign forces, regional and international organizations (IOs), and  
nongovernmental (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) organize and 
collaborate.  Recent peacetime operations, such as HA/DR, have presented more of a 
challenge for the military because each are distinctive and require interaction with so 
many different organizations.  The military has many capabilities or “means” to offer 
during peacetime crisis response scenarios including C2, intelligence, planning, training, 
and logistics support, but are limited in the “ways” to accomplish the mission because 
they are not established within the crisis country or region. 
2.2.1.1 Boxing Day Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina 
Many reports circulated about the lack of interoperability between the 
military, local governments, IOs, and NGOs after the Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004 and 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  First responders faced technical problems when trying to 
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communicate due to the different types of radios, frequencies, and/or cell phone systems 
being utilized.  Different communication standards were not just a problem between the 
military and other organizations.  During Katrina, Louisiana parishes quickly discovered 
that local and state government personnel, including police, firefighters, and medical 
personnel, were communicating on separate radio systems and frequencies.  In addition to 
interoperable communications systems, both natural disasters lost critical infrastructure, 
such as power and communication towers, that compounded the problem and slowed 
relief efforts.  Local officials attempted to use satellite phones to coordinate relief efforts 
during Katrina, but the batteries quickly died and power was unavailable to recharge.5 
 Organizational problems and policy requirements also reduced the C2 
capabilities for relief operations.  Nevertheless, USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN quickly 
arrived to provide assistance after the Tsunami, although the proper links between 
military and nonmilitary agencies had not been established to allow the military to 
seamlessly conduct relief operations.  The United Nations (UN)-NGO compound was ten 
miles from the military operations center at the airfield making it difficult to coordinate 
between organizations.6  There were limited attempts to establish a Civil-Military 
Operations Center (CMOC) and the military chose not to move from the airfield to the 
already established UN-NGO compound.  Because they did not share the same 
workspace, military and nonmilitary organizations did not go out of their way to share 
information.  CDR Eric Rasmussen, MC, USN, observed the following during the 
Tsunami relief effort: 
Aboard the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln a team member and I attended 
the evening Flag Brief.  The information presented in the brief was 
extremely valuable and, in part, was unclassified.  The evening Flag Brief 
as an event, however, was classified Secret and so could not be attended 
by the thirty or so members of the United Nations-U.S.  Agency for 
International Development-NGO Interagency Assessment Team that had 
flown aboard that afternoon.7 
                                                 
5 David Perea, “Missed Signals,” Government Executive, February 2006, pp. 53-56. 
6 Eric Rasmussen, CDR, MC, USN, Report on “Assessing Information Support at the Civil-Military 
Boundary, Operation Unified Assistance in Indonesia,” 6-17 January 2005, p. 8. 
7 Ibid., p. 9. 
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The briefs contained security reports and local images that were critical to all 
organizations involved, but were not shared. 
2.2.1.2 Recommendations for HA/DR Operations 
Many articles and documents recommended early identification of 
interoperability problems through exercises and training in order to improve the 
effectiveness of HA/DR operations.  Response organizations, such as the military, need 
to address the hard science of hardware and software system interoperability and organic 
power alternatives and the soft science of developing relationships with other 
organizations to improve collaboration.  Conducting planning and exercises that focus on 
interagency and military cooperation are important to improving response time and 
building trust. 
Finally, we must continue to emphasize that our senior officials routinely 
participate in rehearsals, gaming, exercises, and simulations, as well as the 
Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group which has become a 
genuine leap forward in the effort to establish a sound system to 
incorporate crisis and deliberate planning across the interagency.8 
The Strong Angel exercise, held periodically in San Diego, includes the San Diego 
Emergency Operations Centers, city police, Emergency Medical Service (EMS), 
hospitals, medical directors, churches, radio stations, airports, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and military participants to address disaster relief.  The focus of the 
exercise in August 2006 will be on establishing communication links between the various 
players to increase situational awareness for a pandemic scenario.  All organizations 
participate in planning and execution to determine current capability gaps in technology, 
policy, and organizational structure.9 
                                                 
8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Pub 1 
(Washington, D.C.:  14 November 2000), VI-5, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Posture 
Statement before the 106th Congress Committee, On Armed Service, United States Senate,  
8 February 2000. 
9 Strong Angel III, San Diego, CA from 20-26 August 2006, Overview, Hosting Requirements, and 
Task List, 16 January 2006. 
20 
2.2.2 QDR 2006 
 The QDR 2006 captured current military missions and identified future missions 
that require new or improved capabilities.  The DoD shifted its focus from preparing for a 
single, predictable threat to planning for multiple irregular, asymmetric operations to 
support the Global War on Terror (GWOT).10  Recent wartime operations, such as 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and HA/DR 
efforts, such as the Boxing Day Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and the  
Philippine Mudslides, have introduced new challenges for the U.S. military and their 
ability to quickly and effectively respond.  The QDR emphasized the need for improved 
Joint C2 and Net-Centricity capabilities to defeat terrorist networks and defend the 
homeland in depth. 
2.2.2.1 Defeating Terrorist Networks and Defending the Homeland  
in Depth 
 To address the new strategic and operational challenges of GWOT and 
homeland defense, the U.S. military must cooperate and integrate with other services, 
government agencies, and coalition partners.  Many policies do not allow organizations to 
share time-critical information, limiting mission effectiveness.  In addition, the majority 
of systems are not interoperable, causing communication challenges.  The QDR 
identified that 
. . . the Department seeks to improve the homeland defense and 
consequence management capabilities of its national and international 
partners and to improve the Department’s capabilities by sharing 
information, expertise and technology as appropriate across military and 
civilian boundaries.11 
Recent events, involving U.S. troops, have covered the spectrum of military operations 
and have demonstrated the need to work with multiple organizations.  The QDR 
highlighted the need for Joint C2 to: 
• Defeat Terrorist Networks:  Joint coordination, procedures, systems, and 
when necessary, C2 to plan and conduct complex interagency operations. 
                                                 
10 Quadrennial Defense Review, 6 February 2006, p. vii. 
11 Quadrennial Defense Review, 6 February 2006, p. 29. 
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• Defend the Homeland in Depth:  Joint C2 for homeland defense and 
civil support missions, including communications and C2 systems that are 
interoperable with other agencies and state and local government.12 
2.2.2.2 Joint C2 
In addition to identifying a need for interoperable hardware and software for C2 
and communication systems, the military has emphasized the importance of organizing 
and training C2 personnel to improve mission effectiveness.  The Standing Joint Task 
Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ-CE) has recently been developed to rapidly 
deploy and provide Combatant Commanders with additional trained personnel to plan 
and execute crisis action operations with other agencies and coalition partners.   
SJFHQ-CEs are standing, coherent teams of “joint generalists” led by a flag or general 
officer.  They are full-time, Joint C2 elements within the RCC’s staff.  They are  
mission-tailorable and bring extensive knowledge of joint operations, the area of 
responsibility and its key issues and regional players, as well as an on-going 
understanding of the RCC’s theater perspective to the Joint Task Force (JTF).13  The 
SJFHQ-CE also supports the DoD’s vision of Net-Centricity to accelerate the  
decision-making process by harnessing the power of information connectivity by 
enabling critical relationships between organizations and people.14  The metrics that will 
determine SJFHQ-CE effectiveness are 1) the reliability of communications and 
information systems and 2) the ability to coordinate and foster trust among other 
organizations in the early stages of crisis response. 
2.2.3 Joint Publications 
To gain an understanding of how the military currently plans and operates for 
different missions and environments, the R2C2 team researched multiple Joint Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) documents.  These documents described the current 
U.S. military policy and doctrine based on lessons learned from previous operations.  
                                                 
12 Quadrennial Defense Review, 6 February 2006, p. 27. 
13 United States Joint Forces Command, “Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element,” 
http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_sjfhq.htm, 18 January 2006. 
14 Ibid., p. 58. 
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They also gave insight to challenges, capability gaps, and manning requirements 
associated with each mission.  The Joint Publications (JP) researched included:   
Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (JP 1), Doctrine for  
Joint Operations (JP 3), Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (JP 3-05), JTTP for 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (JP 3-07.5), and Interagency Coordination During 
Joint Operations, Vol. I, (JP 3-08).  The Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other 
Than War (MOOTW) (JP 3-07), 16 June 1995, and Joint Communications Systems  
(JP-06), 20 March 2006, specifically addressed our capstone project and are  
discussed below. 
2.2.3.1 Joint Doctrine for MOOTW (JP 3-07) 
JP 3-07 defined MOOTW as “the use of military capabilities across the 
range of military operations short of war.  These military actions can be applied to 
complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur 
before, during, and after war.”  JP 3-07 provided insight to the many considerations 
required for multinational operations including: set common goals, support unity of 
effort, improve national force through training and share common resources, learn and 
respect cultural differences, and ensure communication capability to respective coalition 
leaderships.15  The specific missions of MOOTW are discussed in depth later in  
this chapter. 
2.2.3.2 Joint Communications Systems (JP 6-0) 
In addition to defining current communication systems and terms, the  
JP 6-0 helped the R2C2 team determine, “who needs to exchange info with who.”  For 
planning and management, the JP 6-0 identified the need for modular packaging, 
interoperability, standardization, and commercial capabilities.  Since military operations 
rarely occur in the same location, the RCC should plan for the communications system to 
be built-up incrementally and with modular capability to address the specific mission 
needs.  Including common and standardized equipment can mitigate the risk of 
                                                 
15 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War,  
Joint Pub 3-07, Washington, D.C.:  19 June 1995, p. IV-4. 
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noninteroperable systems.  Commercial systems can ease logistic and training problems 
due to their availability and use worldwide, thereby reducing the amount of equipment 
needing to be transported into theater.16 
2.2.4 Interviews 
 The team conducted multiple interviews to determine potential stakeholders and 
system users, analyze current operational C2 issues, develop a problem statement, and 
determine project scope.  NPS faculty, students, and technical representatives provided 
insight into current operations and available technology.  The SMEs included  
U.S. Navy Special Warfare Officers, information professionals, and U.S. Marine Corps 
Communications Officers.  Their experience and expertise helped the team develop 
realistic scenarios and architectures.  NPS faculty from the Systems Engineering, 
Operations Research, Defense Analysis, Naval War College, Space Engineering, and 
Information Sciences Departments provided potential contact information and feedback 
on the proposed scenarios.  Multiple interviews with the primary stakeholder, DJC2 JPO, 
supplied the background of the DJC2 system, determined RRK mission and user 
requirements, and provided feedback on the SE products developed by the R2C2 team.  
Representatives from CENTCOM, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Air Force 
Contingency Response Group, and Net-Centric Warfare Division (N71) also submitted 
feedback on the generated scenarios. 
2.2.5 Current NPS C2 Efforts 
 There were many on-going C2 theses, projects, and exercises that the team 
investigated to gain test and evaluation insight and ideas for potential R2C2 architectures.  
HFN, COASTS, and TNT utilized COTS and emerging military technologies to develop 
C2 architectures and tested them in varying environments.  From their input, the  
R2C2 team gathered valuable metrics for communications, such as range, bandwidth 
(BW), power, and system integration, in an operational environment to supplement 
component specifications given by commercial companies or open sources. 
                                                 
16 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Communications System, Joint Pub 6-0, Washington, D.C.:   
20 March 2006, pp. III-18 - III-20. 
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2.2.5.1 COASTS and HFN 
 The coalition-based research program, COASTS, was “a field 
experimentation program designed to research low-cost, state-of-the-art, rapidly scaleable 
airborne and ground communications suites including various wireless network 
technologies.”17  COASTS students, faculty, and contractors have conducted multiple 
peacekeeping and law enforcement exercises with the Royal Thai Armed Forces in 
Thailand to demonstrate C2 technologies and foster coalition relationships.  COAST 
explored field experimentation research in:  wireless network technologies, ultra wide 
band technologies, GPS tracking, sensors, wearable computing devices, unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAV), situational awareness applications, persistent surveillance, and foreign 
language translation devices. 
 The HFN group included personnel and equipment involved with the COASTS 
program, but they focused on HA/DR response.  After the Boxing Day Tsunami, the 
HFN group quickly deployed to the devastated region to set-up Internet connectivity at a 
survivor camp and a graves registration center.18  Networks were established in five days 
and remained operational for five months. 
Users immediately took advantage of their newfound Internet 
connectivity.  NGO’s and IO’s found it convenient to communicate with 
the home office, media personnel were in direct contact with their 
colleagues and family members or friends of the hundreds of missing 
relatives/friends were able to send and receive pictures of those they were 
looking for.19 
Shortly after returning from Thailand, the HFN group deployed to  
Bay Saint Louis, Mississippi to provide Internet connectivity to local government 
departments.  From experiences learned in HA/DR, HFN students and faculty have 
improved FLy-Away-Kit (FLAK) prototypes to provide rapidly deployable network 
nodes.  The R2C2 team included FLAK concepts when evaluating current designs and 
analyzed its capability in Chapter 6.0. 
                                                 
17 Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System 2006 Overview. 
18 Report on Naval Postgraduate School response to the 2004 Southeast Asian Tsunami, “Hastily 
Formed Networks for Complex Humanitarian Disasters and Emergencies,” 25 July 2005, p. 3. 
19 Ibid., p. 10. 
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2.2.5.2 TNT 
TNT conducted quarterly exercises to demonstrate new technologies to 
support the near term needs of the warfighter.  NPS students and faculty, the  
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Advanced Technology Directorate, industry 
partners, and national laboratories participated in these exercises to identify “key gaps 
and deficiencies resulting from applications of advanced technology, particularly network 
communications, unmanned systems, and net-centric applications.”20  The R2C2 team 
observed experiments at Camp Roberts, California that involved:  high bandwidth 
communications for urban operations, convoy tracking using a controlled UAV,  
field biometrics, and field information analysis and collaboration. 
2.2.6 DJC2 Documents 
 The DJC2 JPO submitted a CPD in November 2005 for the Milestone C 
Decision.21  The CPD provided the R2C2 team with background information on the DJC2 
program and requirements for En Route, Early Entry, and Core systems.  All DJC2 
systems have similar functions, but are different in scale.  The En Route system supports 
a small C2 capability for 10-20 operator positions, while en route to a deployment site.  
The Early Entry system supports 20-40 operators and the Core system scales up to 
support a JTF of 60 operator positions.  To address the RCCs’ need for an even smaller 
system to rapidly deploy for crisis action response, the RRK was augmented as a new 
requirement into the CPD to 
. . . provide a state-of-the-art, agile, self-contained mobile, quick response 
capability with a small footprint; with secure access to mission critical 
information and support staff using satellite connectivity designed to serve 
up to four operators, expandable up to ten in group collaboration with 
reachback and is readily transportable on commercial or military aircraft.22 
The CPD contains initial RRK system requirements, but does not explain the type of 
missions or tasking that the system will perform. 
                                                 
20 TNT Overview Report, 2006. 
21 Milestone C is a DoD decision review used to evaluate products completed during the system 
development and demonstration phase and is required before starting the production and deployment phase. 
22 DJC2, CPD, OPNAV N71C2-688(1)-71-05, 30 November 2005, p. 8. 
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 Shortly after the CPD was released, the DJC2 JPO prepared a BAA for companies 
to submit proposals for the RRK.  The BAA included the technical parameters that the 
proposed systems must meet or exceed.  Some of the technical parameters cited in the 
BAA are not required in the CPD, which caused confusion for the JPO and the R2C2 
team.  The differences in the two documents, and how the R2C2 refined the 
requirements, are explained in Chapter 3.0. 
2.3 NEEDS ANALYSIS AND CAPABILITY GAPS 
 The need for a system such as the R2C2 has evolved as the military takes on an 
increased role in assisting countries in crisis action response or HA/DR operations.  As 
the military continues to become faster and lighter, it needs a rapidly deployable system 
that can conduct a wide range of missions from peacetime operations to full-scale war.  
The RCCs are tasked to deal with these issues as they arise, which is why, “The 2006 
QDR provides new direction for accelerating the transformation of the Department to 
focus more on the needs of Combatant Commanders.”23  This shift in focus generated the 
need for a standardized C2 collaborative system and construction of ad hoc C2 systems 
were no longer an acceptable practice.  Thus, the DJC2 JPO came into existence with the 
goal of developing a system that provides a seamless, shared information environment 
supporting Joint, Multinational, and Interagency operations.24 
Initial conceptual design of the DJC2 included three configurations of the scalable 
system:  En Route, Early Entry, and Core configurations.  Each configuration can be 
thought of as a different phase in the system.  The configurations increased in size, 
beginning with En Route and ending with the Core, and each was capable of being a 
stand alone C2 system.  After the JPO held a user’s feedback session with representatives 
from the RCCs, the requirement for a smaller system was proposed by EUCOM.  This 
proposal resulted in the RRK being supplemented into the CPD. 
Although EUCOM had expressed the want for a smaller C2 system, the  
R2C2 team’s SE approach further explored the customer’s actual need for such a system.  
                                                 
23 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006-04-17, p. 3. 
24 DJC2, CPD, OPNAV, N71C2- 688(1)-71-05, 30 November 2005, p. 2. 
27 
As a starting point for identifying a need, the requirements for the RRK were looked into.  
The R2C2 team researched the generation of requirements found within the DJC2 CPD 
and the RRK BAA to help define the need.  Correspondence was done with the Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N71C2, United States Joint Forces Command 
(USJFCOM) J88, and DJC2 JPOs to determine the basis for the outlined requirements.  It 
was discovered that user inputs from the RCCs drove the requirements generation. 
 For additional insight, interviews and discussions were held between the R2C2 
team and SMEs across the NPS campus.  These SMEs included service members in the 
Special Operations community, military faculty members with experience on the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels in a Joint environment, and civilian faculty 
members with similar experience or background.  They were asked to discuss some of 
their operational experiences, the type of equipment they used, what equipment was 
lacking, if any, and could an R2C2 help them out.  From these talks, an asset such as the 
R2C2 proved to be a much needed system to have for the range of operations the military 
encounters.  It was mentioned repeatedly that an R2C2 would have either made the 
mission easier or improved their capability. 
From their research and analysis, the R2C2 team identified a needs statement for 
the R2C2.  The statement was deduced to be:  The RCCs need a deployable, standardized 
C2 system with a small footprint to be utilized by first responders in Joint, Civil-Military, 
and Coalition operations. 
 Next, the capability gaps produced by the introduction of an R2C2 system were 
studied.  RCCs have existing systems that have similar functions to the R2C2 system; 
however, they were not standardized or interoperable across services or RCCs.  Current 
systems employed by the U.S. military were researched and a detailed comparison was 
done between the capabilities offered by current systems and the capabilities of the 
R2C2.  This involved analysis of not only the system capabilities of various equipment, 
but also the tactical employment and doctrine behind the use of the equipment. 
The R2C2 team discovered that the RCCs do not have standardized, common, 
interoperable, and rapidly deployable C2 capability to support Joint, Multinational, and 
Interagency Operations.  As mentioned earlier, ad hoc systems were commonplace for 
RCCs to implement when deploying C2 systems.  For instance, a particular RCC may use 
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one type of arrangement of equipment different than another RCC to do the same 
mission.  They also lack the modular and reconfigurable design to permit flexible 
addition of new capabilities with minimum interruption or standardized configurations 
for specific organization and echelon levels.  The ability to have a small system facilitate 
intelligence gathering and transmitting that information in a covert manner in hostile 
situations has also been identified as a gap in the current way the RCCs conduct business.  
These gaps have been identified as critical elements to the success of any small  
C2 system that has to be utilized by first responders. 
2.4 DETERMINING THE STAKEHOLDERS AND MISSIONS 
 As the principal organization responsible for the design and development of the 
RRK, the DJC2 JPO became the immediate stakeholder for the R2C2 team’s integrated 
project.  Mutual support by the R2C2 team and the DJC2 JPO ensured a constructive 
product for both parties.  Continuous collaboration with members of the JPO provided 
guidance to portions of the study.  This report and the analysis contained had been used 
to assist the SE efforts conducted by the DJC2 JPO for the RRK. 
 The research conducted by the R2C2 team spawned various interested parties 
throughout the NPS campus.  Through collaborative efforts with these groups, the R2C2 
project gained their support and interest.  These groups included faculty and students 
involved in COASTS, TNT, and HFN.  Input and assistance from the different groups 
provided valuable information to the technological aspect of the R2C2 study. 
2.4.1 Regional Combatant Commanders (RCCs) 
 The ultimate stakeholders for the R2C2 are the users.  In this case, the users for 
the R2C2 will be the RCCs.  The RCCs were chosen as the users for the R2C2 because 
the system was a subset of the larger DJC2 system.  The user’s feedback session, held by 
the JPO identified four potential users of the R2C2:  EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, PACOM, 
and CENTCOM.  As the study progressed, Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and 
SOCOM were added to the list of stakeholders.  Their addition was due to the lack of 
capabilities available for personnel responding to disaster relief situations such as 
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Hurricane Katrina.  All their inputs to the requirements, scenarios, and forecasted use of 
the R2C2 were critical in determining the scope of the R2C2’s capability. 
2.4.2 Missions of the R2C2 
 Having various stakeholders proved to be slightly more difficult than predicted 
because each RCC had specific missions and tasks for their particular AOR.  Standard 
military operations (i.e., war, NEO, and antiterrorism) did not vary between RCCs; 
however, research found that there were complexities and variances with the carrying out 
of region-specific missions that fell under their responsibility.  More specifically, factors 
such as weather, terrain, operating environment, and geopolitical climate contributed to 
the inconsistency between RCCs.  Designing a system that could meet all these missions 
proved to be beyond the scope of the study.  Therefore, from the number of military 
operations supported by the RCCs, different missions were chosen for examination.  
These scenarios were picked for their relevance to the RCC’s regions and their likeliness 
of occurrence.  More on scenarios development is covered in the next section. 
2.5 DETERMINING POTENTIAL SCENARIOS 
The RCCs need to be prepared for numerous missions that require different levels 
of C2 support and span different geographical regions.  These differing expectations or 
stresses on the role of the R2C2 must be studied in order to architect a system that best 
suits the requirements.  The process of predicting and listing all the possible scenarios is 
beyond the scope of this study.  Hence, rather than be prescriptive, we recommended the 
following two-pronged approach in our system engineering process: 
• Devise a methodology to analyze how different scenarios will stress  
the R2C2. 
• Apply this approach to the most probable scenarios that we have identified 
together with DJC2 JPO to test its relevancy. 
2.5.1 The Methodology – Scenario Stress Matrix 
We adopted a matrix comparison methodology in our analysis of the degree of 
stresses that different scenarios apply on the R2C2.  A matrix template was formed with 
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rows and columns for comparison.  The rows indicated the types of possible missions or 
scenarios that RCCs may encounter.  The columns were various considerations that may 
incur stresses on the R2C2 when it needs to be deployed. 
The types of possible missions should follow directly from the range of military 
operations that will be expected.  The best guidance was the Doctrine for  
Joint Operations,25 where this range was defined.  This has been reproduced in Table 1 as 
a reference and the terms “War” and “MOOTW” are defined below. 
 
 Military Operations 
General  
U.S. Goal Examples 




Deter War and 
Resolve 
Conflict 














Table 1:  Range of Military Operations 
War (Fight and Win).  In such cases, the goal is to “win as quickly and with as 
few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on 
terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies.”26  Deploying R2C2 in such scenarios would 
incur high risks and potential conflicts could be expected.  Hence, the appropriate level of 
security protection must be allocated to ensure the safety and success of the deployment. 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).  MOOTW are an aspect of 
military operations that focus on “deterring war and promoting peace.”27  These can be 
subdivided into either the involvement or noninvolvement of the use or threat of force. 
• MOOTW involving the use or threat of force.  The general goals of  
U.S. military operations during such periods are to support national 
objectives, deter war, and return to a state of peace.  Such operations 
involve a greater risk that U.S. forces could become involved in combat 
                                                 
 25 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0:  Doctrine for Joint Operations, Chapter 1, 
“The Strategic Context,” September 2001, p. I-2. 
26 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0:  Doctrine for Joint Operations, Chapter 1, 
“The Strategic Context,” September 2001, p. I-3. 
27 Ibid., p. I-3. 
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rather than operations conducted to promote peace.  This Period of 
Tension (POT) is often sensitive, as great efforts are placed in deterring 
any probable transition into a war.  Security requirement will also be high 
when deploying the R2C2 since hostile forces will be expected in the 
region.  Examples of such operations include combating terrorism, 
enforcement of sanctions, enforcing exclusion zones to prevent civil 
unrest, and NEO. 
• MOOTW NOT Involving the use or threat of force.  These operations 
occur in Peace time and do not usually involve combat, but there is 
potential for them to escalate into armed conflicts.  Hence, military forces 
deploying the R2C2 must always be prepared to protect themselves and 
respond to a changing situation.  Such operations include HA/DR, 
counterdrug operations, pandemic control, evacuation of noncombatants, 
and peacekeeping.  Such operations are often “Joint” in nature and most 
also involve multinational cooperation among different military forces  
and NGOs. 
With these categories of military operations defined, the amount of stress on 
deploying the R2C2 for each operation was analyzed based on a series of stress points.  
For our context, the Mission, User, and In Situ stress points represent the three categories 
of concerns that would affect the design of our R2C2 system.  Mission stress points refer 
to considerations that spin off from different mission requirements.  User stress points are 
the expectations of stakeholders and In situ stress points are more geographically related 
and are concerned more with the in-theater challenges facing R2C2 deployment.  A list of 
each stress point and corresponding considerations is provided in Table 2 for illustration. 
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No. Considerations Explanation Grade[(1)/(2)/(3)] 
Mission Stress Points   
1 Response Time How much time is available to set up the R2C2? 
Adequate (> 1 day)/ 
Urgent (< 1 day)/ 
Immediate (< 6 hrs) 
2 Probability of Occurrence 
What are the likelihood and frequency of this 
specific scenario occurring in the near future? Low/Medium/High 
3 Impact What is the impact if such an R2C2 is not deployed to the scenario site? 
Localize/Regional/ 
Widespread 
4 Prior Intelligence/ Information 
Is prior information about the area of operations 
critical in deploying the R2C2? 
Not required/ 
Bonus/Necessary 
User Stress Points     
5 User Expectation How detailed are the Inputs, Process, and Output? How frequently are they transmitted? Low/Moderate/High 
6 Stakeholders Who directly or indirectly need the information provided by the R2C2? 
Intra-agency/ 
Inter-agency/Coalition 
7 Complexity of Operation 
Who will be involved in using the system for 
regular updates and what skill set do they need? 
Small (2 px)/Medium 
(platoon)/Large 
(company and beyond) 
8 Duration  (stay + ops time) 
How long will the R2C2 be deployed (including 
stay time and operations time)? 
Short (< 1 week)/ 
Medium (< 1 month)/ 
Long (> 1 month) 
In Situ Stress Points     
9 Environment 
What is the environment (e.g., counter 
Information Assurance, troop safety, political 




What are the supporting elements (e.g., logistics, 
power supply, network maturity, communications 
availability) that will be available for usage? 
Supported/ 
Supplementary/Poor 
11 Trafficability How convenient is it to deploy/extract the R2C2 to/from the designated spot/location? 
Supported/ 
Supplementary/Poor 
12 Special Requirements 
Are there other special requirements to be met 
under this scenario?  If so, how extensive are these 
additional efforts or resources? 
None/Some/Lots of 
resources and efforts 
Table 2:  Scenario Stress Matrix Stress Points 
Referring to Table 2, the grading provides a pseudo-quantitative measurement of 
the stress level of each scenario, with respect to each consideration in the stress points. 
The larger the number, the higher the stress level that a particular consideration places on 
the specific scenario.  Referring to Appendix A, Scenario Stress Matrix, provides a useful 
and direct approach to compare the scenarios on the extent of each consideration 
affecting the R2C2 deployment.  However, it must be cautioned that there is little 
meaning in summing all the figures for each scenario to an eventual figure, as each 
scenario is unique and placed different emphasis and weights for each consideration.  To 
summarize, the Scenario Stress Matrix provides a qualitative appreciation between 
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scenarios and consideration (stress points) and the pseudo-quantitative measurement 
serves as a guide for comparison across scenarios for each consideration. 
2.5.2 Applications to Probable Scenarios 
 The preceding discussions proposed three probable types of missions:  War, POT, 
and Peace.  These form the basis of choosing the most common scenarios to deploy the 
R2C2.  To encompass the three areas, five missions were chosen to represent the 
flexibility of the R2C2.  The geographic locations were arbitrarily picked to support the 
missions for educational purposes only. 
 For the “War” missions, a potential deployment to Iran has been selected.  This is 
because Iran does pose a significant threat in the Middle East.  From lessons learned in 
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, implementation of an R2C2 was 
studied to gage the potential uses in a similar environment.  Conscious of the sensitivity 
in choosing Iran, the R2C2 team strictly considered the capabilities of an enhanced C2 
system not the probable tactics of U.S. forces in an Iranian conflict. 
 For the “POT” missions, possible civil unrest in Ivory Coast and counterterrorism 
operations off the southern Philippines are appropriate scenarios that exemplify the 
potential security tensions that such missions stress on the R2C2.  Aside from the 
“Peace” missions, these types of missions presented the next highest likelihood of 
operational use for the R2C2 system. 
 For the “Peace” missions, the R2C2 system supports disaster relief in  
Central America and pandemic control efforts in Singapore to emphasize the difficulties 
in remote C2, even in a peaceful environment.  Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina 
and the Boxing Day Tsunami provided insight into the complexities faced in aiding 
victims of natural disasters.  Collaboration of information between civil, military, and 
outside agencies in a coordinated effort proved very difficult.  Because of their 
probability of occurrence, the R2C2 team chose these two missions to further investigate 
the effectiveness of the R2C2. 
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2.6 MISSION SCENARIOS 
The scenario stress matrix guided us to approach the problem of identifying the 
RCCs’ scenarios systematically by comparing the scenarios individually with the 
potential stress points on the R2C2.  Using this methodology, we have come up with  
five probable missions to be focused on:  Pandemic, Disaster Relief, Counterterrorism,  
Civil Unrest, and Deployment. 
2.6.1 Pandemic Scenario 
Avian influenza (or “bird flu”) is a contagious animal disease that infects birds 
and some mammals.  Wild waterfowl, especially ducks, are a so-called natural reservoir 
of influenza viruses, including bird flu.  The birds carry the virus without displaying any 
symptoms of the disease and can spread the virus over great distances, while remaining 
healthy themselves.  The severe form of the disease, which is known as  
“highly pathogenic avian influenza,” is extremely contagious and has been the source of 
numerous epidemics among domesticated birds.28 
Although frequently deadly for poultry, past avian influenza viruses have rarely 
caused severe disease in humans.  However, in 1997, a highly pathogenic strain of bird 
flu known as H5N1 jumped from birds to humans during an outbreak among poultry in 
Hong Kong.  The 1997 event was notable for two reasons.  First, molecular studies 
indicated that the genetic makeup of the human and avian viruses were virtually identical, 
indicating direct transmission from birds to humans.  Second, the H5N1 virus caused 
severe illness with extreme mortality among humans:  of the 18 persons known to be 
infected, 6 died.  The outbreak ended after authorities slaughtered Hong Kong’s entire 
stock of poultry. 
Since the 1997 episode in Hong Kong, there have been several outbreaks of the 
H5N1 influenza around the world.  In 2004 and 2005, the H5N1 virus spread among 
poultry populations in Southeast Asia and affected Vietnam, Japan, Korea, Thailand, 
Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, and Malaysia.  More recently, the virus has shown up 
in Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Romania. 
                                                 
28 World Health Organization, Avian Influenza Report:  Assessing the Pandemic Threat (Geneva:   
World Health Organization, January 2005). 
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The number of human cases of the H5N1 virus has also grown.  Between  
January 2004 and August 2005, there were 112 human cases of H5N1 avian flu  
(in Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia) that resulted in 57 deaths.  Nearly all of 
the human cases resulted from close contact with infected birds.29  There is evidence, 
though, of at least one case of probable human-to-human transmission, and some experts 
suspect that a few other cases of human-to-human spread of the H5N1 virus  
have occurred. 
Based on the experience of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 
2003, a H5N1 flu pandemic is expected to spread widely across national borders very 
rapidly.  The most immediate impact of a pandemic would be a surge in demand for 
medical services, and keeping track of where the disease is and where it was going would 
be difficult.  As the pandemic progresses, international travel would dramatically decline, 
as people avoid avian flu “hotspots” and governments issued travel warnings.  Business 
confidence would be dented and economic activity generally slows down, thereby 
affecting the world economy.  As such, it is important that the U.S. work with its 
coalition partners in curbing the spread of the virus at the earliest possible opportunity. 
For our scenario, last month several workers in a printing company in Singapore 
were diagnosed with the H5N1 virus.  Investigations revealed that one of the workers had 
visited his family on a poultry farm the weekend before.  The other workers were not 
known to have any direct contact with live birds or poultry.  This could signal the first 
case of massive spread of the H5N1 virus variant that is capable of human-to-human 
transmission.  Shortly thereafter, a lady fell ill at the Tan Tock Seng Hospital in 
Singapore and was diagnosed with the H5N1 virus.  She made regular trips to regional 
countries for business and had just returned from a trip to Thailand.  Similarly, she has 
had no known contact with live birds or poultry during her trips.  As part of the national 
response plan, designated medical institutions in Singapore were put on alert30 and a 
                                                 
29 World Health Organization, Avian Influenza:  Assessing the Pandemic Threat (Geneva:   
World Health Organization, January 2005). 
30 News@AsiaOne Report, 5 April 2005, “Singapore outlines flu pandemic preparedness plans; to hold 





Contact Tracing Center was set up to monitor the development of the spread of the virus 
and to commence contact tracing, starting with the lady business traveler and establishing 
all the persons she came in contact with for the past week. 
2.6.1.1 Mission 
PACOM decided to deploy an R2C2 crew to Singapore to provide an 
accurate situational awareness picture on the spread of the H5N1 virus across  
Southeast Asia.  If required, this R2C2 crew could be later augmented to form a  
Regional Coordination Center.  Accurate monitoring of the situation is crucial in 
formulating an appropriate response plan and deploying mobile medical facilities  
where necessary.31 
The mission is to make use of all available information resources in order 
to compile an accurate situation awareness picture on the extent of the spread of the 
H5N1 virus in Southeast Asia.  Identifying and establishing contact with the various 
sources is critical in gaining the most accurate information for the RCC.  Figure 4 depicts 
the CONOPS for the Pandemic scenario.  Local communications, depicted by blue 
dashed lines, are made with the R2C2 scouts, as well as the police, fire, and medical 
departments of Singapore.  Red dashed lines illustrate long haul communications with 
PACOM, medical facilities supporting operations from the U.S., and an en route 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG).  An orange line represents the communications with 
NGOs, such as the Red Cross and WHO, which may possibly communicate locally  
or remotely. 
                                                 
31 “A Potential Influenza Pandemic:  Possible Macroeconomic Effects and Policy Issues,”  





Figure 4:  Pandemic Concept of Operations 
From Hawaii, the R2C2 crew is to deploy to Commander Logistics 
Western Pacific (COMLOGWESTPAC) in Singapore.  Once at COMLOGWESTPAC, 
the R2C2 crew will be supported with the necessary materials and facilities to conduct 
continuous operations.  A Civil-Military Operating Center (CMOC) will be established 
on base as a central hub for information gathering and distribution.  Access to the CMOC 
will be granted to civil authorities and NGOs on a need to know basis to regulate security 
and information trafficking. 
Upon establishing reachback capability, certain R2C2 scouts will be 
deployed to the major hospitals in Singapore.  From the hospitals, all data from reported 
H5N1 cases will be collected minus personal patient information.  This data shall include 
statistical information such as, but not limited to, the number of avian flu cases, rate of 
infections diagnosed, and death rate.  Also, virus imagery that is available is collected for 
transmission back to the U.S. for examination and DB building.  The majority of the data 
collected by the scouts is passable through voice situational reports (SITREPs) to the 
R2C2.  Imagery or bulk data information will be physically brought back to the CMOC 
for transmission via long haul connection. 
The remaining scouts will establish contact with agricultural officials to 
gather data.  Their responsibility will be to collect information on the poultry industry.  
38 
Reported poultry deaths and the regions of occurrence will be the primary information 
these scouts are gathering.  Their information will be passed through voice SITREPs as 
well.  To mitigate the chance of infection, the scouts are not authorized to visit any 
poultry farms.  Data collection will be limited to information reported to the  
agricultural offices. 
At the CMOC, the R2C2 operators will conduct collaborative efforts with 
local and NGO representatives.  The R2C2 will provide Internet access for the NGOs to 
collaborate with their parent organizations.  An increase in information sharing and 
coordinated efforts is the objective by providing this capability.  Bulk data and imagery 
collected by the scouts will be passed by the R2C2 from the CMOC to PACOM, ESG, 
and the U.S. medical facilities.  Coordination with the ESG and the R2C2 will be done in 
order to provide any medical support needed as identified in the information gathered by 
the scouts. 
2.6.1.2 Complexities 
 The small geographic region of Singapore promotes pockets of densely 
populated areas.  In heavily populated sections, the spread of the H5N1 virus has a higher 
probability of transmission.  Investigating a communicable virus across the region 
increases the risk of acquiring the virus for the R2C2 crew.  The utmost levels of 
precaution must be taken by the R2C2 crew and the various organizations they will be 
working with.  In addition, once their mission is complete, the crew members of the 
R2C2 must be quarantined as a preventative measure. 
 Depending on how the RCC decides to augment the R2C2 crew, typical 
crew members will have little to no medical experience.  Quick, informative training on 
H5N1 and safety measures will need to be done for the crew members prior to deploying.  
If the R2C2 crew is not augmented with medical personnel, support from local medical 
agencies will be critical.  Working through patient confidentiality clauses in order to gain 
access to data is an issue that needs to be further investigated.  Support from stateside 
medical facilities will be important to help guide the crew in their information collection. 
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2.6.1.3 Assumptions 
The first assumption made for the Pandemic scenario is that the R2C2 crew will 
be properly trained prior to deploying to Singapore.  If deployed without an augmented 
medical team, the R2C2 team will be collecting data with minimal medical backgrounds.  
Ancillary to the training, the crew will be adequately outfitted with the proper safety 
equipment and protective gear for dealing with the avian flu virus.  A full-blown outbreak 
has not yet occurred; however, for crew safety, all risk factors must be mitigated. 
That notification of deployment to the other in-theater agencies of 
Southeast Asian countries will be undertaken by PACOM is a second assumption.  The 
onset of a pandemic involves the probability of spreading to other countries.  In the 
region of Southeast Asia where Singapore is located, the relative closeness of her 
bordering nations is a concern for virus containment.  PACOM shall undertake the 
diplomatic responsibilities of coordinating with bordering nations and their  
health organizations. 
The third assumption made was that Singapore has no objection to the 
presence of additional U.S. forces in country in the joint combat against the pandemic 
outbreak.  Working together with the Singaporean government and military in a joint 
effort makes for an easier situational evaluation.  The U.S. and Singapore have 
maintained a healthy relationship diplomatically and militarily over the years.  The U.S. 
presence to support the people of Singapore would only strengthen the existing bond 
between the two nations.  The small footprint of military personnel also adds to the 
acceptance of the R2C2 crew. 
It is also assumed that COMLOGWESTPAC is self-sufficient in terms of 
infrastructure support such as power, network connectivity, and physical protection.  
Having the dedicated power supply, shelter, and infrastructure to operate within the 
CMOC improves the operational capability of the R2C2 system.  Also, the support of 
COMLOGWESTPAC to provide services enables the CMOC’s existence.  The purpose 
of the CMOC is to promote the collaborative and distributive efforts of multiple 
organizations outside of the military.  Providing this capability will show the  
Singaporean Government and other nations of Southeast Asia the level of commitment of 
the U.S. Government in the region. 
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2.6.2 Disaster Relief Scenario 
El Salvador sits on an active fault line that produces an average of two 
earthquakes a year registering over magnitude five.32  In the next 20 years, there is a 50% 
(±30%) probability that San Salvador, El Salvador will have an earthquake of the 
magnitude 7.75 ± 0.3.33  The red circles shown in Figure 5 depict earthquakes registering 
over magnitude five near San Salvador and along the coast since 1980.  Though 
earthquakes are frequent, those that measure above magnitude six cause immediate 
devastation to the country’s infrastructure and significant loss of life.  The last major 
earthquakes in January and February 2001, measuring 7.6 and 6.6 Mw, killed  
1,259 people and destroyed 149,563 homes.34 
 
Figure 5:  Earthquake Epicenters Around El Salvador Since 198035 
                                                 
32 U.S. Geological Survey, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/regional/world/central_america/density.php.  
Last accessed in March 2006. 
33 Randall A. White, “Seismic History of the Middle America Subduction Zone Along El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Chiapas, Mexico:  1526-2000,” Manuscript accepted 16 June 2003, 
http://www.gsajournals.org/gsaonline.  Last accessed in March 2006. 
34 Red Cross Red Crescent Operations Update, http://www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf_appeals.pl?01/020118.pdf.  
Last accessed in March 2006. 
35 Google Earth, Copyright 2006, Europa Technologies, Image Copyright 2006 Terrametrics.   
Last accessed on 5 April 2006. 
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This earthquake scenario is similar to the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami that brought 
about a new sense of awareness regarding disaster relief.  It was massive in scale and 
required relief operations that could match it in terms of size, complexity, and response.  
Although this experience has set new benchmarks for international cooperation, the need 
to have better coordination and information sharing and to operate in the field in a 
sustainable manner cannot be overemphasized. 
International organizations and the U.S. are obliged to provide and offer 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to states in need.  The desired outcome of the 
provided aid includes restoring social stability in the affected state.  Even more so than 
social instability, political instability in disaster regions may spill over to neighboring 
nations.  The greater the disaster, the greater the chance of political instability arising.  
Again, by providing aid to a state in need, IOs and the U.S. can speed the return to 
normalcy and help avert any potential economic downturn. 
 The approach to disaster relief can be categorized by three critical states:   
Disaster Strike, In-Theater Assistance, and Normalcy, going through two transition 
phases of Deployment and Reconstruction, with the eventual effect of capability build up.  
The event that triggers the entire relief effort is when disaster strikes, following which, 
relief efforts will be provided through the deployment of teams to render assistance at the 
relief sites (In-Theater Assistance).  The objective is, of course, to bring the disaster-hit 
regions back to normalcy as soon as possible. 
The core processes involved in this Deployment phase are impact analysis, 
scoping of relief efforts, and capabilities preparations specifically for resources and 
logistics.  Impact analysis focuses on assessing the extent of damages from the 
unforeseen disaster, with reference to environmental factors, and also through constant 
feedback from the progress at the disaster sites.  With the analytical results, the range and 
depth of relief support will be determined.  A comprehensive plan is useless without the 
appropriate implementation.  Hence, it is very important to step up relief preparations to 
ensure the availability, dependability, and capabilities of the resources provided.  Finally, 
timely logistics support and transport of the necessary resources to the disaster sites are 
also critical to the relief efforts.  Through in-situ insertion of an R2C2 crew to monitor 
the environment, we will be able to attain the level of time critical awareness. 
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It is important to appreciate that social and economic reconstructions are the focus 
in this Reconstruction phase.  Economic reconstructions will focus on the “hardware” 
aspects, concentrating on building infrastructures that support basic needs.  Social 
reconstructions tackle the “heartware” of the victims by providing them with moral 
support and counseling through this difficult and sensitive period.  If there is no 
established communication system being setup, the R2C2 will continue to be the source 
of information gathering to aid decision makers in the journey to normalcy. 
2.6.2.1 Mission 
A U.S. military Forward Operating Base (FOB) is located at the  
El Salvador International Airport, located approximately 25 miles southeast from densely 
populated San Salvador.  The FOB supports a small detachment of counterdrug air assets 
and supporting staff.  In our scenario, a magnitude 8 earthquake strikes between  
San Salvador and the FOB, devastating the region and triggering massive landslides.  
Power and local communications are disrupted and major roads are impassable.  
SOUTHCOM has lost communications with the FOB and the U.S. Embassy and has 
ordered an R2C2 crew to deploy to the region to determine the status of the FOB 
personnel and provide disaster relief assistance. 
Figure 6 depicts the CONOPS for this scenario.  The blue lines represent 
local communications between the scouts and the R2C2 and the red lines represent long 
haul communications back to the RCC or the ESG.  Unable to contact the FOB or the 
Embassy, SOUTHCOM alerts an R2C2 crew, consisting of intelligence personnel, 
communication technicians, and scouts, to prepare for operations in El Salvador.  After 
circling and taking pictures of the El Salvador International Airport, the military 
helicopter determines a suitable landing site and drops off the R2C2 crew.  The  









Figure 6:  Disaster Relief CONOPS 
Initially, no power is available at the airport, so organic power sources 
transported by the R2C2 crew are used.  Voice and data communication checks are 
established with the R2C2 and SOUTHCOM and the R2C2 and the scouts.  The initial 
situation report (SITREP) to SOUTHCOM includes the status of the FOB personnel, 
video clips or pictures of the coastline and the airport, and immediate first aid requests. 
The R2C2 crew starts relocating the scouts to the San Salvador 
fairgrounds, the Embassy in La Libertad, and the Port of Acajutla located approximately 
20, 25, and 35 miles away, respectively, from the airport.  After the 2001 earthquakes, 
local agencies, International Organizations, and NGOs assembled at the fairgrounds to 
organize the relief effort.  The scouts assigned to the fairgrounds will help establish a 
CMOC and report on search and rescue requirements, medical needs, local population 
morale, and physical security updates.  As critical pictures of the devastated region 
become available from the RCC, scouts will provide these images to the CMOC.  The 
scouts assigned to the Embassy will report on the status of Embassy personnel and 
equipment, work to restore Embassy communications, and help the Embassy execute the 
natural disaster plan.  The last scout team will travel to the Port of Acajutla to determine 
port damage and security for the ESG.  The ESG is en route, carrying relief supplies, and 
is expected to arrive in five days.  The ESG has many air assets to provide the much 
needed logistic support to deliver supplies and transport evacuees. 
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During the first 24 hours of the operation, the scouts are reporting hourly 
to the R2C2 and the R2C2 is reporting bi-hourly to the RCC.  At the beginning of the 
second day, the FOB personnel are able to provide mobile generators used by the aircraft 
and support equipment to power the R2C2.  Throughout the remainder of the operation, 
SITREPS continue bi-hourly from the scouts to the R2C2 and reports to the RCC and 
ESG are sent three times a day. 
2.6.2.2 Complexities 
This is a time critical surge operation that requires sudden and massive 
support. As a result of the sudden congregation of large amounts of resources (manpower 
and materials) in a haphazard manner, the relief operations are constantly subjected to 
uncertainties from the unfolding situation.  During the Tsunami relief operation, over  
40 countries and 700 NGOs contributed in various ways such as providing manpower, 
supplies, and pledges of funds for the relief and reconstruction work.  Coordination 
among the various parties was a major challenge during the Tsunami and will be a 
challenge in our scenario.  Potential tension may arise between civilian and military 
organizations due to different requirements, expectations, and operating norms.  The  
U.S. military must patiently work with the civilian organization leading the disaster relief 
to ensure effective and efficient use of military resources. 
Physical security currently poses a challenge to the U.S. military, visitors, 
and locals in El Salvador.  The U.S. Embassy considers El Salvador a critical crime-
threat country.  Armed assaults, carjackings, and kidnappings, as well as petty crimes, are 
prevalent throughout El Salvador.36  There is potential for civil break down after a natural 
disaster and criminals might hijack the relief supplies or harm relief personnel. 
The operating environment will be difficult because the infrastructure 
(e.g., communications, water, sanitation, and power supplies will likely be devastated.  It 
will be difficult to determine the best logistic routes due to road destruction and potential 
physical threats from looters.  Power grids will be damaged and gas needed for 
generators will be difficult to find. 
                                                 
36 United States Department of State, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1109.html.  Last 
accessed in March 2006. 
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2.6.2.3 Assumptions 
Three assumptions have been made for this scenario:  1) The  
El Salvadoran military will provide transportation for the scouts; 2) Generator power is 
available after the first day of operations; and 3) The ESG is en route and expected to 
arrive in five days.  Since the El Salvadoran military has a base at the  
International Airport, it is assumed that they would be able and willing to provide 
transportation to the scouts and provide local protection as required.  Since the FOB 
utilizes gas-powered generators to power aircraft on the deck and support equipment, the 
second assumption—that the R2C2 can utilize this power source after the first day of 
R2C2 operations—was determined.  Though gas will be scarce, there will likely be 
enough gas at the airport to power the generators.  The final assumption is based on the 
Navy’s quick reaction in deploying USS LINCOLN to Southeast Asia to provide disaster 
relief after the Tsunami.  For this scenario, an ESG based in San Diego quickly stocks 
disaster relief equipment and supplies and transits down to El Salvador in five days. 
2.6.3 Counterterrorism Scenario 
The most southern province of Basilan in the Philippine Islands (Figure 7) has 
been devastated by terrorism for many years.  A significant reason behind the terrorism 
against the government is due to inequality toward the Muslim community.  Muslims 
comprise 71% of the population in the southern provinces; however, the Christian 
population owns over 75% of the land and the Chinese control 75% of the businesses.  
This region is surrounded by oceans, rich land, and untouched forest, yet over 75% of the 
food consumed is imported from neighboring provinces.  Although food is grown in the 
region, it is largely cultivated for export. 
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 was passed to distribute the 
land in the region; however, the Muslim population was again over looked, resulting in 
family feuds and clan conflicts.37  The inequality toward the Muslim population and the 
influx of Christians from the north, forcing the Muslims to be a minority in their own 
land, resulted in the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), whose 
                                                 
37 Jose Toresse, Jr., “Basilan:  Abu Sayyaf’s Birthplace,” ABS-CBN News Report, http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/images/news/microsites/abusayyaf/basilan.htm.  Last accessed in February 2006. 
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purpose was to develop an independent Muslim nation.  The MNLF eventually 
negotiated a peace settlement with the Philippine Government; however, one group did 
not agree with the conditions of the settlement and separated from the MNLF, forming its 
own organization, which became the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).  The initial goal of the 
ASG was to separate from the Christian majority, but when the ASG demanded 
separation and was ignored, terrorism began around the country with the goal of 
promoting an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.38 
The U.S. State Department formally designated Abu Sayyaf a terrorist 
organization in 1997, which enabled the U.S. Government to freeze any assets the group 
had in the United States.39  Aburajak Janjalani was leading the terrorist factions, but after 
his death in 1998, his brother Khadafi Janjalani became the group’s leader.  The ASG has 
been funded by kidnapping ransoms and extortion; one such incident being the  
“April 2000 kidnapping of Western tourists and a resort employee in Malaysia. . . 
[which] ended in a multimillion-dollar ransom payment negotiated by Libya and 
reportedly paid by European governments.”40 
After the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the  
United States became very involved in the fight against terrorism.  The United States 
ordered SOCOM to send troops to the Philippines to assist in the training of their military 
forces.  U.S. special operations forces (SOF) have been in the Philippines conducting 
exercises on Basilan Island with the Philippine military and constantly training and 
preparing them for combat in the fight against terrorism. 
While conducting exercises in the Philippines, U.S. SOF received intelligence of 
increased Abu Sayyaf activity, indicating that the group may be planning a terrorist attack 
in Manila and that a high ranking terrorist leader is possibly in the region (in a camp near 
Buriasan; see Figure 7).  The Philippine Government was made aware of the intelligence 
report and requested U.S. support to survey and possibly eliminate the terrorist leader. 
                                                 
38 Jose Toresse, Jr., “Basilan:  Abu Sayyaf’s Birthplace,” ABS-CBN News Report, http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/images/news/microsites/abusayyaf/basilan.htm.  Last accessed in February 2006. 
39 C.S. Kuppuswamy, “Abu Sayyaf:  The Cause for the Return of U.S. Troops to Philippines,”  
South Asia Analysis Group Paper, No. 417, 28 February 2002. 
40 Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorism:  Question and Answer, Abu Sayyaf Group:  Philippine 






Figure 7:  Philippine Islands 
2.6.3.1 Mission 
In the continuing fight against terrorism, the United States and the 
Philippine Government agreed to tackle terrorism in the Philippines head on.  A team of 
U.S. and the Republic of the Philippines (RP) SOF left the Balikatan exercises being 
conducted on Basilan Island and were assigned this coalition mission.  The SOF team, 
deploying with the C2 capabilities of the R2C2, will covertly move from Basilan Island 
to Mindanao Island (the location of the terrorist camp) by small boat.  SOF team 
members will conduct surveillance in and around Buriasan and pass situation awareness 
data to the R2C2 operators.  From the operators, the collected data will be transmitted 
back to SOCOM.  Due to the high level of secrecy involved in this mission, the SOF will 
inconspicuously collect and transmit Human Intelligence found in Buriasan to SOCOM.  
Utilizing their Filipino counterparts as translators, the U.S. SOF team is able to gather the 
necessary intelligence from the local population of Buriasan. 
After the Abu Sayyaf training camp is located near Buriasan, the coalition 
SOF team will conduct surveillance.  Scout members of the team will deploy and 
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surround the camp to gain the most information possible.  Radio transmissions will be 
made between the scouts and the R2C2 to provide intelligence.  Digital imagery will be 
taken by the scouts of the camp whenever possible.  Identifying the High Value Target 
(HVT) is their primary mission.  Subsequent to that, intelligence on camp size, training 
tactics, and personnel size is gathered.  Live video, which positively IDs the HVT in the 
camp, will be transmitted back to SOCOM when available, and then the team will await 
confirmation and follow-on orders.  Figure 8 represents the CONOPS for this mission.  
The blue lines indicate the local communication between the scouts and the R2C2.  The 




Figure 8:  Counterterrorism Concept of Operations41 
2.6.3.2 Complexities 
In order to carry out its missions, the U.S.-RP team will have to covertly 
move from Basilan to Buriasan without alarming the High Value Target (HVT) in the 
country.  The short timeline the team has to complete the mission forces them to move 
                                                 
41 Google Earth, Copyright 2006 Europa Technologies, Image Copyright 2006 Terrametrics.   
Last accessed on 25 May 2006. 
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quickly, which may increase the chance of mistakes.  The actual location of the terrorist 
camp is not known at the start of the operation.  Gaining that information from the 
citizens of Buriasan without someone notifying local terrorists adds difficulty to the 
mission.  This mission is designed to be carried out during nighttime, which places an 
added strain on the system with regard to power, as it cannot use a generator; the 
operation’s length is considerable; and the team can only carry so many batteries with 
them.  The R2C2 system will have to be supplied with organic power that is deployed 
with the system, where it can be plugged into an inorganic power supply.  The U.S.-RP 
team would have to covertly locate and monitor the activities of the terrorist camp, and 
afterwards be able to transmit that information to SOCOM within the allotted power and  
bandwidth requirements. 
Mobility of the team will be an issue.  Since the location of the camp is 
unknown, the U.S.-RP team may have to solicit transportation from locals in order to 
arrive at the objective in a timely manner before the HVT leaves the area.  Failure to 
locate the HVT before he leaves the area will result in mission failure, even though the 
team may still be able to foil the plans of the terrorists.  The covert movement of scouts 
to and from the R2C2 takes time, and the more they have to move to pass data, the 
greater the risk of alerting the terrorist camp to their presence. 
2.6.3.3 Assumptions 
 The first assumption is that the intelligence received by the  
U.S. Government is credible and accurate, giving the U.S.-RP credible information from 
which to operate.  Secondly, it is assumed that the Philippine Government supports the 
coalition team and their efforts.  Thirdly, it is assumed that the Buriasan locals are 
cooperative with U.S.-Filipino forces.  Our fourth assumption is that the Buriasan locals 
are also aware of terrorist activities and know where the terrorist training camp is located 
and they can confirm the arrival of a potential HVT in the region.  The final assumption 
is that the U.S.-Filipino forces have been conducting exercises utilizing the capability of 
the R2C2 in the Balikatan exercise; therefore they are well versed in its capabilities and 
how to operate it. 
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2.6.4 Civil Unrest Scenario 
 For over three decades, after its independence from France in 1960, Côte D’Ivoire 
(Ivory Coast) was a model of political stability and economic prosperity under its then 
President, Felix Houphouet-Boigny.  It avoided many of the pitfalls that plagued other 
African nations that experienced the difficulties of sovereignty. 
Ivory Coast (Figure 9) is separated by religious principles with a predominantly 
Muslim north and a predominantly Christian South.  Houphouet-Boigny, with his strong 
leadership abilities, managed to unite the country under a single government.  During his 
tenure, he forged close political ties with the West (United States), which sheltered  
Ivory Coast from the crises associated with assorted military uprisings and  
Marxist experimentations that characterized other countries in the region.   
Houphouet-Boigny’s leadership made it possible for the Ivory Coast to focus on 
stabilizing its economy, thereby attracting investors from foreign countries and making it 
the largest producer of cocoa not only in the region, but in the world. 
 
Figure 9:  Ivory Coast on the Continent of Africa 
 After the death of Houphouet-Boigny in 1993, Henri Konan Bedie became his 
successor.  He faced an array of problems “including economic pressure from falling 
world market prices for cocoa and coffee, internal corruption that steeply reduced foreign 
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aid and a mounting political opposition.”42  During his tenure, Mr. Bedie implemented 
laws that prevented his then rival, Allassan Ouattare, from running in the presidential 
elections.  In addition, he also instituted a policy that prevented anyone of foreign 
parentage, (i.e., both parents not of Ivorian descent, and who have never held nationality 
of another country) from running in presidential elections. 
. . . [the] Supreme Court disqualified all of the candidates from the two major 
parties by establishing the criteria that all candidates must have two Ivorian 
parents and never held a nationality of another country.  This barred Ouattara and 
his Rally of Republicans party, or Rassemblement des Republicaines (RDR), from 
running after courts declared that his mother was from Burkina Faso.43 
In 1999, a coup led by Army General Robert Guei overthrew the  
Bedie government.  General Guei then formed his own government, promising to hold 
open elections in 2000; he also self-appointed his own Supreme Court.  The court, 
selected by General Guei, upheld Mr. Bedie’s policy regarding participation in the 
country’s presidential elections. 
 Peace negotiations got underway in the beginning of April 2005, but October 
2005 brought about additional frustrations for the rebels in the north when  
President Gbagbo cancelled the elections and invoked a law which he said allowed him to 
remain in office.  The African Union recommended that Mr. Gbagbo stay in office an 
additional 12 months, and urged him to appoint a prime minister—acceptable to all 
parties to reduce tensions—with executive powers.44 
 For the R2C2 scenario, the failed peace negotiations between the rebels and the 
government led to presidential elections being canceled for the second consecutive year, 
and President Gbagbo’s term being extended another 12 months.  This decision further 
enraged the rebels who decided to take matters into their own hands.  They launched an 
attack against the Gbagbo government with the intent of overthrowing it.  As the fighting 
intensified, the rebels overwhelmed the UN/French peacekeeping forces patrolling the 
zone of confidence that separates the northern rebels from the southern government 
                                                 
42 Global Security.org, Ivory Coast Conflict, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ivory-
coast.htm.  Last accessed in February 2006. 
43 Global Security.org, Ivory Coast Conflict, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ivory-
coast.htm. 
44 BBC News, “Country Profile:  Ivory Coast,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/ 
country_profiles/1043014.stm.  Last accessed in February 2006. 
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controlled regions, forcing them to retreat.  The rebel forces began a surge to the south 
toward the capital city of Yamoussoukro.  As the rebels closed in on Yamoussoukro, the 
UN/French forces continued to fall back to the south.  To help combat the rebel forces, 
the UN and Ivory Coast Government reached out to the U.S. for military assistance. 
2.6.4.1 Mission 
The growing tensions in Ivory Coast forced the French/UN forces to reach 
out to the United States to assist in the peacekeeping mission.  The United States agreed 
to assist in the Civil Unrest operation, while conducting a NEO of the U.S. Embassy.  
U.S. military forces, with the C2 capability of an R2C2, will deploy two R2C2 crews:  
one in Yamoussoukro and the other in Abidjan in order to conduct surveillance in the 
rebel-held north (Yamoussoukro) and execute a NEO at the U.S. Embassy in the 
government-controlled southern region (Abidjan) of the country.  The collected 
information will be transmitted via the R2C2 system, along with Situation Assessment 
data, to the RCC, depicted by the red line in Figure 10.  The crews will simultaneously 
determine the political and social climate.  These R2C2 crews must establish 
communications with the UN headquarters, the French, the other R2C2 crew and scouts 
in their region, as seen by the blue lines in Figure 10.  Video imagery must be transmitted 
to the RCC that gives positive identification of rebel forces’ headquarters and any top 
rebel force leaders.  Digital imagery that identifies evacuation routes in Abidjan for NEO 
operations must be transmitted to the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) conducting the 





Figure 10:  Civil Unrest CONOPS 
2.6.4.2 Complexities 
In order to carry out this mission successfully, the northern R2C2 crew 
will have to covertly move to Yamoussoukro and set up the system.  Protecting the  
R2C2 system and personnel from the rebels will require additional personnel and 
protective equipment (i.e., dedicated force protection personnel and weapons for the 
system’s operators).  Placing the system in Yamoussoukro, where the UN/French troops 
are expected to see the most rebel activity, adds a calculated risk to the mission of the 
R2C2 crew in the north.  The actual location of the rebel leaders is not known and 
gaining that information from the local population without someone notifying the rebel 
factions adds difficulty to the mission.  The expected availability of power at the  
U.S. Embassy, adds more complexity to the operation.  The R2C2 system will have to be 
deployed with organic power, be it batteries or other power sources, as reliable power 
may not available at the Embassy or in Yamoussoukro. 
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Mobility of the team will be an issue.  Since the optimum location is 
unknown, the northern R2C2 crew may have to solicit transportation from locals, the UN, 
or French troops in order to arrive in Yamoussoukro and set up in a short amount of time. 
2.6.4.3 Assumptions 
 The first assumption is that an ESG is en route to the region to provide a 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) for the NEO.  Second, the Abidjan R2C2 crew will be 
able to communicate with the en route ESG.  Third, the ESG will be prepared to provide 
information to support the R2C2 crews.  Fourth, adequate to limited infrastructure is 
available for R2C2 operations in the city of Yamoussoukro. 
2.6.5 Deployment Scenario 
 The Middle East is largely populated with an Islamic majority; however, Israel is 
one nation in the region with a large Christian population, and it has the backing and 
support of the United States.  Along with supporting Israel, the United States has made 
significant efforts to promote democracy throughout the Middle East.  Certain countries 
in the region have shown their disapproval of U.S. involvement there and its assistance  
to Israel. 
 The U.S.-lead War on Terrorism has sparked more hatred and rage among the 
Islamic community in the Middle East and around the world against the United States.  
After Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, some of the countries 
in the Middle East vowed to rid the region of American influence.  Iran, with its highly 
sophisticated weaponry, is promoting anti-U.S. sentiments among other Islamic nations.  
Iran has publicly criticized the United States for their continued military presence in the 
region and vowed to eliminate the U.S. presence in the region by any means necessary. 
 For over two decades, in search of nuclear weapons, Iran has secretly conducted a 
uranium enrichment program in direct violation of International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) safeguards.45  Iran does posses the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the 
                                                 
45 John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence, “Threats, Challenges, and Opportunities for 
the U.S.,” Annual Threat Assessment to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2 February 2006. 
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Middle East46 and is known for its use of ballistic missiles as an integral part of strategic 
deterrence and, if necessary, retaliation.  Within its inventory, Iran already has the 
capability of deploying a nuclear weapon by the missiles shown in Table 3.  The danger 
of combining a nuclear weapon with its ballistic missiles creates a serious threat to the 
United States and to the nations bordering Iran. 
Name Range Payload Fuel Source Circle Error Probable (CEP) Status 
Scud B 










700 kg Liquid North Korea N/A Deployed 









Shahab 4 Between 1,800 and 2,000 km 
Approximately 





N/A – Not Available         
Table 3:  Iran’s Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missiles 
Intelligence has revealed that Iran also has ties with terrorist groups.  Because of 
this they have been sanctioned as a State Sponsor of Terrorism by the United States.  In 
their efforts to disrupt peace between Israel and Palestine, Iran has been a long time 
supporter of Hezbollah in Lebanon, a group which is responsible for more American 
deaths than any other terrorist organization apart from al-Qaeda.47  During the 
development of a democratic state in Iraq, Iran has played a problematic role in 
supporting extremist groups and sectarian militias.  Anticoalition efforts have been 
carried out by these groups and militias through the supplying of funds, weapons, 
training, and explosives from Iran.  Iran is also responsible for at least some of the 
increasing lethality of anticoalition attacks in 2005, by providing Shia militants with the 
capability to build improvised explosive devices (IEDs) with explosively formed 
projectiles similar to those developed by Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah.48 
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 In the continuing fight against terrorism and the increase in tensions 
caused by Iran in the region, preparations have been made to conduct operations inside of 
Iran’s borders by U.S. and coalition forces.  No longer tolerant of the U.S. presence in the 
area, Iran has publicly threatened the U.S., focusing on harming American interests in the 
region.  Knowing Iran’s threat is valid, the United States initiates operations within the 
country.  Swiftly and overwhelmingly, U.S. and coalition troops are able to secure the 
coastal city of Būshehr as well as Shirāz, approximately 100 miles to the northeast, 
within five days.  These two cities ensure a safe logistics line to and from the  
Persian Gulf.  With the two cities secure, CENTCOM deploys a single R2C2 crew into 
the operational area (OPAREA). 
 For the wartime deployment scenario, the R2C2 system will take on two 
missions.  The primary mission of the R2C2 crew will be to determine a staging area for 
the RCC to set up its DJC2 core.  Their secondary mission is to aid the local command 
element of the ground forces by enhancing the commander’s C2 function, creating a more 
robust capability.  In order to accomplish these missions, scouts will be deployed as part 
of the team to augment the R2C2 operators.  Figure 11 depicts the CONOPS for the 
R2C2 crew during their missions.  As seen, the red line depicts the reachback link to the 
RCC.  The blue lines in the CONOPS represent the local communication provided by the 
Local Suite between the scouts, R2C2, and ground forces.  Together, these missions 
stress the R2C2 system’s ability to gather situational assessment, process gathered 




Figure 11:  Deployment CONOPS in Iran 
 Once local communications have been established between the R2C2 and 
the scouts, the scouts individually deploy with squad-sized infantry units to various 
locations throughout the city and its surrounding areas.  Through voice communications, 
scouts will report back the position of any potential staging areas for a DJC2.  Digital 
imagery of the possible locations will be taken by the scouts.  All imagery taken by the 
scouts will be physically uploaded back at the R2C2.  Transmission of various factors 
such as imagery, infrastructure, accessibility, protection, and habitability of different 
locations will be sent to the RCC for their approval via hourly SITREPs.  A second 
message with only information pertaining to DJC2 sites will be sent to a construction 
battalion in the OPAREA who is responsible for the DJC2 staging area.  This process will 
continue until a suitable site has been selected by the RCC, at which time the scouts will 
then be directed to secure that location. 
 Concurrently, as the scouts try to find an area for the DJC2 to operate in, 
they will report SITREPs to the R2C2 to build situational assessment.  BDA will be done 
on the ground by the scouts through their digital imagery ability.  The steady flow of 
information from the scouts raises the level of awareness in the AO.  The information 
being reported back to the R2C2 is then shared with the ground element’s commander 
and reported to the RCC.  The software tools available on the R2C2 provide the RCC and 




In order to carry out its missions, the R2C2 crew will first have to 
integrate with the ground forces already in Shirāz.  Dedicated ground transportation from 
the coastline to the city of Shirāz will be necessary.  Transportation is not an organic 
asset of the R2C2 system and will need to be provided by another source.  Seamless 
integration will allow for a better COP for the ground commander, protection for the 
R2C2 crew, and a power supply for the R2C2.  The scouts would be dependent on ground 
troops for force protection.  Availability of dedicated troops to patrol with the scouts may 
be limited.  Scouts could be augmented to scheduled patrols to mitigate this problem; 
however, mission objectives for the patrols and the scouts may be conflicting and 
difficult to coordinate.  Power will be the largest factor of the three previously listed.  
With access to a stable power source, the R2C2can sustain unlimited operational time. 
Mobility of the scouts will be an issue that will extend the timeline of 
operations.  Even though it has been deemed secure, tactical measures still need to be 
adhered to when moving about the city of Shirāz.  Having to physically upload imagery 
from the field back to the R2C2 will require more time.  The availability of military land 
transport vehicles, will increase their mobility; however, it is not a guaranteed asset. 
2.6.5.3 Assumptions 
 The largest assumption for this scenario is that ground forces will 
experience light resistance from Iranian forces in the cities of Būshehr and Shirāz.  This 
enables the ground forces to quickly move up to the city of Shirāz and secure a logistics 
route to and from the Persian Gulf.  Being able to move quickly in securing both cities 
provides a relatively safe environment for the R2C2 crew to operate in. 
 A second assumption is that insurgent threats in the cities are not to be 
expected.  The two cities will remain fairly secure for U.S. operations.  Any threat of 
engagements will be with Iranian military forces only. 
 The third assumption for the deployment is that when integrated with the 
ground command element, the R2C2 will be provided a power source.  A dedicated 
power supply shall be made available for R2C2 use, enabling continuous operations and 
support to the RCC and ground forces. 
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 Finally, the last assumption is that Chemical, Biological, and Radiological 
(CBR) warfare is a viable threat in the area of operations.  Iran has been researching and 
developing biological weapons since the mid-80s with the help of Russian scientists.  
Observing Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield has given the Iranian government 
enough incentive to employ biological weapons as a deterrent.49  All ground forces, 
including the R2C2 crew, will be prepared to operate in a CBR environment. 
2.7 FEEDBACK FROM THE STAKEHOLDERS 
 The R2C2 team’s primary stakeholder was the DJC2 JPO.  Three members from 
the R2C2 team visited the JPO in March 2006 to discuss the scenarios that were 
generated.  The JPO made a few suggestions, and recommended that the scenarios be 
slightly modified and that we change one of the scenarios to include the SOUTHCOM 
area of responsibility (AOR).  The El Salvador earthquake scenario is a direct result of 
the recommendations from the primary stakeholder. 
 The R2C2 team, after making the modifications to the scenarios and developing a 
scenario in the SOUTHCOM AOR, forwarded the scenarios to the JPO.  The JPO 
reviewed and validated the scenarios and then forwarded them to representatives of the 
RCCs to get their feedback.  Before using the scenarios to develop requirements, the 
R2C2 team wanted to ensure that its scenarios were in line with how the RCCs expected 
to use the R2C2 system.  Lt COL Jeffrey Renner, USAF, stated, 
The Contingency Response Group [CRG] could/would deploy for all of 
the 5 missions you list.  We are manned and equipped to be light and lean, 
so any effort to reduce manpower or equipment airlift requirements 
without reducing capability are always being explored.50 
After the responses from the RCCs and requirements offices were collected 
another of the scenarios was revised again.  The Pre-Deployment scenario that involved a 
covert landing in Tehran, Iran, in which the R2C2 team conducted network warfare to 
obtain information to pin-point the location of high-level civilian and military leaders, 
                                                 
49 Defense Update News Commentary, “Iran’s National Deterrent:  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Program,” http://www.defense-update.com/2004/04/irans-national-deterrent-weapons-of.html, April 2004. 
50 Email response from LtCol Jeffrey Renner, USAF, 86th Air Mobility Squadron, spokesperson for the 
EUCOM Contingency Response Group, March 2006, office communication. 
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was considered to be a little out of scope, therefore that scenario was replaced, resulting 
in the development of the Deployment scenario.  The final five scenarios were validated 
and approved by the DJC2 JPO after the inclusion of the Deployment scenario. 
On 21 March 2006, members from the DJC2 JPO came to Monterey, California to 
attend the R2C2 team’s Preliminary Design Review (PDR).  The JPO gave much insight 
during the brief, further increasing the relevance of the work that had been completed.  
After the brief, the R2C2 team had a one-on-one meeting with the members of the JPO to 
discuss the remaining steps in the completion of the project.  This meeting helped narrow 
the scope of the project as well as supply the JPO with valuable information to be used in 
testing the RRK. 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
Introduced to a potential need for a small, rapidly deployable, C2 system by the 
DJC2 JPO, the R2C2 team began their research into the utility of such a system.  To 
provide direction and understanding, the characteristics of environment, user, mission, 
and technology for the R2C2 system were deduced and defined.  Drawing on multiple 
sources, such as lessons learned from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, 
QDR 2006, Joint Publications, and DJC2 documents, the value of an R2C2 became more 
apparent.  Interviews with SMEs added additional importance to the study, which 
amplified the potential operational gains with an R2C2 system. 
Once a better understanding of C2 systems was reached, further research was 
done to define mission needs.  Deriving RRK requirements and additional inputs from 
SMEs resulted in a defined need for an R2C2.  The R2C2 team stated this need as:  The 
RCCs need a deployable, standardized C2 system with a small footprint to be utilized by 
first responders in Joint, Civilian-Military, and Coalition operations.  After a need was 
identified, capability gaps between current C2 systems and the R2C2 were investigated.  
The following capability gaps were found:   
• Lack of standardized, common, interoperable, and deployable C2 
capability to support Joint, Multinational, and Interagency Operations. 
• Lack of modular and rapidly reconfigurable design to permit flexible 
addition of new capabilities. 
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• Lack of a small system for covert intelligence gathering and  
data transmission. 
To help further facilitate the usefulness of the R2C2, identification of the 
stakeholders was completed.  The DJC2 JPO was the project’s primary stakeholder as the 
entity responsible for the development of the RRK.  EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, PACOM, 
CENTCOM, and NORTHCOM were the users of the R2C2 system and their input 
provided the most value.  Additional NPS stakeholders in TNT, COASTS, and HFN were 
added in recognition of their support and collaborative efforts. 
The next step involved determining what types of scenarios to use.  Under the 
guidelines of the Doctrine for Joint Operations, the range of military operations of  
War and MOOTW was analyzed.  A scenario stress matrix was developed using the 
range of operations and considerations that fall under the three stress points.  The 
scenarios that were chosen included:  Pandemic (avian flu in Singapore), Disaster Relief 
(earthquake in San Salvador), Counterterrorism (southern Philippines), Civil Unrest 
(Ivory Coast NEO), and Deployment (Iran conflict).  These five scenarios were analyzed 
in the scenario stress matrix to quantify the amount of stress that would be put on the 
R2C2 in each scenario.  This information helped determine the optimum architecture of 
the R2C2. 
The iterative phase of mission analysis conducted by the R2C2 team involved the 
preliminary background and foundation for the subsequent analysis.  This portion of the 
team’s SE process provided justification for the use of an R2C2.  The team was able to 
identify the need for the R2C2 and then elaborated on that by analyzing the system in 
various scenarios.  Supported by feedback from the stakeholders, the R2C2 team reached 
the mission analysis goal of evaluating the R2C2 in operational scenarios.  Established in 
a clear direction, the R2C2 team moved forward to define requirements based on 




























 The requirements generation aspect of the project occurred during the  
Conceptual Design Phase of the Systems Engineering Process.  Upon completion of the 
mission analysis, operational requirements were generated, utilizing the information 
obtained from the five scenarios.  Operational requirements were decomposed into 
system requirements after completing the functional analysis and scenario timelines.  
Both the operational and system requirements laid the foundation for the remainder of the 
project.  The Architecture group designed the system based on requirements and the 
Modeling and Analysis groups focused on developing models to determine if the 
architectures met the requirements.  This chapter identifies the processes used to develop 
and refine requirements and compares the R2C2 team-generated requirements to the 
requirements outlined by the DJC2 CPD and the BAA. 
This phase required continuous communications between the R2C2 team and the 
customer, stakeholders, and SMEs to ensure that all of the user’s needs were captured in 
the generated requirements and were realistic.  The R2C2 team contacted people from the 
Navy Requirements Office (N71C1), JFCOM Requirements Office (J88), EUCOM, 
PACOM, and CENTCOM, to collect information about potential missions and user’s 
needs in order to help refine requirements that were based on the five scenarios. 
Developing requirements did not come without its set of challenges.  The most 
important part about developing requirements was to communicate on a frequent basis 
with the users, and our short project schedule and the difficulties in identifying the actual 
operators of the system made this process difficult.  Many potential customers who have 
the most experience with C2 systems and operations were more focused on dealing with 
real world situations in their Area of Responsibility (AOR) instead of providing input for 
the development of the system because of its higher priority.  Since it was difficult to 
contact the customers to determine their expected uses and functionality, the R2C2 team 
composed several scenarios and timelines that covered the range of military operations 
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(e.g., Pandemic, Disaster Relief, Counterterrorism, War, and Civil Unrest) and 
formulated a list of requirements. 
Before the R2C2 team generated requirements, DJC2 JPO published a CPD and a 
BAA that listed a number of requirements for the RRK.  The CPD and BAA documents 
do not specify what missions the RRK will be used for or what tasks the RRK must 
accomplish.  The R2C2 team wanted to be able to trace requirements back to the specific 
tasks identified in a mission, so they developed the scenarios and functional analysis to 
help justify each requirement.  Scenario timelines were developed to place constraints on 
the system and to develop performance requirements for the R2C2 system.  The 
requirements that were generated by the R2C2 team were then compared to the 
requirements received from the DCJ2 JPO in the CPD and the BAA. 
3.2 TIMELINES 
 After developing the five scenarios, and vetting them through the customers and 
stakeholders, the R2C2 team further dissected the scenarios and developed timelines to 
determine the operational requirements, functional requirements, and system 
requirements.  The timelines helped determine answers to critical questions such as: 
• how long does the system need to provide power?; 
• what bandwidth is required by the system?; 
• what is the range at which data has to be passed?; and 
• what is the frequency of data transmissions?, etc. 




0+00 PACOM receives reports of an outbreak of avian flu in Singapore 
suspected to be caused by a new strain of H5N1 virus that is capable of 
spreading among humans 
0+10 PACOM makes initial assessment of severity, possible scope of 
outbreak, and assistance required 
0+50 PACOM activates R2C2 crew to configure R2C2 system to gather on-
site outbreak information and provide assistance in coordinating 
medical assistance efforts 
1+00 PACOM configures R2C2 system for mission requiring long haul 
communications, local communications, information management 
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system, video or digital camera, maps, virus test kits, and medical 
software modules 
6+00 R2C2 crew departs 
12+00 R2C2 crew arrives at Singapore airport 
13+00 R2C2 crew arrives at hotel and begins to set up R2C2 
13+20 R2C2 crew conducts voice and data checks with PACOM and with 
organic communications and sensors via R2C2 system 
13+30 Medical scouts dispatched to gather information from U.S. Embassy 
and local authorities via R2C2 system 
16+00 R2C2 crew sends initial reports on virus information, scope of 
outbreak, and containment actions by local authorities 
22+00 Medical scouts collect samples of virus and digital imagery from local 
health facilities.  R2C2 crew sends images back to RCC via  
R2C2 system 
 
+1 day R2C2 conducts video teleconference (VTC) once a day with RCC to 
support telemedicine consultation 
Constant exchange of messages throughout the day to coordinate 
medical tests and results 
Upload of digital signature of virus result images every four hours 
Exchange of coordination information on further medical assistance  
of ESG 
Collaborate with other NGOs on-site 
Coordinate and track movement of medical scouts as they go about 
gathering information and rendering assistance 
 Keep track of the spread of virus 
 
+ 3 days R2C2 establish connectivity with ESG 
 Coordinates prearrival arrangements 
 
Disaster Relief Timeline 
 
0+00 SOUTHCOM receives reports of major earthquake in Central America 
0+10 SOUTHCOM unable to contact Forward Operating Base and Embassy 
0+50 SOUTHCOM alerts R2C2 crew 
1+00 SOUTHCOM configures R2C2 system to include long haul 
communications, local communications, information management 
system, video or digital camera, maps, firearms, and translation 
software 
6+00 R2C2 crew departs RCC via helicopter 
12+00 R2C2 crew arrives at airport 
12+20 R2C2 crew finds U.S. staging area and personnel begin to set up R2C2 
13+00 R2C2 crew conducts voice and data checks with SOUTHCOM and 
with organic communications and sensors 
13+30 R2C2 crew sends video clips of the coastline and airfield taken while 
onboard helicopter to SOUTHCOM 
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15+00 R2C2 reports that U.S. military personnel accounted for at airport with 
minor first aid needs 
20+00 R2C2 scouts find rides with local military to embassy, fairgrounds, 
and Acajutla Port 
22+00 Scouts give on-station report to R2C2 crew 
 
+1 day Scouts give hourly reports 
From the port, the scouts report damage and security issues:  is it 
suitable to receive shipments from ESG and other relief ships?; are 
roads from port to San Salvador open?; is it safe to operate? 
From the Embassy, the scouts report the status of U.S. personnel and 
medical requirements 
From the fairgrounds, the scouts report status of creating a CMOC 
with local government, IOs, and NGOs 
R2C2 relays port and landing zone data to ESG (pictures/voice)  
and RCC 
R2C2 receives satellite imagery from RCC and shares information 
with the CMOC 
FOB provide mobile generators for power 
 
+ 5 days ESG arrives 
Scouts pass bihourly reports to R2C2 
R2C2 compiles reports and passes status to SOUTHCOM and ESG 
R2C2 crew relays evacuation data between CMOC and ESG 
R2C2 relays CMOC needs for medical, water, and equipment to 
SOUTHCOM and ESG 





–30 days United States and Republic of the Philippines forces conducting 
Balikatan training/exercises on nearby island of Basilan with the aid of 
an R2C2 system 
0+00 U.S. receives intelligence of increased Abu Sayyaf activity; the 
possibility of a terrorist attack in Manila; and that a high ranking  
al-Qaeda leader is temporarily in camp near the town of Buriasan 
1+10 Intelligence report is passed to Filipino government with request to 
immediately utilize SOF to locate terrorist camp before al-Qaeda 
leader departs area within the next 24 hours, and pass streaming video 
of high ranking al-Qaeda leader to U.S. 
2+00 Intelligence report and mission is passed to U.S.-RP forces conducting 
training in Basilan 
2+30 U.S.-RP forces (8-man team) halt training and prepare to move to 
Mindanao Island, along with R2C2 system 
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5+30 U.S.-RP forces arrive on Mindanao Island to conduct  
counterterrorism operation 
6+30 RP forces initiate surveillance in and around Buriasan to obtain 
information as to location of terrorist camp and al-Qaeda leader 
8+30 U.S.-RP concludes initial surveillance in and around Buriasan and 
covertly moves to location from which to conduct mission 
11+30 R2C2 site determined 
12+00 R2C2 is set up and attains positive communications and data checks 
with RCC and organic sensors 
12+00 Initial SITREP sent from R2C2 to RCC 
12+15 Scouts deployed to covertly locate terrorist training site.  Information 
will be gathered through field PDAs/cameras/camcorders/radios and 
transmitted to R2C2 
15+15 Terrorist camp located and surrounded 
16+20 Video of terrorist camp passed to R2C2 
16+25 Video relayed to RCC 
18+00 Streaming video of possible high level terrorist leader sent to R2C2 
18+05 Streaming video relayed from R2C2 to RCC 
20+14 Order to strike terrorist camp is issued 
20+18 Order received by R2C2 
20+19 Order passed to organic sensors 
20+42 Simultaneous attack on terrorist camp initiated to take out terrorists 
and high level leader 
 
Civil Unrest Timeline 
 
–5 days EUCOM receives report that rebel forces have increased attacks on 
UN/French troops in Ivory Coast 
–4 days EUCOM alerts ESG leaving Strait of Gibraltar toward  
Norfolk, Virginia and redirects them to make best speed (18 kts) 
toward Ivory Coast to conduct possible NEO 
0+00 EUCOM receives distress call from U.S. Embassy in Abidjan for an 
assisted evacuation of American citizens 
0+30 EUCOM alerts two R2C2 crews 
0+45 EUCOM configures R2C2 systems to include long haul 
communications, local communications, video and digital cameras, 
movement sensors (infrared (IR), acoustic, visual), maps, translator, 
and firearms 
1+00 Embassy orders all U.S. citizens to report to the U.S. Embassy 
5+00 R2C2 crews deploy via commercial aircraft 
11+00 R2C2 crews arrives Abidjan International Airport 
11+20 R2C2 crews locate U.S. personnel from Embassy and depart for 
mission areas 
 (Crew A:  Embassy; Crew B:  Yamoussoukro) 
11+35 Crew A arrives U.S. Embassy and begins R2C2 set up 
11+55 Crew A establishes reachback link 
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12+00 Crew A conducts voice and data check with EUCOM, en route ESG, 
NGOs, organic communications, and sensors 
12+05 Crew A coordinates with Embassy over preplanned evacuation plan 
12+10 Crew A deploys scouts to take visual pictures of landing site for 
helicopter evacuation 
12+30 Crew A sends SITREP with ESG Embassy evacuation plan and 
imagery of landing site 
13+20 Crew B arrives in Yamoussoukro at French/UN command position and 
begins set up of R2C2 system 
13+30 Crew A reports hourly SITREP 
13+55 Crew B conducts voice and data check with Crew A, EUCOM, ESG, 
UN troops, French troops, organic communications and sensors 
14+00 Crew A receives initial tasking from Marine Expeditionary Unit 
Commander for NEO 
14+05 Crew B deploys scouts with French escorts to set up motion sensors 
14+15 Crew B relays initial SITREP to EUCOM, ESG, and Crew A of 
information gathered from French/UN command 
14+20 Crew B receives satellite imagery from EUCOM displaying 
concentration of rebel forces and unclassified (UNCLASS) imagery is 
shared with UN/French 
14+30 Crew A reports hourly SITREP 
15+00 Crew B scouts report sensors in place.  Scouts move to take video 
imagery of any rebel activity. R2C2 begins collecting data from 
motion sensors 
15+15 Crew B reports hourly SITREP to Crew A with available data 
collected by sensors and video imagery from scouts 
15+30  Crew A reports hourly SITREP 
16+15 Crew B sends SITREP 
16+30 Crew A reports hourly SITREP with evacuee information to ESG 
commander 
17+15 Crew B reports SITREP showing a halt in advancement, but a buildup 
of rebel forces on the outskirts of Yamoussoukro 
17+15 Hourly SITREPS by both crews 
20+30 Crew B reports start of rebel movement and increase in fighting 
21+00 Crew B breaks down R2C2 system and extracts from Yamoussoukro 
back to Abidjan via French transport 
23+00 Crew A reports weather conditions, confirms safe landing zone, and 
confirms estimated time of arrival (ETA) with ESG commander 
23+15 Crew B arrives at the U.S. Embassy 
24+00 ESG arrives on station 
ESG deploys helicopters to evacuate U.S. citizens and R2C2 crews 
from Embassy.  Crew A breaks down R2C2 system when all  
U.S. citizens are safely evacuated 
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Deployment Scenario Timeline 
 
–6 days U.S. ground forces enter Iran and begin conflict 
–4 days U.S. forces secure city of Būshehr 
–1 days U.S. forces secure city of Shirāz 
0+00 R2C2 crew enters Iran 
2+00 R2C2 crew arrives at Shirāz and joins ground command element 
2+30 R2C2 crew establishes reachback with CENTCOM 
2+45 R2C2 crew conducts voice and data checks with CENTCOM, ground 
forces, and organic communications and sensors 
3+00 R2C2 scouts deploy into city of Shirāz 
3+00 R2C2 crew reports to CENTCOM with initial information of force 
status, environmental issues, general SA 
3+20 R2C2 crew receives imagery from RCC of possible pockets of 
resistance, updated city map, Iranian force movement in the vicinity 
3+25 R2C2 crew passes information to ground command element 
3+45 R2C2 crew receives reports from scouts 
4+00 R2C2 crew reports SITREP with imagery of local population and 
initial BDA of the city 
4+45 R2C2 crew receives imagery from RCC with updated ppposition 
forces information 
4+45 R2C2 crew receives reports from scouts 
4+55 R2C2 crew passes CENTCOM information to ground  
command element 
5+00 R2C2 crew reports SITREP to CENTCOM with imagery of potential 
locations for DJC2 staging 
5+10 R2C2 crew passes same information to construction battalion 
5+30 R2C2 crew receive updated imagery from RCC 
5+40 R2C2 crew passes imagery to command element 
5+45 R2C2 crew receives updates from scouts 
6+00 R2C2 crew reports STIREP CENTCOM with amplifying information 
on previously reported staging areas (infrastructure, size dimensions, 
accessibility, protection, habitability, etc.) 
6+15 R2C2 crew passes same information to construction battalion 
6+45 R2C2 crew receives reports from scouts 
7+00 R2C2 crew reports SITREP with additional staging areas and 
amplifying BDA 
7+10 R2C2 crew passes additional staging areas to construction battalion 
7+45 R2C2 crew receives reports from scouts 
8+00 R2C2 crew reports SITREP with amplifying information on  
staging areas 
8+15 R2C2 crew passes same information to construction battalion 
12+00 RCC crew tells R2C2 crew choice for DJC2 staging area 
12+10 R2C2 scouts are redirected to chosen area for further evaluation 
12+15 R2C2 crew passes chosen site to construction battalion and  
ground command element 
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14+00 R2C2 crew receives additional imagery and information on  
staging area 
14+15 R2C2 crew passes information to construction battalion 
+4 days Initial elements of DJC2 arrive in Shirāz 
3.3 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Operational requirements outlined the capabilities needed by the system to 
complete the intended mission.  They do not specify how these capabilities must be met.  
To determine the capabilities required of the system, the R2C2 team had to realistically 
answer the following crucial questions: 
• what functions will the system perform?; 
• when will the system be required to perform its intended functions and for 
how long?; 
• where will the system be used?; and 
• how will the system accomplish its objective? 
Answering the above questions provided insight as to how the system will be used 
and function.  Once the intended uses and functions of the system were determined, it 
was feasible to start thinking of ways to develop a new system or simply locate a COTS 
system that already has the ability to perform the intended functions.  After determining 
the functions of the system, figuring out when the system would be required to perform 
those functions and for how long was one of the driving factors behind the development 
of timelines.  By calculating when the system would have to operate and for what 
durations, the R2C2 team determined organic power duration requirements for the system 
if local power was not available.  Deciding in what environments the system would 
operate generated many questions: 
• how to protect the system in excessive weather conditions?; 
• how to protect the system in extreme heat?; 
• how to power the system if local power is not available, how to protect 
electronic components in dusty areas?; and 
• how to secure the system in hostile locations? 
Answering the question, how will the system accomplish its objective? required 
the team to look at different types of software and hardware components.  If the mission 
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required only voice transmissions, determining the required components was relatively 
simple, but if the mission required streaming video transmissions, then that operational 
requirement placed more stress on the system by requiring higher bandwidths, more 
power, and additional wireless components to relay information back securely to the 
Primary Suite.  The ability to provide local communications, within 35 miles of the 
Primary Suite, and long haul global communications were essential in order to better 
facilitate gathering, processing, and passing information to the required entities. 
The evaluated missions required classified information transmission that, if placed 
in the wrong hands, could not only jeopardize the mission, but possibly endanger the 
lives of those conducting the mission.  This drove the requirement to provide a secure 
means of passing and receiving operational and tactical information to and from the 
supported commander.  Not only does the information need to be secure, but the 
equipment being used and the personnel operating that equipment must also be trusted—
driving the need for physical, data, and network security.  In some scenarios, the R2C2 
will be operating in a hostile environment that added the requirement to protect the 
physical location of the equipment, secure access to the equipment, secure access to the 
room or location where the equipment will be staged, and secure the identity of the 
personnel that are out in the field collecting data for the R2C2. 
Working with organizations outside of the U.S. military introduces many 
variables when determining R2C2 concepts of operations and requirements.  When 
working with agencies that are not a part of the R2C2 system, such as IOs, interagencies, 
NGOs, and local government agencies, establishing ways to transmit information was 
difficult.  Almost all agencies use different communications systems and frequencies, 
requiring the R2C2 system to be interoperable with many other entities.  The ability to 
share data and information was one of the most important aspects to effectively work 
with other organizations, as well as one of the most challenging.  Not only does the  
R2C2 system need to share information with coalition or a civilian authorities, it needs to 
transmit and receive critical information to and from the scouts. 
Power was one of the most important constraints for any contingency response 
operation.  Most of the scenarios were in austere locations where no local power was 
available and required the R2C2 system to provide organic power, such as batteries or 
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generators, until the local power could (if possible) be restored.  Bringing along 
generators was a viable option for some scenarios (i.e., Deployment, Pandemic,  
Natural Disaster), but not for the Civil Unrest and Counterterrorism scenarios, due to the 
high probability of being detected if a generator was used in those situations.  Thus, these 
two particular scenarios required the use of battery power.  Additionally, if power is 
available, the R2C2 system must be equipped with power adapters or conversion devices. 
The scenarios and timelines evaluated required the use of scouts to supply time-
critical information essential to mission completion and success.  In order for them to 
provide the R2C2 with situational awareness, the scouts needed to collect and display 
data and transmit information back to the R2C2 system.  The R2C2 operators also needed 
a means by which to collect and display the data that was transmitted from the scouts.  
After receiving data from the scouts, the R2C2 operators have to analyze, compile, and 
pass the data to the RCC. 
This system will be carried to some of the most austere locations depending on 
the mission, requiring that the delicate electronics be packaged properly to sustain the 
jarring that may be encountered during transport.  Since the system must be mobile and 
ready to go on short notice, the packaging must withstand the vibrations and pounding 
customary onboard naval aircraft, ships, and land vehicles.  The ability to transport the 
R2C2 system via commercial aircraft dictates the size and weight of the system as well as 
the packaging of the system. 
The expectations of the R2C2 system to have a small footprint and be able to 
complete a wide range of missions required the system to be adaptable and flexible to 
fulfill any mission.  The system has to be able to switch from a humanitarian mission to a 
counterterrorism mission with very little added stress to the operator, requiring that the 
system have software and hardware connections to facilitate the addition of new  
mission modules. 
The following are the operational requirements that the R2C2 team derived from 
the scenarios. 
(1) Provide capability of local and long haul communications to the RCC, 
DJC2, other R2C2 systems, coalition partners, military assets, and  
civilian assets. 
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(2) Provide secure means (physical security, data security, and network 
security) of passing tactical information to the supported commander  
for SA. 
(3) Provide means of collecting data from organic or inorganic assets. 
(4) Provide self-supporting power supply in addition to the capacity to operate 
on standard electrical power. 
(5) Provide capability for operators to receive, display, analyze, filter, and 
pass simultaneous data from organic or inorganic assets. 
(6) Provide compact, rugged, and mobile packaging 
(7) Provide flexibility for mission-dependent software and hardware 
configurations. 
3.4 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
 System requirements describe what the system must do, but not how the system 
should do it in regard to specific hardware, software, facilities, people, or data.51  
Determining the system requirements for the R2C2 system was an iterative process.  The 
R2C2 team analyzed the scenarios and timelines to identify performance requirements 
necessary for mission success.  The R2C2 team focused on the six primary requirement 
areas to determine requirements: 
• BW (for both local and long haul communications); 
• security (physical, data and network); 
• data types (streaming video, images, video, and voice); 
• power (amount needed and duration); 
• information management; and 
• weight. 
By identifying the scenarios that placed the greatest strain on the system, it was possible 
to further determine the minimum performance capabilities of the system to operate in all 
five missions. 
                                                 
51 B.S. Blanchard and W.J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall, 
1998, pp. 48-50. 
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 The BW requirements were calculated by analyzing the timelines to determine 
what type of data and how often the information would be transmitted to and from the 
inorganic and organic sources in the local area or outside of the operating area.  The 
analysis of each scenario was critical in determining the minimum amount of BW that 
would be needed to perform each mission for local and long haul communications.  
Factors that played heavily in determining the BW requirements were: 
• how much data would be transferred?; 
• what type of data would be transferred (voice, images, video or  
streaming video)?; 
• how often would that data be transferred?; 
• in what type of environment would that the information be passed?, and 
• how much security would be needed to ensure that sensitive information 
arrived at its intended destination without being compromised? 
 Security also placed restraints on the system and involved the protection of the 
actual location of the R2C2 system, the data being passed to and from the system, and the 
network on which the R2C2 system was operating.  Some of the scenario locations were 
hostile, requiring physical security to prevent anyone from entering the room where the 
system was being operated, in an attempt to destroy, gain access to, or monitor the 
system.  This requirement increased the number of people operating the system (from  
2 to 4) in order to provide security as a safety measure.  Securing the data required 
encryption, biometrics, or authentication to gain access to a device in order to input 
information or pass that information to the R2C2.  Network security required that 
information being passed was encrypted and that the network be protected from hackers 
gaining access to sensitive information that could jeopardize the mission. 
 Based on the scenarios, the types of data that needed to be transmitted ranged 
from voice only, to images, to streaming video.  The BW requirement for a voice only 
transmission was small in comparison to the streaming video bandwidth requirement.  
Not only is the streaming video BW requirement high, the amount of power needed to 
transmit was affected. 
 The power required for each mission was calculated from the amount and type of 
data being passed and the frequency of that data transmission.  Some scenarios (e.g., the 
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Pandemic) would require a lot of information to be passed, especially early in the mission 
in order to gain a complete assessment of the severity of the outbreak.  The amount of 
information that would be passed and the relatively frequent requirement for passing that 
information necessitated a high demand for power.  The power requirement also takes 
into account the number of people who would be using the system to access information 
to the Internet or other organization’s databases such as the WHO or the Red Cross. 
 The length of time that power would be required was determined by analyzing the 
scenario timelines and looking realistically at how long the system would be in operation 
before commercial power was available.  Some scenarios lacked local power, requiring 
the system to provide its own power.  The longer the system has to operate without 
commercial power, the more restrictive the organic requirement became.  If the scenario 
was in a location that was destroyed by natural forces, the entire scenario required the use 
of a mobile power source.  If local power was available, the duration of organic power 
was minimized, depending on the reliability of the local power grid.  The R2C2 team 
determined that the system primary suite will consume approximately 1,350 watts of 
power.  The local power grid must be able to support this power consumption in order for 
the organic power supply requirement to be reduced. 
The management of information included the means by which the R2C2 crew 
analyzed, displayed, edited, and entered information.  The more interactions the system 
had with the information, the higher the requirement for information management.  These 
interactions were classified into the following categories: data input (keyboard,  
point devices, floppy disk drive, Ethernet port, wireless local area network (LAN) 
interface, speakers, headphones, or camera for video conferencing), data storage  
(hard disk, secondary storage, Universal Serial Bus (USB) thumb drive for data exchange 
with external parties), data analysis (messaging software, Web browser, mission planning 
software, blue force and enemy tracking software), data presentation (color  
Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) screens, printers, scanners, or projectors),  and data 
protection (antivirus software, encryption software, and access control mechanism such 
as Common Access Card (CAC), secure token or biometric).  As the data received by 
R2C2 system increased, the more information management became important to extract 
and compile information to develop the situation awareness picture for the RCC. 
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The R2C2 system will be a mobile system that must be transported by two 
personnel.  This restriction placed constraints on the weight of the system.  It must be 
commercial airline checkable, which further restricted the weight and size of the system.  
The weight of the system can vary depending on its mission and mode of transportation.  
The commercial restrictions for luggage is 40 pounds for carryon and 70 pounds for 
checked luggage and the military restrictions for luggage is 45% of the operator’s weight.  
If the system is being carried by military means, the weight can be higher, especially if it 
does not have to be carried by two people once it gets into the operating area. 
Table 4 shows the break out of the system requirements for all five scenarios 
(Pandemic, Disaster Relief, Counterterrorism, Civil Unrest, and Deployment).  The six 
primary requirement elements were rated against the scenarios to determine which 
scenario placed the greatest amount of stress on the system, so that if only one system 
was designed, the system would meet the requirements for all missions.  The matrix is 
interpreted as follows:  red indicates a higher requirement, leading to a more stressful 
situation for the R2C2 system, green is low stress on the system, and yellow is moderate 
stress on the system.  The legend at the bottom of Table 4 explains what is considered to 
be high, moderate, and low stress for each of the six requirement elements. 
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 >2 Mbps          Physical, Data & Network   Streaming Video High    > 24 Hrs        High  >90 
1-2 Mbps         Data & Network                 Video & Images     Medium  12-24 Hrs      Medium   70-90 
<1 Mbps         Data                             Voice                 Low < 12 Hrs           Low    <70   
 
Table 4:  Operational Requirements 
3.5 FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 Functional analysis is the process of translating system 
requirements into detailed design criteria, along with the identification of 
specific resource requirements at the subsystem level and below.  One 
starts with an abstraction of the needs of the customer and works down to 
identify the requirements for hardware, software, people, facilities, data, or 
combination thereof.52 
By looking at the functions that the system must fulfill according to the scenario, 
timelines, and customer needs, the R2C2 team dissected those functions to determine 
specific requirements of the system.  In order to generate the functional requirements of 
the R2C2 system, the R2C2 team used two different approaches.  The first approach was 
to look at the R2C2 system from the operators’ point of view by developing a Functional 
Flow, to ensure that all user requirements were taken into account and the second 
approach was looking at the R2C2 system from a mission point of view by developing a 
                                                 
52 B.S. Blanchard and W.J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall, 
1998, pp. 62-63. 
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Functional Tree.  Both aspects provided insightful information in the development of 
requirements for the R2C2 system. 
3.5.1 Functional Flow 
The Functional Flow analysis looked at every aspect of the R2C2 system, from 
getting the team together, deploying with the system, completing the mission, and 
reconstituting the R2C2 system.  The Functional Flow divided the operation of the R2C2 
system into three categories:  deploy, conduct mission, and reconstitute.  These three 
operations were further divided into more categories until actual requirements of the 
system were reached. 
 The deployment section of the analysis required looking at the time to marshal the 
system, transport the system, and setup the system making it operational.  Marshalling the 
system required assembling the team, selecting the proper components for the mission, 
packaging the system based on the type of environment it would have to endure, and 
loading the system on a transport vehicle.  Transporting the system was broken into three 
categories depending on how the system would be deployed:  by air, sea, or land.  Once 
the system was transported to its operating location, it required a timely set-up.  The  
set-up involved determining the optimum location for system operations, establishing 
means by which to power the system (commercial or mobile), and finally, conducting 
system checks to ensure the system was fully operational to conduct the  
intended mission. 
 Conducting the mission included the majority of the R2C2 system functions.  The 
most stringent requirements were generated from this part of the Functional Flow 
analysis.  Conduct mission was divided into four categories:  provide communications, 
provide situational awareness, provide situation security and assurance, and  
provide infrastructure. 
 Providing communications required communicating both with local links and 
long haul links.  Once it was determined what type of link would be needed, the  
R2C2 team had to determine who would be communicating.  Afterwards, the information 
was further dissected into three types:  video, voice, and data.  After analyzing the type 
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data and frequency at which it was to be transmitted, it was then possible to determine the 
bandwidth and the best communication link to pass the data to the intended recipient. 
 SA was the ability of the R2C2 crew to access, modify, and display the collected 
data.  SA required the means to collect data, store data, analyze data, display data, and 
afterwards output or transmit data to the RCC. 
 Situational security and assurance (SSA) involved the protection of the  
R2C2 system as well as those operating it.  Physical security, data security, network 
security, and system availability were required to ensure that the R2C2 system was able 
to accomplish its intended mission. 
 Providing power to support ongoing R2C2 operations, providing environmental 
protection against the elements (dust, heat, etc.), ensuring that logistic support was 
available for operations, and providing a user interface that allows the operator to interact 
with the R2C2 system were critical to the infrastructure and required by the  
R2C2 system. 
 The reconstitution category focused on the life of the R2C2 system immediately 
following the completion of a mission.  The system would be dealt with in one of the 
following three ways:  integrated with the DJC2, meaning that it would become a part of 
the DJC2 core infrastructure; redeploy or be reassigned to carry out another mission 
within the RCC’s AOR; or simply exit the theater and return to the RCC without any 
additional tasking. 
The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) is a “. . . manual that provides a 
standardized tool for describing requirements for planning, conducting, evaluating and 
assessing joint and multinational training”53 written by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).  
The UJTL lists an array of requirements that are used to ensure that missions accomplish 
the goals set forth by the JCS, e.g., the R2C2 team’s scenario missions would require the 
following tasks be met:  OP 2.2 Collect and Share Operational Information, SN 2.4.1 
Evaluate, Integrate, Analyze, and Interpret Information, and SN 3.3.6.1 Assess Critical 
Infrastructure (CI) Impacts to Operational Capability, to name a few.  The R2C2 team 
referenced the UJTLs to ensure that the generated requirements were in compliance and 
                                                 
53 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04D Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), 1 August 2005, 
p. 1. 
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along the same lines as those outlined by the Joint Staff.  The complete Functional Flow 
analysis and the requirements that were generated from it, along with the associated 
UJTLs, are found in Appendices C and B. 
3.5.2 Functional Tree 
 The Functional Tree analysis dissected the mission of the R2C2 system from a 
mission point of view.  The form of analysis provided much of the same information as 
the Functional Flow except it gave more detailed information about the mission specifics.  
When comparing the two forms of analysis, it became apparent that many of the elements 
revealed in the Functional Flow analysis were duplicated in the Functional Tree analysis.  
The Functional Tree Analysis is in Appendix C. 
3.6 R2C2 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
 The requirements below describe the operation of the R2C2 system.  It states the 
minimum performance requirements that must be met by the system in order to 
successfully complete the assigned mission.  The list does not include the type of 





1. Local Communications ≥ 1.8 Mbps (max range 10 miles) 
2. Long Haul Communications ≥ 1.8 Mbps 
3. Security – Physical, Data, and Network 
4. Data Types – Voice, Images, and Video 
5. Power Duration – 12 hours 
6. Information Management Resources – Medium 
7. Weight ≤ 45% body weight per case 




1. Local Communications ≥ 2.8 Mbps (max range 5 miles) 
2. Long Haul Communications ≥ 2.8 Mbps 
3. Security – Physical, Data, and Network 
4. Data Types – Voice, Images, Video, and Streaming Video 
5. Power Duration – 10.5 hours (darkness) 
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6. Information Management Resources – Low 
7. Weight ≤ 45% body weight per case 




1. Local Communications ≥ 2.5 Mbps (max range 35 miles) 
2. Long Haul Communications ≥ 2.5 Mbps 
3. Security – Physical, Data, and Network 
4. Data Types – Voice, Images, and Video 
5. Power Duration – 2-8 Weeks (if power is not available) 
6. Information Management Resources – High 
7. Weight ≤ 45% body weight per case 




1. Local Communications ≥ 1.8 Mbps (max range 10 miles) 
2. Long Haul Communications ≥ 1.8 Mbps 
3. Security – Physical, Data, and Network 
4. Data Types – Voice, Images, and Video 
5. Power Duration – 11 hours (if power is not available) 
6. Information Management Resources – Medium 
7. Weight ≤ 45% body weight per case 




1. Local Communications ≥ 2.4 Mbps (max range 20 miles) 
2. Long Haul Communications ≥ 2.5 Mbps 
3. Security – Physical, Data, and Network 
4. Data Types – Voice, Images, and Video 
5. Power Duration – 2-8 Weeks (if power is not available) 
6. Information Management Resources – High 
7. Weight ≤ 45% body weight per case 
8. Size – Two-person transportable 
3.7 PROGRAM OFFICE CPD AND BAA REQUIREMENTS AND  
THE DIFFERENCES 
 The JPO developed two documents that list the requirements for the RRK.  The 
CPD and the BAA stated system requirements for the RRK.  These requirements were 
based on stakeholder inputs and similar systems, and were not necessarily tied to a 
particular mission or task.  Some of the requirements were derived based on the systems 
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that are currently being used by U.S. military forces.  The CPD requirements that were 
determined to be critical are: 
• Agile, quick response capability with small footprint 
• Satellite connectivity designed to serve up to four operators 
• Expandable to up to ten in group collaboration with reachback to Internet, 
NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and required multinational/coalition networks and 
collaboration tools and services 
• Transportable on commercial or military aircraft 
• Transportable by 2 persons 
• Operable on standard electrical power sources 
• Capable of operating on small lightweight organic power sources such as 
host national power grid, facility power or generators 
• Operable in austere locations 
• Provide data and voice communications and collaborative capabilities  
via reachback 
• Provide limited capability to include SHF, SATCOM, UHF, TACSAT, 
INMARSATA, and handheld global satellite phone for SA, planning and 
other C2 functions54 
The BAA requirements that were determined critical are listed below: 
• Provide capability to connect to two (2) GIG-accessible, crypto-covered 
networks at once (e.g., NIPRNet, SIPRNet, CENTRIXS) 
• Provide secure wireless (objective) to clients 
• Utilize Everything over Internet Protocol (EoIP) 
• All equipment must meet commercial standards for carry-on luggage for 
commercial aircraft (Objective:  Transport by two persons) 
• Provide Net Centric operations to the maximum extent possible 
• Demonstrate multi-mode (data, video, and voice) operations 
• Provide minimum of four (4) Voice over IP (VoIP) telephonic instruments 
and four (4) client computers 
                                                 
54 DJC2, CPD, OPNAV N71C2- 688(1)-71-05, 30 November 2005, pp. 19-21. 
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• Must be able to use thin or thick clients, and must support 5 clients 
(threshold)/15 clients (objective) 
• Provide radio with 1.024 Mbps threshold, 4.196 Mbps objective  
per network 
• Provide reliability, maintainability, availability, built-in test and logistic 
support as an objective 
• Provide compact, ruggedized, protective packaging55 
Though the basic requirements in the CPD and the BAA are comparable, the 
differences posed a new set of problems for the R2C2 team.  Both documents do state the 
need for a lightweight system that is two-person transportable, but the CPD states a need 
for up to ten operators and the BAA states a need for 5-15.  Determining which set of 
requirements, or which particular requirement, was most important, if two requirements 
were contradictory, gave the R2C2 team the flexibility to determine which requirement to 
use based on mission analysis. 
3.8 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JPO REQUIREMENT AND R2C2 TEAM 
REQUIREMENTS 
During the analysis of the missions and timelines, the R2C2 team developed 
similar operational requirements for the system as the JPO and identified the need for 
additional capabilities to be mission effective.  Some of the differences impacted the 
amount of equipment and the weight of the system.  The fully operational R2C2 system 
does not meet the two-person transportable requirement outlined in the CPD and BAA 
for a RRK.  This is due to additional capability that the R2C2 teams deem necessary to 
successfully develop SA.  The additional capability includes the Local and 
Civilian/Military Suites that allow scouts, civilian, and military agencies to utilize the 
R2C2 system’s capabilities.  The Local Suite was designed to give a “data link” to the 
scouts to improve the transmission time of relevant information to the Primary Suite (the 
central operating hub for the R2C2 system).  The Civil/Military Suite was designed to 
                                                 
55 Joint Program Office, Broad Area Announcement for Rapid Response Kit, FBO:  DON-SNOTE-05-
0624-002, Version 2.0, p. 4. 
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give NGOs and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) access to the internet to 
facilitate reachback to databases and other agencies not in the region for HA/DR. 
The R2C2 team determined that the system needed an organic power supply since 
60% of the evaluated scenarios did not have local power available.  The CPD stated that 
the system needs to be “capable of operating on small lightweight organic power sources 
such as host national power grid, facility power or generators,”56 the R2C2 team took this 
requirement a step further, making the power source a part of the R2C2 system.  Based 
on the scenarios and timelines, it became apparent that the locations in which the R2C2 
system would operate may only have intermittent power and self-supporting power 
would have to be transported with the system. 
The task of the R2C2 team was to develop a set of requirements that could be tied 
to specific missions in order to add validity to the requirement.  Because of this task, 
some of the requirements that were developed by the R2C2 team were not part of the 
requirements captured by the JPO.  In order to provide a system architecture that fulfilled 
the needs of the JPO, their requirements were analyzed and incorporated if they traced 
back to mission tasks. 
3.9 FEEDBACK FROM STAKEHOLDERS 
 The feedback received from the JPO was very constructive.  Their feedback 
allowed the R2C2 team to focus their efforts on particular aspects of the project that 
minimized risk and allowed the R2C2 team to complete the project in the allotted time.  
The JPO made the suggestion that the R2C2 team focus only on voice communications 
links from the organic sources to the R2C2 crew. 
3.10 CONCLUSIONS 
 The development of requirements involved many different analysis methods.  
Analyzing the scenarios and timeline to determine requirements, with the feedback from 
the JPO and customers, ensured that the requirements were relevant and realistic.  After 
the development of the timelines, the operational requirements and system requirements 
                                                 
56 DJC2, CPP, OPNAV N71C2-688(1)-71-05, 30 November 2005, p. 20. 
85 
were derived.  The construction of the Functional Flow and Functional Tree allowed the 
R2C2 team to dissect operator and system tasks to determine all functions that the system 
had to fulfill.  Some of the scenario- and timeline-based system requirements generated 
by the R2C2 team differed from the list that the JPO promulgated.  The difference in 
requirements made the process a little difficult when deciding which requirements were 
the most important.  The R2C2 team mitigated the difference in requirements by 
evaluating all requirements set forth by the CPD, BAA, and R2C2 team to see if each 
requirement could be traced to a specific mission task.  The final requirements were 
compared to the UJTLs to determine if the system requirements were consistent with 
those requirements established by the JCS.  Most of the requirements generated for the 
R2C2 system were in compliance with those listed in the UJTLs, adding validity to the 
R2C2 team’s requirements.  The completion of the requirements made way for 
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4.0 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE DESIGN 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
System architecture design is a part of the SE process that relates system 
functional requirements to physical system design.  The architecture describes a 
relationship between products, requirements, and overall system interaction. The system 
architecture design for the R2C2 was completed at a top level of abstraction.  All system 
designs were completed through the use of scenarios, functional flow, requirements 
mapping, and user input.  Given the wide range of scenarios and required functionality, 
the R2C2 system was broken down into different suites that offer differing functionality, 
flexibility, and scalability.  The R2C2 system consists of three suites:  the Primary Suite 
(PS), the Local Suite (LS), and the Civil/Military Suite (CMS).  One PS, three LS 
alternatives, and two CMS design alternatives were selected for modeling and evaluation. 
 This chapter covers the approach used to identify different design architectures, 
trade-offs, and final design.  Additionally, any assumptions that were made during the 
course of the design were outlined in each respective section. 
4.2 APPROACH 
The first steps taken in the design of the R2C2 system were to identify all 
communication links needed in each scenario, develop a system design template called 
the Architecture Baseline, and identify current technology and software maturity through 
a market survey.  These three phases of approach led to the generation of multiple 
alternatives as well as the creation of the R2C2 suites. 
4.2.1 Communication Link Identification 
The communications necessary for each scenario were analyzed using the 
previously generated timelines and CONOPS.  Table 5 shows all of the different 
communication links identified.  A green box denotes the need for that particular type of 
communication capability, while a red box denotes that no communication link between 
the entities was required. 
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  Local Long Haul Local Local Long Haul Long Haul 
Disaster Relief             
Pandemic             
Civil Unrest             
Counterterrorism             
Deployment             
Table 5:  Communication Links Needed in the Scenarios (green means the link is needed) 
 The civilian communication link represented local or long haul communication.  
Local civilian communication was a connection with local authorities, NGOs, IOs, etc., 
within the area of operation.  Long haul civilian communication was the link back to 
civilian resources and databases outside the area of operation.  Tactical communication 
represented communication with the R2C2 scouts who were within the area of operation 
collecting data and intelligence.  The coalition communication link was either via a local 
link or via the CENTRIXS link.  The CENTRIXS network facilitates multinational 
information sharing by combining many different global networks in a common, virtual 
location.57  In order to access CENTRIXS, a user must have a long haul connection to the  
Global Information Grid (GIG) and the SIPRNET.  The GIG is classified as a data 
computing grid that connects all Department of Defense technologies and users via 
networks like SIPRNET and the NIPRNET.  Lastly, the strategic link was a connection 
back to the RCC and/or to the GIG for NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and CENTRIXS access. 
In the Disaster Relief and Pandemic scenarios, civilian, tactical, and strategic 
coordination was needed; specifically, an emphasis was placed on civilian coordination to 
help in quick response, aid, and information collection.  As shown in Table 5, the  
Civil Unrest scenario required the R2C2 to be connected to all communication contacts.  
Civilian, tactical, coalition, and strategic communications capabilities were needed for 
proper mission execution.  Lastly, both the Counterterrorism and Deployment scenarios 
displayed a need for a streamlined R2C2 system to reduce the system footprint.  These 
scenarios did not require a civilian or coalition communication capability. 
 Upon further investigation into the requirements for each of the four 
communication types, the R2C2 team determined that each had required functions as well 
                                                 
57 The Joint Interoperability Test Command, “Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange 
System (CENTRIXS),” http://jitic.fhu.disa.mil/washops/jtca/centrix.html.  Last accessed in May 2006. 
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as a potential for enhancement to improve link capacity.  For civilian communication, a 
local voice link as well as a long haul data link back to civilian databases and resources 
were required.  An enhancement to the civilian communication system was determined to 
be the addition of an Internet access point for limited civilian use.  This conclusion was 
based on user input and HA/DR findings in the previous chapters.  For the tactical 
communications link, it was concluded that voice communications would be sufficient to 
pass important information.  However, adding a wireless, long-range connection could 
increase SA for the R2C2 operators by providing scouts the means to transfer video and 
data in real time.  The coalition communication link must simply ensure a voice and 
CENTRIXS capability.  No enhancements to this communications link were identified.  
Lastly, the strategic communications link provided R2C2 operators the ability to send 
voice, video, and data.  This requirement came directly from mission analysis as well as 
both the DJC2 CPD and BAA documents.  To enhance the long haul link, a high 
bandwidth satellite terminal must be teamed with a high bandwidth satellite constellation. 
 The identification and elaboration of all the links needed for communication 
required the R2C2 team to further investigate communications links not specified in the 
DJC2 CPD and BAA.  Both the civilian communication enhancement and the tactical 
link were not addressed by the CPD and BAA, but have been deemed necessary given the 
previous mission analysis and detailed link analysis in Table 5. 
4.2.2 Architecture Baseline 
The R2C2 team created the Architecture Baseline to act as a graphical 
representation of how different functionalities of the R2C2 interact.  Each box on the 
Architecture Baseline represented an area that was filled by a physical component or 
software application during system design alternative generation.  By filling every box 
with different design alternatives, a variety of designs were created, while still ensuring 
full system functionality in each scenario.  The Architecture Baseline is better explained 





































Figure 12:  Architecture Baseline 
The Architecture Baseline was broken into the Main toolset, outlined in a black 
dotted line, and the Support toolset, outlined in the yellow dotted line.  The Support 
functions existed solely to ensure the Main aspects of the system were able function.  
Four Functional areas made up the Main aspect of the system:  the Long Haul 
Communications (LHC) link, Local Communications (LOC) link, Information 
Management (IM), and security.  The LHC area covered the strategic, civilian, and 
coalition communication links that were previously discussed.  The LOC link offered 
communication capabilities to entities within the area of operation.  This area covered the 
tactical link to supporting scouts and other local links to civilians and coalition partners.  
Next, the IM area included the collection, storage, analysis, and display of all data 
entering the system.  The IM areas would ensure the most up-to-date SA software was 
integrated and accurate for local, organic, and command entities.  The last subset of the 
Main toolset was security, outlined in solid black.  Security fed into the LHC, LOC, and 
IM systems to reduce the risk of data corruption and to maintain its integrity. 
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 The Support toolset consisted of five functional areas that were integral to  
Main system operation:  Power, Human System Interface (HSI), Logistics Support, 
Physical/Personnel/Operations Security, and Environmental Protection.  Power and HSI 
were the most important areas of concern.  The Power subset addressed whether there 
was a need for a portable R2C2 power source.  HSI, in this case, referred to the 
transportability and packaging of the system and forced system designs to incorporate 
lightweight and compact components. 
4.2.3 Market Analysis 
Given the broad spectrum covered by the Main and Support toolsets, many 
different methods and equipment were identified as possible solutions to areas of the 
Architecture Baseline.  In order to fully identify all methods and equipment, a market 
survey was completed by the R2C2 team.  The team was divided into smaller groups to 
research areas of communications, IM, and power.  All researched equipment and 
software were geared towards creating a small, portable unit for use in an austere 
location.  The findings of the survey are revealed in Sections 4.2.3.1.1 through 4.2.3.1.4. 
4.2.3.1 Communication Alternatives 
Communication systems are comprised of a sender, a receiver and a 
transmission medium over which the information travels.  The objective is to ensure the 
meaning assigned to the data is recovered with minimum degradation.  The mobile R2C2 
communication system focused on transferring three critical types of information: voice, 
video, and data.  The market survey was conducted to identify all means to transport 
information via a local and long haul link.  From mission analysis, it was assumed that 
hard-line, terrestrial infrastructure was not reliable or available for communications and 
all links must be achieved through the free space environment. 
4.2.3.1.1 Local Voice Communication.  Local communication 
alternatives were broken down into voice and data options.  Table 6 shows common, 
present-day voice communication devices.  Information on the size, weight, number of 
components, infrastructure, security, and coverage were identified for each 
communication method.  These were selected to facilitate the selection of voice 
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equipment that could easily be integrated into the R2C2 without a significant addition in 
weight or a reduction in capability. 
Device Size Weight Number of Components 
Infrastructure 
Needed Secure Coverage 
Satellite Phones       
Globalstar58 Handheld Ounces 1 Space No Global 
Iridium59 Handheld Ounces 1 Space Yes Global 
Radio Phones60 Handheld Ounces 1 Terrestrial No Local/Extendable 
Cell Phones Handheld Ounces 1 Terrestrial No Local 
Personal Cell System61 Handheld Ounces Many Personal No Extendable Local 
Military Radio       
Manpack Radio62 15 x 10 x 4 20 pounds 1 None Yes Beyond LOS 
LMR63 Handheld Ounces 1 Space Yes LOS 
Table 6:  Voice Communication in the Local Environment 
Satellite phones were selected because they are currently used 
worldwide by traveling businesses and during military operations.  These phones are 
small and lightweight, but require a user to be within a satellite coverage zone.  Satellite 
phone constellations travel in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) patterns and operate within the  
L Band.  Globalstar and Iridium satellite phones are comparable in capability, but the 
U.S. military currently has a contract with Iridium Satellite LLC. 
Radio phones were researched because they are a means of 
communication used in countries all over the world.  In many Third World countries, 
Radio phones are used predominantly for police and government communication.   
Radio phones use a frequency within a country’s radio spectrum and operate by utilizing 
the national radio tower communications infrastructure.  Any individual with a  
Radio phone can set the correct frequency and transmit over a long range because the 
signal is relayed from tower to tower.  Although the Radio phones can transmit long 
                                                 
58 Globalstar, Inc. Company Website, http://www.globalstar.com, April 2006. 
59 Iridium Satellite Company Website, http://www.iridium.com, March 2006. 
60 Interview between Dr. Gary Langford, Professor, NPS and ENS James Colgary, Student, NPS,  
1 March 2006. 
61 IP Access, “Nano BTS,” http://www.ipaccess.com/products/nanoBTS.htm, March 2006. 
62 Interview between Capt Kevin Stoffell, USMC, Student, NPS and ENS James Colgary, Student, 
NPS, 29 March 2006. 
63 Ibid. 
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distances, all transmissions are subject to interception because encryption does not  
commercially exist.64 
 Cell phones are in common usage all over the world.  Given that 
the cell infrastructure only exists in highly populated areas, the use of cell technology in 
far removed locations is not possible.  The internationally recognized cell phone standard 
is GSM.  Cell phones will only function if within a working coverage area, the individual 
has subscribed to a cell phone service provider, and the individual has a compatible cell 
phone.  Currently, transmission over cell phones can be intercepted and easily 
interpreted.  The encryption standard used by GSM has been deemed vulnerable by 
international cryptologists.65 
 A personal cell system is a relatively new concept that allows 
individuals to set up or expand a small cell phone infrastructure.  This technology is 
useful in locations that do not receive acceptable cell phone coverage.  Small transceiver 
devices are setup in a method to expand cell phone coverage over a particular area.  The 
transceiver can link back to a commercial cell system or act as an independent system for 
multiple users to communicate only with one another. 
 Military radio uses Government-Off-The-Shelf (GOTS) products 
that are commonly used in the field for voice communications between soldiers.  Both 
manpack radios and handheld Land Mobile Radios (LMRs) were chosen to represent this 
category.  Manpack radios and LMRs can operate in the same frequency spectrum, but 
manpack radios provide an additional link power to send voice transmission further than 
standard LMRs.66 
4.2.3.1.2 Local Data Communication.  Table 7 displays the data 
communication options for local communications.  The number of components needed, 
power requirements, security of transmission, data rate, and coverage area for available 
technology was collected. 
                                                 
64 Interview between Dr. Gary Langford, Professor, NPS and ENS James Colgary, Student, NPS,  
1 March 2006. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Interview between Capt Kevin Stoffell, USMC, Student, NPS and ENS James Colgary, Student, 
NPS, 29 March 2006. 
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  Power Required Secure Data Rate Coverage 
Wireless Personal Area 
Network (PAN)67 Low No 2 Mbps 10 m 
Wi-Fi: 802.11b68 Med Yes 11 Mbps 30 m 
Wi-Max: 802.1669 High No 70 Mbps 50 km 
Table 7:  Data Communication in the Local Environment 
The wireless PAN is a very short range means of data transfer.  
This technology is commonly used to facilitate “hands free” and local (within 10 m) data 
transfer of large files.  Utilizing a wireless PAN can reduce wire clutter and overall 
equipment weight, but remains unsecured and only useful in short range. 
802.11 (Wi-Fi) is the most common wireless protocol.  It allows 
for a high data transfer rate over a wide area.  One wireless router can support multiple 
users over a 30-meter radius.  Wi-Fi eliminates the need for wires connecting each 
computer and greatly increases a user’s mobility.  Currently, only 802.11b is  
National security Agency (NSA) certified to be secure using a SECNET 11 device.70 
802.11 “a” and “g” are not supported by an approved security standard. 
 802.16 (Wi-Max) wireless technology is a long range, high 
bandwidth protocol.  Current employment of Wi-Max technology is in a point-to-point 
configuration and requires a large amount of power.  Two Wi-Max antennas must point 
directly at one another to successfully transmit data.  Data transmission ranges have 
exceeded 50 km in coverage.71  Wi-Max technology can be coupled with Wi-Fi to 
transmit data over a long range and create a local access point for standard Wi-Fi users. 
4.2.3.1.3 Satellite Constellations Used for Long Haul 
Communications.  Table 8 displays the various satellite constellations that can be used for 
long haul communications.  Constellations were organized into Geosynchronous Earth 
Orbit (GEO) and LEO groupings.  GEO satellites orbit at an altitude of 22,000 miles, 
                                                 
67 Mobile Computing Definitions, “PAN,” http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/sDefinition/ 
0,,sid40_gci546288,00.html, May 2006. 
68 Wikipedia, “802.ll,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/802.11b, March 2006. 
69 BluePrint Wi-Fi Report I. 
70 Harris, “Secure Communications Solutions,” http://www.govcomm.harris.com/secure-comm/,  
May 2006. 
71 Caroline Gabriel, “Wi-Max:  The Critical Wireless Standard,” BluePrint Wi-Fi Report I, 
1 October 2003, p. 4. 
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while LEO satellites orbit at an altitude between 312 miles and 1,242 miles.72  In order to 
successfully transmit over the long GEO range, a ground terminal must transmit at a 
higher power than small or handheld LEO satellite communication devices.  The altitude 
of a satellite system has a direct impact on the time it takes to send a message from one 
location on the earth to another.  The higher the orbiting altitude, the longer it takes for a 
message to reach the recipient. 
 
Satellite Primary Band BW (Mbps) 
GEO    
Commercial    
INMARSAT73 L <0.125 
Intelsat Ku Dependent on terminal
Eutelsat Ku Dependent on terminal
Hispasat Ku Dependent on terminal
Eurpoestar Ku Dependent on terminal
IPStar Ku Dependent on terminal
ShinSat Ku Dependent on terminal
AsiaSat Ku Dependent on terminal
Military    
DSCS74 X Dependent on terminal
Milstar75 X <1.544 
MUOS76 UHF <0.0625 
LEO    
Globalstar77 L <0.01 
Iridium78 L <0.01 
Table 8:  Satellite Constellations Available for Use 
GEO satellites were organized into commercial and military 
categories.  Commercial constellations require satellite transmission in Ku Band, while 
military systems require transmission in the X Band.  The Commercial INMARSAT and 
the military’s Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) operate in different bands.  
                                                 
72 Tin Hua Lee, “An Analysis of Emerging Commercial Wide Band Satellite System and Their 
Potential for Military Use,” http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA361515.  Last accessed in May 2006. 
73 Inmarsat Company Website, http://government.inmarsat.com/solutions/default.aspx.  Last accessed 
in April 2006. 
74 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 6-0, Joint Communications System,  
20 March 2006, pp. 11-10. 
75 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
76 Bryan Scurry, “Mobile User Objective System (MUOS),” Presentation given at the  
Norfolk Convention Center, Norfolk, VA, 29 June 2005. 
77 Globalstar, Inc., Company Website, http://www.globalstar.com, April 2006. 
78 Iridium Satellite, Company Website, http://www.iridium.com, March 2006. 
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INMARSAT requires users to purchase an INMARSAT satellite dish and operate in the 
L Band.  Other commercial constellations can accommodate any satellite dish as long as 
the terminal supports the required frequency.  Additionally, INMARSAT only supports 
up to 0.125 Mbps, while other satellite constellations provide as much throughput as the 
designated ground satellite terminal can support.  The military MUOS satellite system 
operates in the UHF frequency spectrum and supports only voice communication.  This 
system has been put into place to globally connect ground forces without reliance on a 
commercial provider. 
The Globalstar and Iridium satellite constellations can provide a 
data transfer capability to users worldwide, in addition to normal voice communication.  
The small terminal required for the LEO constellations makes data products appealing, 
but the data rates available on each system are less than 0.01 Mbps.  The slow Globalstar 
and Iridium data rates would not adequately support users trying to access a SIPRNET or 
NIPRNET account. 
 
4.2.3.1.4 Satellite Terminals Used for Long Haul Communications.  
The last aspect researched for the communications market survey was portable ground 
terminals.  Only Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) satellite systems that had the 
ability to access commercial and military satellite constellations and were capable of 
sending information over Internet Protocol (IP) were investigated.  Furthermore, VSAT 
systems had to have a dish size of less than one meter, a throughput of 2.0 Mbps or 
greater, and a total weight of less than 100 pounds.  These specifications were set in order 
to limit research to satellites that were man-transportable, while still meeting both CPD 
and BAA technical requirements.  Five VSAT terminals were identified that met the size, 
throughput, and weight standard.  Information on all remaining VSATs was collected 
concerning their operating bands, system weight, transmit/receive rate, setup time, power 
consumption, stowed dimension, military standards compliance, licenses, and  
iDirect capability.  iDirect was important during satellite selection because it provides the 
most reliable IP modem for transmission via satellite.79  Additionally, iDirect is the only 
                                                 
79 iDirect, “iDirect Technologies Broadband VSAT System – Summary,” www.idrect.net, May 2006. 
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IP solution authorized for military Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).80  Table 9 
shows an abbreviated compilation of VSAT specifications.  Appendix D contains a more 
detailed table showing specifications for each of the previously stated categories. 
Bands Weight Transmit Rate 
Receive 
Rate Setup Time 
Power  
ConsumptionSat System 
X Ku Ka lbs # of Cases Mbps Mbps min W AC 
Norsat Globetrekker81 Optional Yes Optional <50 1 4 4 <10 480 
Norsat U.P. 520082 Optional Yes Optional 46/46 2 8.448 8.448 10 480 
SWE-DISH IPT-i Mil 
Suitcase83 Yes Yes Optional 86 1 4 4 5 650 
TCS DVM-9084 No Yes No 40 1 2.4 2.4 20 500 
GSI GlobeComm 
Auto-Explorer (.77m)85 No Yes No 48/50 2 4.2 4.2 15 375 
Table 9:  VSAT Terminals 
4.2.3.2 Information Management (IM) Applications 
IM applications help users to manage the information gathered from 
various sources, whether they are organic or inorganic.  An effective package of IM tools 
handles the collection, analyzing, displaying, and storing to give the user optimal SA.  
Commercial, as well as military software suites, currently exist that fulfill the need for 
IM.  Identified from the market survey were three key attributes that must be 
encompassed within a complete IM package:  geospatial information application, a 
collaborative information environment (CIE) application, and digital storage. 
Geospatial information applications provide a variety of maps, satellite 
images, elevation contours, and interactive drawing tools for mission planning and 
operations.  Google Earth®, ArcView®, and Microsoft Terraserver® are commercial 
software products with which the user can see multiple images of a location from 
                                                 
80 Telephone conversation between Mr. Joseph Harry, STEP Site Operations Technician,  
Camp Roberts, CA, and LCDR Lisa Sullivan, Student, NPS, 15 May 2006. 
81 Norsat, Norsat Globetrekker Brochure, http://www.norsat.com/pdf/download/UPT.pdf.   
Last accessed in April 2006. 
82 Norsat, UP 5200 Brochure, http://www.norsat.com/pdf/download/Norsat%205200Ku-10W-
P3K.pdf.  Last accessed in April 2006. 
83SWE-DISH, SWE-DISH IPT-I Mil Suitcase Brochure, http://www.swe-dish.se/upload/_PDF/SWE-
DISH%20IPT%20MIL%20Suitcase%202006.pdf.  Last accessed in April 2006. 
84 TeleCommuncations Systems, TCS DVM90 Brochure, http://www.telecomsys.com/downloads/ 
government/pdf/brochure_DVM90.pdf.  Last accessed in April 2006. 
85 GSI GlobeComm, Auto-Explorer Brochure, http://www.globecommsystems.com/pdf/0.77% 
20Auto%20explorer.pdf.  Last accessed in April 2006. 
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different angles and virtually fly in and around the location of interest.  These SA 
functions are useful for mission planning, rehearsal, and execution.  While commercial 
products are user friendly and open source, they do not include the most updated satellite 
imagery.  There are many military products that provide the same functions with high 
resolution Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED).  FalconView is one example of a 
GOTS system that was originally used for flight planning, but is now being used by 
ground forces.86  In addition to mapping software for mission planning, a COP capability 
that displays an updated battle space environment of terrain, weather, enemy forces, and 
friendly forces will be provided by the military product Global Command and Control 
System-Joint (GCCS-J). 
A CIE utilizes software tools to allow a virtual meeting and workspace 
between different users that are geographically separated.  DJC2 systems, including the 
RRK, will include the Defense Collaboration Tool Suite (DCTS) and Information 
Workstation (IWS) to meet the requirement to allow a CIE “to facilitate parallel 
operations among RCCs, joint force headquarters, the service components, and other 
organizations that are separated by time, organizational boundaries, and geography.”87  
Groove Virtual Office® is a commercial collaborative tool suite that offers peer-to-peer 
access anywhere through the Internet, virtual meetings, file sharing, automatic 
encryption, alert notification, and instant communications via chat or voice.  Groove has 
been successfully used by NPS HFN, TNT, COASTS groups and national agencies, such 
as Homeland Security, for disaster relief exercises and operations and has been approved 
for use in the DCTS.88 
Digital storage refers to computer components, devices, and recording 
media that retain binary information for an interval of time.  Digital storage played an 
important role in the R2C2 environment.  The most applicable type of storage to the 
system was nonvolatile storage.  Non-volatile memory is not affected by inconsistent 
power supply and can retain data for an indefinite period.  It allows important data and 
                                                 
86 Chris Bailey, Senior Research Engineer, “Reference Department of Defense Usage of 
FalconView™,” http://www.falconview.org/events.htm.  Last accessed in March 2006. 
87 DJC2, CPD, OPNAV N71C2-668(1)-71-05, 30 November 2005, p. C-10. 
88 Groove Networks Website, www.groove.net.  Last accessed in March 2006. 
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information captured by the scouts, such as images and video, to be stored in the devices.  
It also provides storage for all the information processed by the R2C2 applications. 
Currently, there are three types of nonvolatile storage which are applicable 
to the R2C2 environment:  magnetic, optical, and flash memory storage.  Magnetic 
storage uses different patterns of magnetization on a magnetically coated surface to store 
information.  The floppy disk and the hard disk are examples of magnetic storage.  These 
two types of storage could be found in the R2C2 laptops, although floppy disk drives are 
fast becoming obsolete items.  The storage capacity of the hard disk in the COTS laptop 
ranged between 40 Gigabytes (GB) and 100 GB.  Optical disc storage uses tiny pits 
etched on the surface of a circular disc to store information, and reads this information by 
illuminating the surface with a laser diode and observing the reflection.  Some of these 
include CD, DVD, CD-R, DVD-R, etc.  The last type of storage applicable to R2C2 was 
flash memory.  Flash memory is a form of rewritable memory chip that is small and 
easily transportable to any system with a common interface.  Flash memory on the 
market included a variety of sized Secure Digital (SD) cards, USB thumb drives, compact 
flash cards, multimedia cards (MMC), memory sticks, and smart media.  The benefit of 
using such devices is the ultra-portability, but it is limited to a current maximum of 4 GB  
of storage.89 
4.2.3.3 Power Alternatives 
 Power alternatives researched in the market survey aimed to fulfill a small, 
portable, long-lasting option that could sustain a communication system.  Categories of 
power researched were:  gas generators, batteries, fuel cells, solar, and wind power 
systems.  The best-performing product in each category is identified in Table 10.  
Generators proved to output the most power, while solar and wind devices were capable 
of the second largest power output.  Solar panels, however, required significant sunlight 
and the wind turbine required a very fast wind speed.  External batteries researched did 
not output a comparable power rating as the previous alternatives, but were very small 
and retained the ability to be placed in series to provide a large amount of power.  Micro 
                                                 
89 Wikipedia, “Computer Storage,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Storage.  Last accessed in  
May 2006. 
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fuel cells were found to produce a comparable amount of power to batteries, last 
significantly longer, and are in a smaller package.  Unfortunately, micro fuel cells have 
not yet achieved commercial maturity. 
 










(portable)90 2,000 20.1 x 11.4 x 16.7 46.3 15 Need gas 
External Battery      
BA5590 Military91 90 6 x 4 x 2 2.2 2.3 None 
N-Charge92 90 9.05 x 11.8 x 0.5 2.96 1.4 None 
Micro Fuel Cell93 90 2.6 x 2.6 x 2.6 1.06 7.2 None 
Solar94 1,350 12.3 x 15.6 x 38 94.6 19 Need light 
Wind95 1,000 51 x 20 x 13 65 Wind dependent Need 26 mph wind 
Table 10:  Power Systems 
4.3 GENERATION OF R2C2 SYSTEM DESIGN ALTERNATIVES 
 As seen from the market survey results, many solutions existed to create a small, 
rapid response, communications unit.  The R2C2 Architecture group selected the best 
alternatives for each functional area highlighted in the Architecture Baseline.  All 
tradeoffs were done under the assumption that local infrastructure was unreliable and/or 
nonexistent and the overall system design had to be small.  These assumptions were taken 
from the mission and requirements analysis done in previous chapters. 
4.3.1 Local Communications (LOC) Link 
 The number of local link alternatives generated by the market survey was reduced 
as a result of the DJC2 JPO’s suggestion that the R2C2 team focus only on LOC voice 
                                                 
90 Honda, “Super Quiet Inverter Generators,” http://www.hondapowerequipment.com/gensup.asp.  
Last accessed in May 2006. 
91 David Morrison, “Micro Fuel Cell Demonstrates High Power Output,” 
http://powerelectronics.com/news/fuel-cell-output/.  Last accessed in May 2006. 
92 Valence Technology, Inc., “Why Compromise Military Safety with Traditional Lithium-ion 
Batteries?” http://www.valence.com/pdffiles/Military_Datasheet.pdf.  Last accessed in May 2006. 
93 Morrison, May 2006. 
94 SolarSense, “Nomad 1500 Pro Series,” http://www.solarsense.com/Products/1-Complete_Systems/ 
3-NOMAD_1500/NOMAD_1500.html.  Last accessed in May 2006. 
95 Southwest Windpower, “Whisper 100/200 Specification Sheet,” http://www.alpinesurvival.com/ 
Whisper_100_200_Spec_Sheet.pdf.  Last accessed in May 2006. 
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connectivity.  The number of voice alternatives was reduced from the seven identified in 
the market survey down to three.  This was done by eliminating those means that were 
reliant on terrestrial infrastructure and incapable of secure voice transmission.  Military 
manpack radios, LMRs, and Iridium satellite phones were therefore selected as R2C2 
local voice alternatives.  These methods were explored further in Chapters 5.0 and 6.0 to 
determine which LOC method was optimal for R2C2 use. 
 Although the DJC2 JPO recommended the LOC link consist solely of voice 
alternatives, the R2C2 team decided to establish an LOC alternative that would allow for 
high bandwidth data transfer over a long distance.  The data link encompassed two 
technologies identified in the market survey:  802.16 (Wi-Max) and 802.11 (Wi-Fi).  This 
decision was made to determine whether or not a data link would truly add value to the 
LOC link used by the scouts operating in the field.  Because a significant amount of 
research with the Wi-Max and Wi-Fi protocols has been done by the COASTS, TNT, and 
HFN groups at NPS, the addition of a similar link into the R2C2 system was chosen in 
order to explore its effectiveness in a small C2 unit.  Link models were created to 
evaluate the LOC data link and were analyzed in Chapters 5.0 and 6.0. 
4.3.2 Long Haul Communications (LHC) Link 
Long haul communication via a satellite relay was determined to be the only 
viable means of IP communication.  Long haul reachback alternatives, using sky waves, 
ground waves, or terrestrial relay systems, were ruled out due to significant range and 
bandwidth restrictions.  Therefore, the utilization of a GEO satellite connection was 
determined to be the only option for high bandwidth voice, video, and data transfer 
between the R2C2 and the RCC. 
Satellite information transfer for a military application can transit by way of the 
“front door” method, “back door” method, or VPN Gateway.  Trade-offs for these three 
methods concerned the security level/layers required as well as the amount of network 
equipment needed by the user. 
The front door method of data transfer is an extremely secure means of 
communication.  Data can be sent from a ground terminal via any location on earth that is 
within the coverage area of a commercial or military satellite.  Before the data is sent 
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from a ground terminal to a satellite, it must pass through an OSI Layer 1 security 
measure: bulk encryption.  Bulk encryption is a method by which the security of an entire 
piece of data, including its intended destination, is concealed.  Bulk encryption can be 
achieved through the use of a separate bulk encryption device or AES.  AES software, 
however, is permitted only when using an iDirect IP modem.96  Once the data package is 
encrypted, it is relayed off a satellite and sent to a military owned and operated ground 
station called a Teleport.  Standardized Tactical Entry Point (STEP) sites,  
Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Stations (NCTAMS), and other 
Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) gateways were combined under one name, a 
Teleport, which handles military correspondence from all over the world and directs it to 
its destination within the GIG.  After the Teleport has accepted the data transmission and 
decrypted the destination, the Teleport routes the request to NIPRNET, SIPRNET, or 
another destination. 
The back door method allows a global user to send information right to the RCC, 
bypassing the Teleport ground station.  This method of data transfer allows the RCC to 
set his own encryption standards.  The global user then accesses the GIG through the 
RCC’s network router. 
The last method that can be used to transmit data via a satellite is creating a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateway to the RCC.  The VPN can be created through 
the public Internet, allowing R2C2 operators to create a direct tunnel to the RCC’s base 
network.  VPN tunneling to the RCC virtually puts an operator at the command 
headquarters, giving them full access to NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and GIG information.  
Utilizing a VPN falls under Layer 3 security.  This method does not require any bulk 
encryption, just access and subscription to a satellite constellation that is also an  
Internet Service Provider (ISP).  Currently, the 86th Air Force Space and 
Communications Squadron uses the VPN solution for reachback when operating their 
own small communications unit.97 
                                                 
96 Telephone conversation between Mr. Joseph Harry, STEP Site Operations Technician,  
Camp Roberts, California, and LCDR Lisa Sullivan, Student, NPS, 15 May 2006. 
97 Interview between Capt Johnny Hill, USAF, 86th Space and Communications Squadron, 
Kaiserslautern, Germany, and authors, 12 April 2006. 
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In order to reduce the amount of equipment while still maintaining the highest 
amount of possible security, the Architecture group determined that utilizing an AES 
encryption to access a Teleport ground station was the most appropriate method for the  
R2C2 system.  Subsequently, this required the selection of a VSAT terminal that 
supported iDirect technology. 
Due to the selection of an AES and the need to connect to a GEO satellite, the 
ground terminal had to be significantly evaluated to ensure the most appropriate one was 
selected.  Without an effective, capable, and reliable terminal with global reachback, the 
R2C2 system can not fulfill its intended mission.  From the VSAT terminals identified in 
the market survey, each was evaluated to choose the terminal best suited for the R2C2.  
Weight, size, iDirect capability, and current licensing were pronominally compared.  
Further detail on VSAT evaluation is found in Chapter 6.0. 
4.3.3 Information Management (IM) 
 Alternatives generated for the R2C2 IM portion of the Architecture Baseline 
consisted of a network architecture as well as different software packages to aid in SA. 
4.3.3.1 Network Design 
To create a network that accomplished SIPRNET, NIPRNET, and 
CENTRIXS reachback capability, many outside system matter experts were consulted to 
help in design of the system.  As a result, the network design was done at a high level and 
touched on integral parts of the network design like SIPR, NIPR, and CENTRIXS 
encryption requirements.  Figure 13 is a graphical representation of the network 
constructed for R2C2. 
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Figure 13:  IM Network Design 
Included in the network design are laptops (single with interchangeable 
hard drives or multiple single hard drive units), encryption boxes, VoIP phone, switch, 
router and a portable VSAT.  Laptops were selected over personal computer (PC) towers 
because they possessed equal computing capability, while being significantly more 
mobile.  The VoIP was included to meet requirements for a voice connection over an IP  
long haul connection. 
 The most important aspect of the above diagram was how a NIPRNET, 
SIPRNET, and/or CENTRIXS connection was established through the use of a satellite.  
As was previously discussed, the network configuration was streamlined and simplified 
by the selection of a VSAT with iDirect technology to allow for AES software bulk 
encryption.  The network configuration requires that all data sent via the VSAT is bulk 
encrypted.  Since NIPRNET requires no end-to-end encryption, it is only bulk encrypted 
before being sent over a satellite link.  Once the computer establishes a connection to the 
GIG, all data is routed directly to the NIPRNET.  In order to access SIPRNET, the data 
traffic must be end-to-end encrypted by an encryption device.  There is currently no 
software application that can be substituted for the physical encryption component.  The 
data can then pass through an ordinary switch and router combination before being sent 
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out over a standard Ku or X band transmission.  The coalition network, CENTRIXS, can 
only be accessed through SIPRNET and has encryption standards on top of those needed 
for a standard SIPRNET connection.  Therefore, data being passed via CENTRIXS is  
end-to-end encrypted twice and bulk encrypted once before leaving the  
satellite terminal.98 
 In the current configuration, one laptop can access NIPRNET, SIPRNET, 
and CENTRIXS.  The hard drive, however, must be changed out before transitioning to 
each network.99  Alternately, three separate computers could access each network 
simultaneously as long as satellite bandwidth allows it. 
 In the event that an extended LOC data link was integrated into the 
network, there would be a distinct separation of the two networks with the use of an 
additional server and firewall.  The graphical representation in Figure 14 shows the 
network integration. 
Laptops
R2C2 CLASS and 
UNCLASS Processing 






























Figure 14:  Integrated LOC Network 
By placing the R2C2 laptops behind an external server and firewall, the 
R2C2 operators have control over the data that comes into the system from the scouts and 
the RCC.  Given that the scout’s sole mission is to pass information, they do not need 
                                                 
98 Teleconference between Mr. Steve Grant, R2C2 Systems Engineer, and the R2C2 team,  
31 January 2006. 
99 Interview between the DJC2 JPO and the R2C2 team, 29 March 2006. 
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direct access to the Internet—a location to offload important data is sufficient.  The  
Scout Server gives the scouts access to offload data as well as confirmation it was sent 
and received.  Because of the potential vulnerability of the LOC link, the firewall and the 
external server help protect the R2C2 laptops from being compromised.  Additionally, 
they stop the scouts from using long haul bandwidth.  When the R2C2 operators need 
information from the scouts, they retrieve it from the Scout Server.  If real time video 
back to the RCC is required, a change can be made to the firewall in order to allow a 
direct feed from the scouts to the RCC.  Lastly, the server allows a place for the R2C2 to 
host a collaborative network to ensure scouts can view an updated COP. 
4.3.3.2 Software Package 
 The selection of a proper software package for IM was selected based on 
the system needs.  The market survey revealed many different geospatial applications and 
CIEs that are necessary to give a user better SA.  DJC2 software build version 1.0.03 
contains both types of SA applications the R2C2 team identified.  By selecting the DJC2 
software package, the R2C2 system achieved software commonality, interoperability, and 
a reduction in training requirements across DJC2 systems. 
4.3.4 Security 
 This section will be expanded upon in the Security Appendix.  Network, local, 
physical, personnel, and operations security concerns will be addressed. 
4.3.5 Support 
 Alternatives generated from the Support portion of the Architecture Baseline were 
limited to concerns with power and HSI. 
4.3.5.1 Power 
From the market survey, many portable power options were identified.  As 
per the identified requirements, just over 1,300 watts of power would be used by a 
functioning R2C2 Primary Suite.  Power would have to be supplied organically by the 
R2C2 for a minimum of 10.5 hours and a maximum of 8 weeks.  Given the varying 
duration the R2C2 would have to supply its own power, the R2C2 team determined that 
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designing a stand alone C2 system without organic power would be an  
incomplete design. 
 From the market survey, multiple power sources were identified.  The 
alternatives were pared down from six to two alternatives.  Small generators and batteries 
were concluded to be the only reasonable means to provide sufficient power to the entire 
R2C2 system.  Solar and wind energy sources proved to be too large for a two-person 
portable team and did not offer enough power if scaled down in size.  Lastly, micro fuel 
cell technology may a viable option for future development, but is currently too immature 
and incapable of providing over 1,300W for a sustained period.  A battery-powered  
R2C2 system would last a maximum of roughly 1.5 hours operating on 10 batteries.  This 
was an average time based on the wattage consumed by each component in the system.  
For any period of time longer than 1.5 hours, new batteries would have to be used 
because expended batteries could not be recharged.  A small generator, however, could 
support up to a 2,000W system for over 15 hours on a single tank of fuel (1.1 gallons).  
However, fuel must be located and purchased after arriving in the area of operation.  
Chapter 6.0 provides deeper analysis into the selection of an organic power source. 
4.3.5.2 Portability (HSI) 
 Alternatives for portability were addressed throughout the alternative 
generation process.  The Architecture group selected COTS equipment that can be easily 
packed away for each functional area of the Architecture Baseline.  Commercial airline 
and military weight and size standards for carried luggage were taken into account to 
ensure the R2C2 system would meet transportability requirements.  Most major airlines 
require carry-on baggage to be no larger than 45 linear inches (bag length, plus height, 
plus depth) and weigh no more than 40 pounds.100  Normally, checked luggage can be no 
larger than 62 linear inches and weigh no more than 50 pounds.  However, if checked 
luggage exceeds the free 50-pound weight allowance, a passenger must pay a fee to 
check luggage up to 100 pounds.101  Military standards require that items carried over a 
                                                 
100 Free Travel Tips, “Luggage Information,” http://www.freetraveltips.com/Airlines/air03.htm.   
Last accessed in May 2006. 
101 Luggage Pros, “Luggage Restrictions,” http://www.luggagepros.com/policies/luggage-
restrictions.shtml.  Last accessed in May 2006. 
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distance be no more than 45% of an individual’s body weight.  Additionally, items lifted 
three feet from the floor can weigh no greater than 87 pounds for males and 44 pounds 
for females.102  The R2C2 system design incorporated rack mounts, foldable satellite 
dishes, and easily stowable network gear to ensure that integral equipment met 
commercial and military size and weight standards. 
4.4 SUITE GENERATION 
Throughout the alternative generation process and scenario elaboration, the  
R2C2 team acknowledged that the overall system design must be divided into specific 
suites of communications gear to facilitate better flexibility and scalability in operations.   
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Figure 15:  The Architecture Baseline with Suites Highlighted in Dotted Red, Solid Blue, and  
Lined Green 
                                                 
102 United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense Design Criteria Standard,  
Human Engineering, MIL-STD-1472F (DoD), 23 August 1999, p. 139. 
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 The Primary Suite (PS), highlighted in red, contains all IM components, LHC 
gear, laptops, VoIP phone, as well as all the support gear necessary for the given mission.  
The PS most closely represents the RRK system that was outlined in both the CPD and 
BAA.  The Local Suite (LS), highlighted in blue, contains all communications gear that 
was needed for collaboration within the area of operation.  This included gear to be 
stationed at the R2C2 PS as well as with the scouts.  The integration of the CMS, 
highlighted in green, was placed outside the system because in the original Architecture 
Baseline, a node at which civilians could utilize the long haul connection did not exist.  In 
the high-level picture, the CMS would integrate through the R2C2’s  
long haul connection. 
4.4.1 Primary Suite (PS) 
 The PS included the network configuration found in Section 4.3.3.1, Figure 13.  
The PS was the core part of the R2C2 system and can be used to establish R2C2 
reachback capability for every mission. 
4.4.2 Local Suite (LS) 
 The LS was a modular suite that can be added to the PS to fulfill local 
communication requirements in a given scenario.  For instance, if it were decided that 
local communications were not necessary in the Counterterrorism Scenario because of 
the close proximity of the PS with the Special Forces, the LS could be left behind. 
The LS contains three alternatives for further evaluation.  The alternatives come 
from those generated and outlined in LOC link alternative generation, Section 4.2.1.  The 
voice alternatives of military radios and satellite phones were further evaluated to 
determine which was best given the scenarios.  Because military manpack radios and 
LMRs work on the same physical concepts, they were lumped into one alternative called 
military radio.  The determination of the better system was evaluated on transmission 
reliability and coverage within a region in Chapters 5.0 and 6.0.  The third alternative for 
the LS was a scout exclusive data network.  The selected voice communications 
alternative would be coupled with a Wi-Max/Wi-Fi network to give system improvement 
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and redundancy.  Decrease in data transfer time versus the amount of extra components 
the link required was evaluated in Chapter 5.0. 
4.4.3 Civil/Military Suite (CMS) 
 The CMS was also a modular suite that could accompany the Primary R2C2 Suite 
on a mission when its functionality was needed.  Specifically, the CMS would be useful 
in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief scenarios.  Upon speaking with users 
familiar with HA/DR operations, the R2C2 team found that providing civilian 
counterparts access to the Internet as an incentive to share information and collaborate 
was an important concept.  The reason for providing Internet access and interacting with 
civilian entities was previously expounded on in Chapter 2.0. 
 The CMS can be teamed with the PS in two ways: it can be integrated into the PS 
or exist as a separate entity with its own satellite dish.  Figures 16 and 17 show both 
alternatives.  The integrated CMS alternative functions by plugging directly into the 
existing PS router.  Civilians would then use the PS satellite dish and share bandwidth 
with the R2C2 operators to access the Internet through the GIG.  Bandwidth usage issues, 
as well as security issues, needed to be considered when integrating the CMS.  These 
concerns were further investigated in Chapters 5.0 and 6.0.  The second CMS alternative, 
bringing a separate CMS, increases the capability to civil organizations and decreases the 
burden on the PS system.  Currently, the NPS COASTS and HFN programs have been 
doing research on a FLy-Away-Kit (FLAK) that sets up a mesh network of hot spots for 
civilians to connect to and gain Internet access.  Further information on the FLAK can be 
found in Capt Lancaster’s Thesis, “Developing a FLy-Away-Kit (FLAK) to Support 
Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
(HA/DR).”103  Bringing along a separate system involves a significant amount of extra 
equipment and personnel for setup and operation.  Figures 16 and 17 graphically show 
the interaction of the integrated and separate CMS. 
 
                                                 
103 David D. Lancaster, “Developing a FLy-Away-Kit (FLAK) to Support Hastily Formed Networks 
(HFN) for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR),” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 








Packable Satellite  
Figure 16:  Integrated CMS 
 
 
Figure 17:  Separate CMS 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 System architecture design was done with enough detail to facilitate system 
modeling and analysis.  Specific commercial Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) 
satellite systems were identified because of their significant effect on overall system 
weight and performance.  Alternatively, specific network gear or military radios were not 
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addressed in the detail of the satellite systems because it is assumed those components 
would be selected based on reliability and commonality of usage. 
 In summary, the system design facilitates a secure long haul reachback capability 
to SIPR, NIPR, and CENTRIXS networks via a VSAT.  The central suite of the R2C2 
was called the PS and contains all components needed to achieve successful reachback 
communications.  Both an LS and a CMS are modular and can be added to the R2C2 
mission package to further enhance the system’s capability within the area of operation.  
The LS contains either military radios, satellite phones, or a Wi-Max/Wi-Fi data network.  
The CMS contains all the equipment necessary to provide Internet access for civilian 
HA/DR personnel, whether it is integrated into the PS or a separate system.  The 
alternatives generated for each suite were modeled and analyzed in Chapters 5.0 and 6.0. 
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5.0 INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Information Assurance (IA) plays a critical role in ensuring the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information in the R2C2 system.  The Information Assurance 
Technical Framework (IATF)104 was used as the main guiding document in designing the 
R2C2 security architecture.  The following sections of the chapter describe the 
Information System Security Engineering (ISSE) process used, the strategy adopted to 
protect the various enclaves, as well as the specific security components in the 
architecture.  Some areas of research on Multi-Level Security (MLS), which may be 
useful of the future development of R2C2 system are included at the end of the chapter. 
The design of the security architecture follows that of the R2C2 architecture 
baseline.  The enclaves are defined by the Primary Suite, Local Suite and the 
Civil/Military Suite.  Correspondingly, the boundaries exist between the different 
enclaves, between the Primary and Local Suites, between the Primary Suite and RCC, 
and between the Primary and Civil/Military Suites. 
5.2 THE INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY ENGINEERING PROCESS 
(ISSE) 
The R2C2 team adapted the ISSE process from that expounded on in Chapter 3 of 
IATF document release 3.1.  The process is developed based on three key principles, as 
listed in the IATF document: 
a. Always keep the problem and the solution spaces separate. 
b. The problem space is defined by the customer’s mission or business needs. 
c. The system engineer and information systems security engineer define the 
solution space, driven by the problem space.105 
                                                 
104 United States Department of Defense, Directive 8500.1, “Information Assurance,” 24 October 2002 
and Instruction 8500.2, “Information Assurance (IA) Implementation,” 6 February 2003. 
105 National Security Agency, “Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF),” Release 3.1, 
September 2002, Chapter 3, p. 4. 
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The document also emphasized that the customer owned the problem.  The 
system designed was to support the customer’s mission or business.  Though the 
customer owned the problem, it was suggested that the customer might not always be an 
expert in discovering and documenting the problem.  The systems engineer and/or 
information systems security engineer should facilitate the customer in the formulation 
and documentation of the problem.  Conversely, the systems engineer and the 
information systems security engineer were expected to be proficient in developing 
solutions.  The challenge of the systems engineer and the information systems security 
engineer would be, however, to resist the customer’s tendency to intervene/preempt in the 
design of the system as customer design inputs could become constraints on the final 
design and limit the SE design flexibility. 
5.3 PROCESS 
Based on the above principles, the ISSE process was conceived and the relevant 
phases of ISSE process had been adapted for the purpose of this project (as in Figure 18).  
The ISSE process supported the R2C2 SE Approach.  The ensuing paragraphs elaborated 
on various ISSE phases and their respective linkages to each SE phase. 
 
Figure 18:  Relationship between Phases of SE and ISSE 
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Table 11 shows a comparison between the various phases of the SE and  
ISSE processes. 
SE Phases ISSE Phases 
Research 
The systems engineer determined the customers.  They 
assisted the customers to understand and document the 
information management needs that support the 
business or mission. 
Discover Information Protection Needs 
The information systems security engineer facilitated 
the understanding of the information protection needs 
to support the mission or business with the customer.  
(the engineer didn’t facilitate the customer) Statements 
about information protection should be documented. 
Conceptual Design 
The systems engineer allocated identified needs to 
systems.  Various scenarios were developed to scope 
the system environment and to link the allocation of 
system functions to that environment.  A preliminary 
system CONOPS was written to describe operational 
requirements of the candidate system (or systems). 
Define System Security Requirements 
The information systems security engineer allocated 
information protection needs to systems.  A system 
security context, a preliminary system security 
CONOPS, and security requirements were developed. 
Preliminary Design 
The systems engineer performed functional analysis 
and allocation by analyzing candidate architectures, 
allocating system requirements, and selecting 
mechanisms.  The systems engineer developed the 
system architecture by allocating functions to selected 
components or elements and describing the 
relationships between the elements. 
Design System Security Architecture 
The information systems security engineer worked 
with the systems engineer in the areas of functional 
analysis and allocation by analyzing candidate 
architectures, allocating security services, and 
selecting security mechanisms.  The information 
systems security engineer developed the security 
architecture by allocating security functions to selected 
components and elements and describing the inter-
components interactions. 
Design Selection 
The systems engineer used models to analyze design 
constraints and trade-offs.  The systems engineer 
developed test and evaluation parameters.  The 
proposed design was tested against the parameters. 
The results of the testing and evaluation phase were 
analyzed to determine the effectiveness of each 
architecture design.  Based on this analysis, the R2C2 
Team provided recommendations to the JPO. 
Develop Detailed Security Design 
The information systems security engineer analyzed 
security design constraints and analyzed trade-offs.  
The information systems security engineer mapped all 
of the system security requirements to the elements 
exhaustively.  The final detailed security design results 
in component and interface specifications that provide 
sufficient information for acquisition when the system 
is implemented. 
Table 11:  SE and ISSE Phases 
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5.4 INFORMATION ASSURANCE FOR THE TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT 
The R2C2 system is expected to operate in a wide range of environment ranging 
from a sheltered, air-conditioned hotel room to a rural environment under hostile fire.  
Information Assurance for system operating in such diverse physical environments is 
especially challenging.  This section highlights some of these specific protection needs. 
The framework was mapped against the various scenarios for R2C2 operation, namely 
Pandemic, Disaster Relief, Counterterrorism, Civil Unrest, and Deployment, to determine 
the protection needs. 
5.5 SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS 
5.5.1 Wiping Classified Data 
The three drivers for tactical data wiping were storage, national level reuse, or 
multinational reuse of equipment.  Tactical data wiping removed residual classified or 
other sensitive information from any storage media residing in tactical communications 
or computer equipment.  The nature of operation that required the deployment of R2C2 
system might transcend different sensitivity and integrity classifications.  As such, IA 
technologies must be available to rapidly and completely remove any sensitive 
information and ensure that the information would not be recoverable prior to reuse.  This 
would allow the R2C2 system rapidly redeployed at different operation classification 
level.  In scenarios like deployment, counterterrorism and civil unrest, the environments 
might hostile.  As such, the information assurance technologies would include  
tamper-proof cryptography, programmable cryptographic chips and over-the-air key load 
and zeroize functions. 
5.5.2 Stored Data Protection in a Hostile Environment 
Tactical forces faced the possibility of enemy capture or overrun, leading to the 
seizure of critical, sensitive or classified information.  Even in relatively nonhostile 
environments like Pandemic and Disaster Relief, the R2C2 operators would be charged 
with the responsibility to maintain the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
information.  As such, information assurance technologies like intrusion 
117 
detection/prevention, file or media/bulk encryption and zeroization (in case of 
compromise) should be included.  These services should be transparent to the users. 
5.5.3 Key Management in a Tactical Environment 
Key management played a pivotal role in current information assurance 
implementation.  The overall key management for a tactical communication network 
involved generation, distribution, and storage of keying materials.  These required 
extensive key management infrastructures (KMI).  For purpose of R2C2, it would not be 
feasible/practical for two-person operators to manage this extensive infrastructure.  As 
such, remote key management mechanisms, like remote rekey, were essential to eliminate 
the need for large COMSEC logistics in the field.  Mechanisms like over-the-air rekey 
(OTAR), over-the-air zeroize (OTAZ) and over-the-air transfer (OTAT) of keys enable 
reaction for key compromise to ensure continual provision of services.  There must be an 
automated process for conducting the above mechanisms. 
5.5.4 Network Mobility/Dynamic Networks 
The crux of the R2C2 system lay on the mobility and dynamic connectivity for 
rapid deployment.  However, together with these capabilities spawned a host of 
vulnerabilities like eavesdropping, spoofing, and denial of service (DoS) attacks.  The 
operator must be capable of seamlessly connected to the network of intent, hence, 
provision of service.  The information assurance must prevent unauthorized access to 
protected network and provide protection against geo-location by an adversary. 
5.5.5 Secure Net Broadcast and Multicast 
Tactical communications equipment must allow operators to roam over a wide 
area and still be able to receive and send secure broadcast and multicast data over the 
local infrastructure.  Even in scenario like the Pandemic and Disaster Relief, it would be 
required for secure multicast and broadcast in order to exercise principle of least privilege 
and maintain integrity (and authenticity) of message in order to facilitate  
rumor suppression. 
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5.5.6 Low BW Communications 
Numerous information assurance technologies were built on high power and BW.  
In the counterterrorism, deployment and civil unrest scenario, there would be low BW 
communication to the R2C2 system.  These communications were usually operated with 
little or no assurance.  This would potentially compromise the information integrity of 
R2C2 system.  As such, there must be mechanisms to address the information assurance 
of low BW communications.  Potential approaches would include the integration of 
commercial information assurance tools into tactical systems. 
5.5.7 Split-Base Operations 
Split-base refers to a situation in which a unit is deployed away from its home 
base to a forward operating base in or near the battlefield.  This cascading concept was 
evident in the R2C2 architecture.  The approach was to operate in the forward position 
with minimum communications logistics while relying on “home base” infrastructure 
through communication links.  Under such circumstances, the communication linkages 
would become the bloodlines of the force’s capabilities; the force would be dislocated if 
the linkages were compromised.  As such, robust information assurance technologies 
would be required to ensure the continual provision of services, integrity of information, 
authenticity of information exchanges.  The network-centric configuration approach 
might address this requirement. 
5.5.8 Multilevel Security 
The specification of R2C2 system dictated that it must be two-person 
transportable.  This constrained the quantity of physical systems possible.  In addition, 
the system would serve as a trusted subject to negotiate information flow in accordance 
with security policies.  The R2C2 would need to operate in different levels of 
classification.  This would be apparent in the disaster relief and counter-terrorism 
scenarios, where the system had to interact in a civil-military and coalition fashion.  
Multilevel systems offered streamlining of device logistics and capability to negotiate 
communication across different level simultaneously.  The potential security violation 
vis-à-vis the operational requirement to operate in a multilevel system environment 
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stressed the security system design.  The investigation into Multiple Independent Level 
Security (MILS) with the necessary encryption technologies might address the multilevel 
security requirement. 
5.6 DEFENSE IN DEPTH INTRODUCTION 
Defense in Depth is a practical strategy for achieving information assurance in 
today’s highly networked environments.  The concept of Defense in Depth is to apply 
multiple heterogeneous mechanisms deployed in a layered manner across the 
organization’s computing environment so as to protect its data, applications, systems and 
networks from unauthorized access.  Defense in Depth is a best-practice strategy in that it 
recommends the application of existing techniques and technologies that are currently 
available to devise a balanced approach to address protection capability, cost, 
performance and operational considerations.  
5.6.1 Adversaries, Motivations, and Classes of Attack 
To effectively protect its information and information systems from unauthorized 
access and attacks, an organization must be able to identify its adversaries, characterize 
their potential motivations and attack capabilities.  From the outcome of the mission 
analysis conducted for R2C2, the potential adversaries would probably include nation 
states, insurgents, terrorists and hackers.  Their main motivation would be reconnaissance 
and intelligence gathering so as to devise the appropriate countermeasures for the various 
planned missions.  The IATF considered five classes of attacks, which could be 
summarized in Table 12. 106 
                                                 
106 National Security Agency, “Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF),” Release 3.1, 





Passive attacks include traffic analysis, monitoring of unprotected communications, 
decrypting weakly encrypted traffic, and capture of authentication information 
(e.g., passwords). Passive intercept of network operations can give adversaries 
indications and warnings of impending actions. Passive attacks can also result in 
disclosure of information or data files to an attacker without the consent or 
knowledge of the user. 
Active 
Active attacks include attempts to circumvent or break protection features, introduce 
malicious code, or steal or modify information.  These attacks may be mounted 
against a network, exploit information in transit, electronically penetrate an enclave, 
or attack an authorized remote user during an attempt to connect to an enclave. 
Active attacks can result in the disclosure or dissemination of data files, denial of 
service, or modification of data. 
Close-In 
Close-in attack is characterized by individuals attaining close physical proximity to 
networks, systems, or facilities for the purpose of modifying, gathering, or denying 
access to information. 
Insider 
Insider attacks can be malicious or non-malicious.  Malicious insiders intentionally 
eavesdrop, steal or damage information, use information in a fraudulent manner, or 
deny access to other authorized users.  Non-malicious attacks typically result from 
carelessness, lack of knowledge, or intentional circumvention of security for such 
reasons as “getting the job done.” 
Distribution 
Distribution attacks focus on the malicious modification of hardware or software at 
the factory or during distribution.  These attacks can introduce malicious code into a 
product, such as a back door to gain unauthorized access to information or a system 
function at a later date. 
Table 12:  Classes of Attack 
It was assumed that the threats induced by the insider and distribution attacks, 
shown in Table 12 in italics, would be mitigated by through personnel security screening 
and an existing secured distribution channel respectively.  As such, the focus is on the 
first three classes of attacks when devising an appropriate suite of security protection 
measures for R2C2. 
5.6.2 People, Technology, Operations 
Information Assurance is achieved when there is confidence that the 
confidentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity of the information is attained, and 
is protected against attacks by the protection mechanisms that are in place.  To fully 
realize the Defense in Depth strategy, the achievement of Information Assurance would 
require a balanced focus of three primary elements, namely, people, technology, and 




Figure 19:  Defense in Depth Strategy107 
It was the deliberate intention of R2C2 to focus on the technology aspects of 
providing Defense in Depth, which was also in line with the focus of the IATF.  The 
technology focus areas are further categorized into 1. Defend the Network, 2. Defend the 
Enclave Boundaries, and 3. Secure the Computing Environment, details of which would 
be covered in the subsequent sections. 
5.7 DEFENDING THE NETWORK 
Networks are mechanisms for the transport of data between users.  They must be 
protected against data interception, as well as DoS attacks that could bring information 
flow to a halt. Such protection will encompass user, control and management traffic. 
The type of communications technologies used in the R2C2 architectures includes 
satellite links, IEEE802.11, IEEE802.16, military links as well as Iridium phones.  All 
these communications links, seen in Figure 20, will have to be protected. 
                                                 
107 National Security Agency, “Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF),” Release 3.1, 
September 2002, Chapter 2, p. 7. 
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Figure 20:  R2C2 Communication Links 
Threats to the network include interception of content (full awareness of all 
communications), interception of IP headers (traffic analysis), spoofing (steal data or 
inject false data), and jamming (denial of service). 
Security requirements for the network comprise access control, authentication, 
availability, confidentiality, integrity, and nonrepudiation.  The general approach towards 
information assurance in the network will be multiple layers of encryption, and strong 
network identification and authentication.  This will include the use of Teleport sites and 
NSA approved (e.g., Type 1) encryptors to protect classified data transported over the 
network. In order to ensure network availability, there will be a need to utilize approved 
mechanisms that ensure the positive control of network elements, Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) enabled authentication and access control for remote management of 
all critical network elements, and authentication and integrity protection for all network 
management transactions. 
A combination of software (shown in blue in Figure 21) and hardware (shown 
above in black) mechanisms would be useful in defending the network at the various 
layers.  To secure datalink traffic, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) would be 
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employed, as well as hardware-based SecNet-11 devices.  At the network layer,  
Viasat KG-250 and TACLANE Type 1 network encryptors (hardware-based) would 
provide another layer of protection.  Yet another layer of tunnelling protection would be 
employed at the application layer, through the use of Secure Shell (SSH) and  
Secure Socket Layer (SSL). 
 
Figure 21:  Defending the Network at Various Layers 
In the future, SecNet-54 devices could be used instead of the SecNet-11 ones, 
allowing greater data communications throughput over the WLAN at IEEE802.11 a/b/g 
(SecNet-11 only operates at IEEE802.11b).  NSA certification is expected in fall 2006. 
5.8 DEFEND THE ENCLAVE BOUNDARY/EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS 
This section addresses the role of IA technologies in providing protection for the 
enclave.  An enclave is an environment under the control of a single authority with 
personnel and physical security measures.  It is an important component of the  
defense-in-depth strategy for IA.  There are three identified enclave boundaries in the 
R2C2 system which consists of three suites, namely the Primary Suite (PS), the  
Local Suite (LS), and the Civil/Military Suite.  Each suite is encompassed by an enclave.  
Each suite either has a network connection to another suite or has an external connection 
to SIPRNET, NIPRNET, CENTRIXS, or the Internet.  Each of these enclaves are 
governed by its own unique security policy. 
The defense focus of the enclave boundary is on the effective control and 
monitoring of data flow in and out of these enclaves.  Devices such as firewalls, guards, 
intrusion detection systems (IDS), network vulnerability scanning tools and virus 
detectors will be deployed in the R2C2 LAN for enclave boundary protection and 
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monitoring.  Their main purpose is to protect the inside from the outside by access 
controlling as well as to detect and respond to malicious network activities within the 
enclave.  The following includes some of the recommendations in support to the IA 
strategy for secure enclaves and between secure enclaves and external systems. 
5.8.1 Firewalls 
Firewall is an important enclave boundary protection mechanism that prevents 
against external attacks such as unauthorized extraction, modification, or deletion of the 
data, denial-of service, and theft of resources or service.  A firewall will be deployed in 
the R2C2 system to restrict incoming and outgoing network connections between the PS 
and the LS as well as between these two suite and external connections such as the 
Internet and RCC.  It will be placed in between the PS, the LS network and the external 
network, see Figure 22.  The main concern here is to protect the R2C2 laptops and its 
data in the PS from the external connections. 
 
Figure 22:  R2C2 Enclave Boundaries 
The features of the firewall should be comprehensive enough to provide the 
adequate protection for R2C2.  The firewall should provide access control/filtering 
capabilities such as restriction of sources, destinations and services, blocking of 
dangerous protocols, restriction of executable services and download capabilities, and use 
of internal access control lists.  It should also include identification and authentication 
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mechanisms to authenticate outsiders to the boundary points.  Any external users from 
the LS and the RCC who require access to the PS shall be authenticated.  The firewall 
should also hide the PS and LS networks using network address translation, audit the 
activities within the networks and scan for malicious software from every incoming 
external connections from RCC and the Internet. 
For more cost effectiveness and better maintainability, it is recommended to have 
a hardware firewall deployed for the R2C2 as compared to installing software firewalls in 
each R2C2 laptops.  This option will provide a single point-of-control and satisfies the 
feature requirements listed above. 
There are three general types of firewalls, namely packet filtering, stateful packet 
filtering and application gateway.  As there will not be any services such as FTP, DNS, 
SMTP, etc. provided by the R2C2 laptops, a firewall equipped with stateful packet 
filtering capabilities would be sufficient for the R2C2 environment.  It has the ability to 
accept or reject packets based on the header information as well as the data of the packet 
where the application protocol appears.  In addition, it dynamically maintains the state 
and context information about the previous packets. 
5.8.2 Guards 
A guard enables data exchange between two or more networks operating with 
different classes of security levels.  The main purpose of a guard is to provide data 
sanitization and separation where various processing, filtering and blocking techniques 
are involved.  It may also involve human review of the data flow.  The guard may consist 
of both hardware and software components to provide secure connection between the 
enclave boundaries. 
The R2C2 scouts at the local suite collects raw data such as digital pictures and 
video clips and sends back to the PS laptops in the primary suite for processing and 
analysis.  As the information involved in the primary suite is of higher security 
classification, the scouts will not be allowed to directly offload the collected data into the 
PS laptops.  Instead, an external server, known as the scout communications server will 
be deployed in between the scouts’ collection equipment and the PS laptops  
(see Figure 22).  This external server will facilitate the scouts offloading the collected 
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raw data meant for the PS operators.  The PS operators will then access this external 
server via the firewall to download the raw data.  Human decision making is required 
from the PS operators in deciding what data to pull from the scout communications server 
into the higher level of security classification network.  The scout communications server 
performs more like a data clearing house than a guard.  However, similar to what a guard 
aims to achieve, the deployment of the scout communications server between the scouts 
and the PS operators aids to provide a controlled information flow from a lower security 
classification network to a higher one.  The scout communications server is deployed 
outside the PS to prevent the R2C2 scouts from introducing malicious files into the PS in 
the process of the data uploading. 
Some of the security features identified for this guard includes the use of 
identification and authentication mechanisms which only allows authorized users to send 
or receive the data, auditing all offloading or downloading activities and data  
encryption capabilities. 
5.8.3 Network Monitoring within Enclave Boundaries and External 
Connections 
IDS will be deployed in the R2C2 environment to provide the network monitoring 
capabilities within the enclave boundaries.  It provides detection and response capabilities 
to mitigate any network attacks.  It complements the firewall in the defense-in-depth 
strategy by detecting all kinds of malicious network traffic and computer activities within 
the enclave where most firewalls are incapable of. 
A host-based IDS is recommended for the R2C2 operating environment and will 
be installed in each PS laptop.  There are several factors contributing to the 
recommendation.  First, software-based IDS would help to reduce the number of heavy 
equipment the R2C2 crew has to carry and deploy at the operating theater.  Secondly, as 
the number of laptops to be protected within the enclaves is small, it is more cost-
effective and economical to use a host-based solution.  Furthermore, the specialist 
knowledge required to operate and utilize a network-based IDS is more demanding.  In a 
tactical environment like R2C2, minimum training for the R2C2 crew to use the 
equipment would be the preferred option.  Finally, another layered defense of network 
intrusion detection would probably come from the external connection to RCC itself 
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where it is assumed that more sophisticated network IDS are deployed at the other end.  
In addition, a host-based IDS with signature-based detection is proposed as it requires 
less configuration and specialist knowledge than one based on anomaly detection. 
5.8.4 Network Scanners within Enclave Boundaries 
In addition to the networking monitoring capability provided by the IDS, another 
type of capability, provided by the network vulnerability scanner may be implemented to 
improve the overall security posture of the enclave boundary.  While the former deals 
with the “cure” part, the latter provides the preventive measures.  It typically operates 
either periodically or even at the request of the operator on an ad-hoc basis to examine 
systems for known vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the adversary. 
However, there will not be any network vulnerability scanners deployed 
physically in the R2C2 system.  Instead, since the R2C2 has an external connection to the 
RCC, it is assumed that the RCC has the supporting infrastructure to provide the network 
vulnerability scanning capability.  The network vulnerability scanners at the higher 
command end would provide features such as comprehensive vulnerability identification 
and analysis, password cracking and risk analysis. 
5.8.5 Malicious Code Protection 
Malicious codes can destroy data through network connections if they are allowed 
to go beyond the network access points or through the individual workstations.  
Malicious code scanning technologies prevent and/or remove most types of malicious 
code such as viruses, worms, logic bombs and Trojan horses.  The four separate levels of 
defense against malicious code should be adopted as far as possible for the R2C2 laptops.  
They are the implementation of pre-infection prevention, infection prevention, infection 
detection, and infection identification.  Antivirus software and spyware programs 
approved by DoD should be installed at the R2C2 laptops to provide adequate malicious 
code protection.  In addition, the firewall deployed at the network access points offers 
another layered defense by scanning malicious code embedded in the packets from 
incoming traffic.  Lastly, similar to the network vulnerability scanning approach, it is 
assumed that the RCC provides the three layers of defense against malicious code. 
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5.9 SECURE THE COMPUTING ENVIRONMENT INTRODUCTION 
Securing the computing environment focused on the use of IA technologies to 
provide for the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity of information as it 
enters, exits, or resides in clients or servers.  Clients are typically end-user workstations 
which include desktops, laptops and peripheral devices.  Servers host services that are 
accessible by clients, and range from Web, applications, and files, to databases and email 
services.  Defending the computing hardware and software of both clients and servers 
from attack could be the first line of defense against the malicious insider, or it could be 
the last line of defense against the outsider who penetrates the boundary defenses.  In 
either case, securing the computing environment is necessary to establish an adequate  
IA posture. 
5.9.1 Authentication, Authorization, and Auditing 
Identification and Authentication (I&A) is the process of recognizing and 
verifying the identity of a user who is trying to gain access to protected resources.  I&A is 
fundamental for access control implementations, permitting authorized users and denying 
unauthorized users; as well as a means of providing accountability through identity-based 
auditing.  The authentication phase could be performed in three different ways:   
1) something the user knows (such as a password or pin); 2) something the user has  
(e.g., an identification card or hardware token); or 3) something the user is (biometrics).  
A combination of these mechanisms could also be used to achieve strong authentication. 
Access control is the process of granting access to protected resources only to authorized 
users, and denying unauthorized users such access.  Access control could only be 
achieved upon successful I&A.  Auditing is the process of logging information system 
activities to facilitate subsequent analysis in support of anomaly detection and 
information forensics activities.  Coupled with I&A, the presence of auditing would 
encourage user accountability and act as a deterrent to potential malicious activities.  
Henceforth, the use of I&A, access control mechanisms and auditing would provide the 
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the information. 
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5.9.2 File Encryption 
Data confidentiality means that information is not disclosed to unauthorized users. 
Access control mechanisms could support data confidentiality by controlling access to 
protected resources.  When the application is not executing, data in storage is vulnerable 
without the underlying OS or application controlling access.  This is where encryption 
plays a vital role in ensuring data confidentiality. 
File encryption protects information in the computer by encrypting the stored 
information.  There are two basic types of file encryption, namely, one in which the user 
selects specific files to encrypt and one that automatically encrypts all information that is 
currently not being processed.  The former could be used to securely transfer information 
between systems or to protect information stored on removable media.  The latter is used 
to protect all files stored within the computer system, and with the incorporation of a 
cryptographic checksum, it could be used to provide both confidentiality and integrity of 
the contents within the data storage media. 
5.9.3 Operating Systems 
The IA strategy promulgated by the IATF is to provide a centrally managed, 
securable, and securely configured operating system foundation.  As a baseline, it is 
recommended that the choice of operating systems be made from those having obtained 
EAL4+,108 namely, Microsoft Windows 2003 Server, Windows XP, and Sun Solaris 9.  
System administrators should ensure that the initial configuration is secure, and enable 
only required services.  Thereafter, they should make a consistent effort to ensure that 
vendor updates and patches are maintained, subsequent configuration changes maintain 
or improve security, and that systems are audited on a regular basis to ensure that the 
configuration remain secure. 
                                                 
108 An Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) is an assurance requirement as defined by  
Common Criteria, an international standard in effect since 1999, to replace the ratings found in  
Orange Book that were set by National Computer Security Center.  The increasing assurance levels define 
increasing assurance requirements in computer systems. 
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5.8.4 Host-Based Detect and Respond Capabilities 
The host computing environment is the last line of defense in the  
Defense-in-Depth strategy.  There is a need to equip both clients and servers with the 
capability to detect and respond effectively to mitigate the effects of attacks that do 
penetrate the perimeter defenses.  The detect capability measures the effectiveness of the 
deployed protection mechanisms, whereas the respond capability could potentially 
improve the protection measures being put in place.  Figure 23 summarizes the respective 
protection mechanisms that are captured under the host-based detect and  
respond capabilities. 
 
Figure 23:  Host-Based Detect and Respond Capabilities 
5.10 MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY (MLS) RESEARCH 
MLS has many implications on the R2C2 system.  It is particularly well-suited for 
R2C2 operating environment because the R2C2 teams are expected to work closely with 
Coalition forces and Civil-Military agencies, and MLS directly supports this requirement 
by allowing information of different classifications to coexist in one system.  MLS 
provides assurance that adequate separation between the different classifications of 
information is enforced. Different parties can potentially make use of the same terminal 
and log in at different session levels to access information authorized for them.  The 
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ability to make use of the same terminal provides potential weight saving opportunities, 
greater flexibility in deployment as well as easier logistics support for the system.  As 
such a portable MLS would be a recommended upgrade option for the next generation  
of R2C2. 
There are currently two broad areas of development in the field of MLS research. 
One is the development of a highly trusted Operating System that is able to enforce the 
desired policy via a Separation Kernel.  The Naval Postgraduate School has ongoing 
research on in this area.  The other development is MILS.  In contrast to MLS, where 
information of different classifications can coexist, MILS takes a different approach by 
isolating each level of information within its own single-level environment.  The 
University of Idaho109 is one of the academic institutions active in this area of research. 
5.11 CONCLUSION 
The security architecture for the R2C2 system has been incorporated into the 
system design.  A Defense-in-Depth strategy was adopted to ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information in the R2C2 system.  Security architecture was 
proposed to protect the various enclaves.  A brief update on the current areas of research 
on MLS was included for consideration for future upgrades. 
                                                 
109 Carol Taylor and Jim Alves-Foss, “MILS Multiple Independent Levels of Security,”  
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6.0 MODELING 
6.1 INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE 
In this capstone project, there were several opportunities and avenues for 
exploring architecture performance through modeling and simulation.  The team 
determined that through modeling it was possible to gain valuable insights to assist us in 
making our final selection of architectures.  The results gained from the models 
complemented architecture design decisions and provided credibility to their analysis. 
Early in the modeling process, it was decided that the simulation efforts would be 
specific and concise, rather than focusing on modeling the system as a whole.  While 
initial thoughts for modeling centered on completing a full-system model, it was 
determined that not enough information existed on the hardware and software 
performance characteristics.  The team needed modeling to help select a final 
architecture, not to test that final architecture.  While a full-system model would have 
been the preferred modeling solution, it was deemed infeasible considering the available 
software tools provided, and the team’s limited knowledge of the hardware components 
contained in the architecture. 
The selection of what to model then shifted to answering specific questions that 
could aid the team in its architecture selection.  The first of these questions was “Why are 
we modeling?”  The team did not create a model because it has historically been a part of 
integrated projects, but rather because there were specific things that were important to 
know in order to make a final architecture decision.  The team’s modeling efforts then set 
out to address three goals. 
First, the models sought to test assumptions developed within the CONOPS and 
scenarios.  As the CONOPS for the scenarios were created by extrapolating from research 
into similar missions as well as personal operational experiences, it was uncertain to what 
extent the impact of their assumptions would have on the selection of a final architecture. 
Second, modeling was important because the modeling results weighed heavily in 
the selection of a final architecture, and helped to contribute to further analytical methods 
(such as the selection of questions in the AHP questionnaire).  By gaining insight in the 
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performance of various architecture choices, it was possible to see what effect that they 
would have on key system drivers such as weight and throughput. 
The third reason that the project team found that the use of modeling tools was 
justified was that there were specific questions that needed to be answered where there 
were no clearly apparent solutions.  Our approach to these questions involved analyzing 
the differences between architectures using key factors such as:  transmission time, 
bandwidth utilization, and system weight.  Outputs from this process can then be used to 
select the preferred architecture for given scenarios. 
6.2 QUESTIONS ASKED 
“What value is there in a dedicated data link between scouts and the R2C2?” 
It was unknown if there was reasonable justification to include a wireless data 
link between the scouts in the field and the R2C2 Primary Suite.  Timely data 
transmission was not a consistently critical element of each scenario, and bringing along 
a dedicated package would incur a significant amount of additional gear.  The answer to 
this question was largely in understanding the necessary requirements that the CONOPS 
had on the architecture. 
“Is a separate Civil/Military system warranted, or is there excess capacity at the  
Primary Suite?” 
The need for a separate Civil/Military System was largely dependent on 
understanding the needs of the Primary Suite users.  In the case that the users of the 
Primary Suite are not consistently stressing the communication link, then it would be 
unnecessary to include a separate Civil/Military System in the final architectures.  As in 
the previous question, modeling was also a way to understand the effect that the 
developed CONOPS had on the selection of architectures. 
“Does our choice of architecture still fit the two-person transportable requirement?” 
The last of the three important questions we sought to answer involved learning 
how our architectures fit within the transportability requirements in the CPD and BAA.  
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Any added weight will come at the expense of transportability, so there was a critical eye 
on any additional weight that might break established limits. 
6.3 CHOICE OF TOOLS 
Several software tools were considered or used in the completion of this project.  
The most prominently utilized piece of software was EXTEND by Imagine That Inc.  
EXTEND was used because it was available within the Wayne E. Meyer Institute of 
Systems Engineering computer labs and the team members had some degree of 
familiarity with it due to a course in simulation software.  While EXTEND does not have 
the same level of granularity with respect to communication links found in advanced 
software packages such as OPNET or QualNet, its object-oriented interface, as well as its 
ease of rapid model fabrication, made it the overall choice. 
Both OPNET and QualNet were originally considered to help model aspects of 
the system, however, due to their complexity, it was unclear whether they had the ability 
to specifically address the project team’s questions within the limited timeframe of the 
integrated project. 
Additionally, Microsoft Excel was used as a software tool for the purposes of 
weight tradeoff studies and mathematical comparisons. 
6.4 PRIMARY SUITE RESULTS 
The selection of a Primary Suite was driven by two key factors.  The  
Primary Suite must meet the technical and functional requirements outlined in the CPD, 
as well as maintain the necessary two-person transportable objective.  As seen  
Chapter 4.0, System Architecture Design, five satellite terminals were considered for 
inclusion in the Primary Suite.  Of those five, three were able to meet the multiband 
requirement as well as the bandwidth threshold.  Table 13 shows the results of market 
research and analysis.  By evaluating system characteristics, it was possible to narrow 
down the selection to two possible candidates. 
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Table 13:  Available Satellite Terminals and Key Drivers 
The final selection was in the SWE-DISH IPT-i Mil Suitcase, as it was 
appropriately licensed for the satellite constellations needed for the system.  Additionally, 
it was determined that the Norsat Globetrekker should be considered as a possible future 
alternative.  While it does not currently have the necessary transmission licenses, it can 
fill the same role as the SWE-DISH model at a significantly reduced weight. 
Additionally, the Norsat Globetrekker uses significantly less power when 
transmitting compared to the similar SWE-DISH model.  Even without the necessary 
licenses and certifications, it was determined that it would be wise to keep it considered 
as an alternative even if it currently may not be a viable option. 
Following the results of the market survey and analysis of available satellite 
terminals, it was possible to create an estimate of overall system weight.  Table 14 shows 




Table 14:  PS Weight 
6.5 LOCAL SUITE (LS) RESULTS 
Using EXTEND, a model was developed to understand the nature of 
communications between the scouts and the PS, and to examine how various message 
delays could have an effect on different mission types.  Using inputs developed from the 
scenarios and CONOPS, it was possible to construct an event-driven model to simulate 
the transmission of data from scouts in the field back to the R2C2 for analysis. 
Figure 24 shows an overview of the model utilized in EXTEND.  As  
scout-produced data was generated on the left side of the model, the time taken to 




Figure 24:  LS EXTEND Model 
The developed CONOPS showed that the majority of transmissions from the 
scouts to the R2C2 were voice in nature (85%), while the remaining transmissions were 
some form of data (15%).  Figure 24 illustrates the breakdown between among the three 
kinds of data. 
This model sought to quantify the delay from the beginning of a transmission to 
the point where it is fully received by the R2C2 operators.  As shown in Figure 25, the 
majority of communication over the Local Suite was voice-only, and as such, the delay 
time for voice communications would be exactly as long as it takes to speak the 
information.  However, the delay times for electronic data types (pictures and video) 
were highly dependent on the existence of a data-link over which to transmit the 
information.  In architectures that include this link (such as 802.16 Wi-Max), the 
transmission time was a function of point-to-point bandwidth.  In architectures without 
that dedicated link, the “transmission time” is a function of how quickly the data can be 
physically moved (using available transportation methods) from the field to the R2C2 
operators at the PS. 
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Figure 25:  LS Communication Type Breakdown 
The CONOPS defined that the users of the LS conduct event triggered and hourly 
or bihourly communications with the PS to keep the RCC appraised on events.  With 
these CONOPS in mind, and following elements of the El Salvador earthquake scenario, 
the model showed the significance of bringing along the extra gear to utilize a data link.  
Figure 26 illustrates the results of the first series of runs by graphing the average amount 
of time taken to transmit a message from scouts to the R2C2. 
 
Figure 26:  Average Message Delay (Aggregate) 
140 
 On average, R2C2 systems with a data link were able to transmit a piece of data 
in 3.1 minutes as opposed to the 11.0 minutes it takes when a link is not present.  As 
noted earlier, the majority of transmissions in both cases were voice-only in nature.  Even 
though data transmission does not occur most of the time, it is an important element in 
the cycle of time-critical missions.  Pictures and video are often used to provide target 
confirmation in time-critical missions before action is taken.  Without an expedient 
method of transmitting the data back, it may not be able to meet the necessary 30-minute 
window of decision and action.110  To further understand the importance of architecture 
selection on time-critical missions, the model was rerun to specifically look at the delay 
times in data transmission.  Figure 27 illustrates the increased delay when looking at data 
transmission only. 
 
Figure 27:  Average Message Delay (Data Only) 
 The second run of the model focused exclusively on data transmission from the 
scouts to the R2C2 PS.  This graph emphasized that one architecture selection was able to 
                                                 
110 Jim Morehouse, Brig Gen, USAF, Director of Command and Control DCS, Air and Space 
Operations, 2002 Time-Critical Targeting Brief, http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2002interop/morehouse.pdf.  
Last accessed in June 2006. 
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meet the 30-minute threshold for time-critical operations.  If transmission times were 
reduced from an average of 55 minutes to an average of 3 minutes, a mission is  
time-critical in nature and including a data link is likely to meet the requirements, while 
architectures without one will not. 
 Tables 15 and 16 each show the estimated gear burden for each scout team.  As a 
result of market research, it was determined that for a primarily voice-only scenario, 
scouts would only need 2.5 pounds of extra gear for the mission.  In time-critical 
missions concerning a need to meet the 30-minute threshold, scouts would be carrying a 
total of 51.5 pounds of gear.  Despite the fact that there was a significant difference in 
size between the two packages, this gear would be carried by individual scout teams, and 
would not count against the two-person transportability requirement for the  
R2C2 PS. 
 
Table 15:  Scout Gear Breakdown (Voice Only) 
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Table 16:  Scout Gear Breakdown (Voice and Data) 
6.6 CIVIL/MILITARY SUITE (CMS) RESULTS 
The Civil/Military Suite was also modeled using the EXTEND simulation 
software.  The goal of this model was to analyze the bandwidth usage of the  
R2C2 Primary Suite as per the developed CONOPS and determine what excess 
bandwidth, if any, was available for usage by other entities.  The concept of the 
Civil/Military Suite is that the R2C2 system would facilitate communication for entities 
other than the Primary Suite operators.  For instance, in the El Salvador earthquake 
scenario, key players in the local government will be without basic communications.  The 
operators of the R2C2 Primary Suite may then act as a lightweight Internet Service 
Provider until normal communications are restored. 
The two options analyzed were a Civil/Military Suite integrated into the  
Primary Suite and a fully separate system.  The decision between the two was based on 
the idea that while a separate Civil/Military Suite will have a dedicated amount of 
bandwidth, it may be possible instead to utilize excess capacity in the Primary Suite.  
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With the Primary Suite leaving sufficient bandwidth for the Civil/Military Suite to utilize, 
it would be unnecessary to bring along a separate satellite link for their usage. 
 With scenario and CONOPS input, it was possible to generate an EXTEND 
model to analyze the usage of the Primary Suite satellite link.  What the team wanted to 
know was the extent of utilization seen on the Primary Suite satellite link.  Knowing that 
the R2C2 CONOPS might not stress the Primary Suite satellite link would allow for an 
integrated Civil/Military Suite solution. 
 Figure 28 illustrates the EXTEND model used for this project.  Data is generated 
within the R2C2 block, and by analyzing the type and size of transmission it became 
possible to estimate the amount of bandwidth that was needed for the system operators. 
 
Figure 28:  Civil/Military Suite EXTEND Model 
The Civil/Military Suite model followed the developed scenarios and CONOPS to 
see how the assumptions made by the team translated into actual usage figures.  The 
model generated periodic and nonperiodic symmetric communications between the R2C2 
and the RCC.  System bandwidth was monitored as a resource to provide an 
understanding of the level of utilization for the duration of the simulation.  It was 
discovered that there was a significant amount of excess bandwidth, as the R2C2 
communications were largely periodic in nature.  Active transmissions only exist in a 
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fractional part of the hour, leaving plenty of opportunity for the friendly Civil/Military 
entities to utilize remaining data resources. 
The model was run several times using different bandwidth thresholds (512 kbps, 
1,024 kbps, 2,048 kbps, and 4,096 kbps) as seen in Figure 29.  Given 24-hours/day 
operation, it was found that the satellite terminal would remain unused for a significant 
portion of the day.  The result of this model showed two important things:  the satellite 
terminal can either be periodically powered down to save on energy usage, or excess 
bandwidth could be “donated” for Civil/Military usage.  Knowing that the CPD objective 
for the Primary Suite satellite terminal was 4,096 kbps, it was a safe assumption that 
there will be a significant bandwidth excess for Civil/Military use.  By sharing an 
existing resource, it would then be unnecessary to bring along a separate  
Civil/Military Suite. 
 
Figure 29:  Civil/Military Suite Model Results 
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6.7 SELECTION OF ARCHITECTURE 
The overall choice for system architecture then became dependent on the  
time-critical nature of the mission.  If there was a significant need to meet the  
30-minute threshold to confirm and act on information, then it becomes necessary to 
bring along a separate data link, such as an 802.16 Wi-Max device.  Examples of these 
time-critical missions included the deployment scenario, the counterterrorism scenario, 
and the Ivory Coast scenario.  Conversely, the El Salvador earthquake scenario and the 
pandemic scenario are examples of normal operations.  Time was also important, but it 
lacked a pressing need to meet the 30-minute, time-critical threshold. 
Additionally, when determining the final configuration for the system architecture 
weight trade-offs were considered because the two-person transportability requirement 
was a key performance parameter for the program office.  As seen in Table 17, there are a 
series of potential opportunities and risks that can be taken advantage of in the R2C2 
system to further reduce its deployed weight. 
 
Table 17:  Additional Weight Trade-Offs 
 The first of the possible trade-offs was to use lighter packaging.  Initial weight 
estimates were done using a set of hard plastic suitcases (such as those made by  
Pelican Cases111) with a weight of 15 pounds per case.  While these cases were quite 
durable, they added a significant amount of weight to the system.  Alternatively, it may 
                                                 
111 Pelican Cases, http://www.pelican.com/cases_detail_specs.php?Case=1600.  Last accessed in  
May 2006. 
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be possible to use lightweight backpacks to carry the gear.  McHale backpacks,112 for 
instance, manufactures 7,500-cubic inch packs weighing only 6.5 pounds.  For less than 
half the weight of hard cases, it was possible to have similarly sized packaging.  While 
the trade-off was that the system weight is reduced, it was exchanged at the expense  
of durability. 
 Another possible trade-off considered was to use the Norsat Globetrekker.  
Currently, the device is uncertified for use on the constellations necessary for the system, 
but the licenses are pending.  By keeping the Norsat model in mind, it was possible to use 
it in place of the SWE-DISH model and save 36 pounds of weight for the system. 
 The third possible trade-off that was identified to reduce the weight of the system 
was to deploy without an electrical generator.  If the deployment location has an 
operational electrical power system, or if it is an acceptable risk to operate without a 
steady power source, the weight of the system can further be reduced by about  
50 pounds. 
6.8 MODEL PROCESS DOCUMENTATION 
6.8.1 Local Suite EXTEND Model 
 The Local Suite model was developed to better understand the importance of a 
data-link within the R2C2 architecture.  The model was comprised of three main 
components:  the scouts (the data generator), the management elements (determine how 
long data is delayed in transit), and the R2C2 (receive and process data) (see  
Figure 30). 
                                                 




Figure 30:  Message Delay Model Overview 
The first of the main components was the data generation element.  Each scout 
needed to provide periodic communications to the R2C2 primary system.  Figure 31 
shows an overview of the data generation process.  Each scout was contained within a 
separate hierarchical block and given an external ID attribute.  As scouts generated 
information, that data was tagged with their ID and merged into a single data stream.  If 
more or less scouts were required in the simulation, hierarchical scout blocks were added 




Figure 31:  Scout Data Generation Overview 
 Figure 32 shows the details of data generation within each of the hierarchical 
scout blocks.  The process or data generation started off with a “Program” block that was 
used to generate a periodic burst of information.  The piece of information was then 
tagged with the scout’s ID and a data type.  Data typing was done by generating a random 
number from 1 to 100 and combining it with the information generated from the 
CONOPS (such as seen in Figure 32).  Once the data type was assigned, it was directed 
through the appropriate path to determine the size of the data.  An attribute was then set 
to represent the size of the information (minutes for voice conversation, megabytes for 
data) before it left the hierarchical block. 
 
Figure 32:  Scout Data Generation 
 As seen in Figure 30 information was then routed depending on whether it is 
voice or data.  Figure 33 shows how the delay in voice communications was calculated.  
A piece of information transmitted from the scout by voice was delayed exactly as long 
as the transmission takes.  If, for instance, a report took three minutes to relay, there was 
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a three-minute delay.  The model replicated this by retrieving the message length and 
delaying it appropriately in the “Activity, Delay” block. 
 
Figure 33:  Voice Delay Model 
 Information that is not voice in nature is routed separately through a  
Data Delay Model as shown in Figure 34.  The Data Delay Model had two different 
paths, as indicated by the decision block.  If data transmission was an option it was added 
into the Data Queue; otherwise, it was fed into a model to transfer data physically  
by vehicle. 
 
Figure 34:  Data Delay Model Overview 
 The length of delay was determined by dividing the data size (in megabytes) by 
the available link speed (a variable set in megabytes per second).  After delaying the 
transmission appropriately, data is then forwarded into the R2C2. 
 Data being transferred physically by vehicle entered the transfer system seen in 
Figure 35.  Figure 35 is the initial breakout of data to be transferred by vehicle.  Each 
scout emplacement had an associated vehicle transmission queue, as represented by the 
three hierarchical blocks labeled as “Data ‘Driven.”  The scout ID number assigned at the 
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beginning of the simulation was now used to match outgoing data with the appropriate 
scout transportation queue. 
 
Figure 35:  Data Delay Vehicle Overview 
Figure 36 shows the details of how a vehicle was used to transfer data.  At the 
start of the simulation a single object (the “truck”) was generated.  Incoming data to be 
transmitted waited in a queue for a vehicle to become available.  Once a piece of data and 
a vehicle were paired up, the data was then delayed depending on the distance from the 
R2C2 and the estimated speed of travel.  Additionally, some randomness was added to 
the transit time to account for variations in road conditions.  Once data separated from the 
vehicle, it arrived at the R2C2. 
 
Figure 36:  Data Delay by Vehicle 
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 The R2C2 system shown in Figure 37 was the endpoint for the simulation.  All 
pieces of data were queried for delay times, which were then statistically analyzed and 
recorded in a file.  After providing their respective delay times, each data object then 
exited the model. 
 
Figure 37:  Model Exit and Statistics Recorder 
6.8.2 Civil/Military Suite EXTEND Model 
The second of the EXTEND models used in this project focused on the analysis of 
bandwidth usage at the Primary Suite.  The EXTEND model sought to simulate periodic 
and non-periodic transmission from R2C2 operators out to the RCC to understand how 
the satellite terminal was utilized. 
The first part of the model is illustrated in Figure 38.  Here there were two 
different message generation systems.  The upper generator created data at periodic 
intervals, whereas the lower one provided nonperiodic information of varying numbers 
(multiple messages at once). 
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Figure 38:  Bandwidth Model Data Generation 
Once data was generated, it was assigned a bit rate depending on the nature of 
communications (voice or video), or a placeholder value for other data types.  Depending 
on the type of data, each piece of information was also assigned a randomized size in 
megabytes before it entered the remainder of the model.  Each parameter, such as the 
bounds for message size or required bit rates, can be adjusted through the many constants 
noted by green circles. 
 The main part of the model is shown in Figure 39.  As outgoing data prepares to 
be transmitted the amount of time necessary to transmit the message was estimated by 
querying the available system bandwidth.  In the event of time-based data 
communication, such as VTC or VoIP, the overall transmission length was estimated as 
the length of the communication session. 
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Figure 39:  Bandwidth Model Overview 
 Once a piece of data had an estimated bandwidth usage and transfer time, its 
bandwidth requirements were deduced from the remaining level and delayed for the 
appropriate transmission time.  As pieces of information exit the model, data about 
bandwidth usage and availability was recorded and displayed in Figure 39. 
 The model can be re-run using different bandwidth thresholds by changing the 
“Initial Number” in the input box to the left of the model.  As the model was run, a graph 
displayed a running view of available bandwidth and average utilization. 
6.9 CONCLUSIONS 
Through modeling and analysis, the integrated project team was able to determine 
several key things.  First, it would be unnecessary to provide a separate system for 
Civil/Military use.  Modeling showed that the Primary Suite operators do not 
significantly stress the system, and leave enough excess bandwidth for an integrated 
Civil/Military Suite.  It was also found that the need for the scouts to be supplied with a 
data link relied heavily on the nature of the mission they intended to accomplish.  If the 
scouts were participating in a time-critical mission where they needed to verify and act on 
information gathered, then it would be necessary to for them to field a dedicated  
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data link.  If time-critical data management was not a requirement of the mission, then it 
was possible to field the scouts with a lighter, less capable set of equipment. 
Additionally, modeling and analysis has found that there are a series of possible 
trade-offs that can be done to lighten the overall deployed weight of the R2C2 system.  
Lightweight packaging in lieu of commonly used durable plastic cases will reduce the 
system’s weight by as much as 27 pounds.  The R2C2 could also choose to use the  
Norsat Globetrekker instead of the currently certified SWE-DISH IPT-I suitcase.  While 
the Norsat model does not currently have the proper licenses for use on satellite 
constellations, it reduces the system weight by another 36 pounds.  The third possible 
trade-off identified is to deploy without bringing a portable electrical generator.  If the 
system is being used in a region with a reasonably stable power supply, it is possible to 
save an additional 50 pounds by leaving the generator back home.  While the combined 
weight trade-offs reduce the Primary Suite from 340 pounds to 227 pounds, any weight 
trade-off selected will better support the two-person transportable requirement. 
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7.0 SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 For the final phase of the SE process, R2C2 team conducted the system analysis.  
The time-critical R2C2 architecture from Chapter 6.0 was chosen and various analyses 
were conducted utilizing the AHP and requirements traffic light comparisons.  AHP and 
the requirements traffic light comparisons provided objective assessment and ranking of 
three competing alternatives systems:  Joint Systems Integration Command Executive 
Command and Control (JSIC EC2), System Y, and R2C2.  In addition to the rankings, 
AHP served another valuable purpose of providing the criterion priority of rapidly 
deployable C2 type systems. 
7.2 ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS (AHP) 
The AHP is a decision-making process developed by Thomas L. Saaty to help 
people solve complex problems involving multiple criteria.  The prime use of the AHP is 
the resolution of choice problems in a multicriteria environment.113  It is a technique that 
could be used in an individual or group decision-making environment.  The application of 
AHP has proven to be successful in the following areas:  selection of alternatives, 
resource allocation, forecasting, total quality management, and business process 
reengineering.  It is an intuitive method that offers the ability to “mirror” human  
decision making by structuring issues in a hierarchy from a top-down approach.  In other 
words, it helps to organize data and information into a structured framework proceeding 
from the goal to objectives to subobjectives.  With simple pair-wise comparison 
judgments throughout the hierarchy, the decision maker would be guided in his analysis 
to derive the most suitable option among competing alternatives. 
AHP’s ability to translate a subjective human decision-making process into a 
quantitative measure also facilitates sensitivity analysis when changes are made to the 
rating of evaluation criteria.  In addition, decision makers can take into consideration 
                                                 
 113 Forman et al., “The Analytic Hierarchy Process – An Exposition,” INFORMS, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2001. 
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qualitative attributes such as safety, quality, and ease of operations.  Most importantly, 
AHP provides a clear, transparent, and objective means to arrive at a defensible and 
credible decision.  Hence, the AHP methodology was chosen for the analysis to derive 
the most preferred system among competing alternatives. 
7.2.1 Principles of Analytic Hierarchy Process 
The AHP approach to problem solving by logical analysis is based on three 
principles:  the principle of constructing hierarchy, the principle of establishing priorities, 
and the principle of logical consistency.114  The principle of constructing hierarchy is 
based on the natural human ability to breakdown a complex issue into its parts, and these 
in turn into their subparts, and so on, hierarchically.  In this way, large amounts of 
information can be digested or presented to form an overall picture of the system. 
The principle of establishing priorities is again based on the human ability to 
understand the relationship between various elements of an issue and to rationalize within 
himself on his preference for one over the other.  A relative importance, known as vector 
of priority, between the various elements in the same level of hierarchy is established by 
making a pair-wise comparison.  Saaty recommended using a scale of 1 to 9 for  
pair-wise comparison as shown in Table 18. 
Intensity of  
Importance Definition Explanation 
1 Equal Importance Two elements contribute equally to the property
3 Moderate importance of one over the other Experience and judgment slightly favor one 
element over another 
5 Essential or strong importance Experience and judgment strongly favor one 
element over another 
7 Very strong importance An element is strongly favored and its 
dominance is demonstrated in practice 
9 Extreme importance The evidence favoring one element over another 
is of the highest possible order of affirmation 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values between the two adjacent judgments Compromise is needed between two judgments 
Reciprocals When activity i compared to j is assigned one of the above numbers, then activity j compared to i is 
assigned its reciprocal. 
Rationales Ratios arising from forcing consistency of judgments 
Table 18:  The Pair-Wise Comparison Scale115 
                                                 
 114 T.L. Saaty, “Decision Making for Leaders:  The Analytic Hierarchy Process for Decisions in a 
Complex World,” RWS Publications, 1990, p. 3. 
 115 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
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Let cij denote the value obtained by comparing criterion ci relative to criterion cj.  
If criterion cj is assessed to be more important than criterion ci, then the reciprocal of the 
relevant index value is assigned, and that cij = 1/ cji.  Clearly, all criteria will rank equally 
when compared to themselves and cii = 1.  When the principal of consistency holds true, 
the condition cjk = cik / cij is satisfied.  This means that for n criteria, only n (n – 1)/2 
comparisons are needed to determine the complete set of pair-wise judgments. 
Next, we denote the pair-wise comparison matrix A and the vector of priority w 
such that each element cij = wi/wj for all i and j.  Given a perfectly consistent matrix A, if 
we post multiply A by the column vector w, the relationship between A and w could  
be established. 
 
   c11 c12 … c1n w1  nw1 
   c21 c22 … c2n w2  nw2 
    Aw =    .   .    .   .  =     . = n w 
     .   .    .   .     . 
     .   .    .   .     . 
   cn1 cn2 … cnn wn  nwn 
 
This relationship is given by (A – n I) w = 0.  The normalized weights are called 
Distributive Mode in AHP, which shows the importance or priorities that should be 
distributed among the criteria and is given by the equation: 
wi = cij/ Σ ckj  (for any j). 
The principle of logical consistency is based on the belief that humans are capable 
of making coherent judgment when setting a logical hierarchy and priorities among the 
various parts of the issue.  However, in real life, a person’s preference may change due to 
certain circumstances or environment.  To ensure a certain degree of consistency so that a 
reasonably sound and reliable result is obtained, the AHP measures the overall 
consistency using a term known as the consistency ratio.  Saaty recommended the value 
of the consistency ratio to be 10% or less. 
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The generic AHP process can be summarized into the following steps: 
1. Identify the problems to resolve 
2. Develop a hierarchy of the problems in terms of the overall goal, 
attributes, decision criteria, and alternatives 
3. Perform pair wise comparison at each level to establish relationships 
between multiple criteria 
4. Perform consistency check at each level immediately after the pair-wise 
comparisons 
5. Calculate the final weight ranking of the various alternatives 
6. Synthesize the results and repeat as necessary 
7.2.2 Research Methodology 
The methodology adopted to develop the AHP was based on the list of  
Critical Operational Issues (COI).  This process was iterative since the COIs were 
constantly revised as new scenarios were developed.  The AHP was finalized after the 
mission scenarios and COIs were completed.  Next, a questionnaire was developed and 
an internal survey was conducted among the team members and faculty advisors to gather 
suggestions for improvements to the questionnaire. 
The target audiences for the survey were SMEs, namely academics, war fighters, 
technical specialists, and logistics officers.  The computed weights of the AHP were 
subsequently used to evaluate three alternatives systems:  EC2, System Y, and R2C2.  
This evaluation and analysis of alternatives represents an academic demonstration of the 
multicriteria decision-making process and the possible insights that could be gained from 
this approach. 
7.2.3 Identifying the Issues 
 In order to develop a meaningful AHP, identifying critical criteria to measure the 
value or relative important aspects of the system was required.  To accommodate such 
needs, development of the AHP started with identifying the COIs of the R2C2 system.  
COIs were identified by tracing back to the five scenarios explored in Chapter 2.0, 
discussing the system with the intended users, and examining all system requirements.  A 
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total of nine COIs were developed and all represent critical functions of the  
R2C2 system.  The COIs were then broken down into Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) 
and Measures of Suitability (MOSs), which are measures that express the extent to which 
a system accomplishes or supports a mission or task.  They were designed to address the 
capabilities and suitability of the system.  These two measures were further broken down 
into Measures of Performance (MOPs), which is a quantitative or qualitative measure of a 
system’s capabilities or specific performance function.  The following is the breakdown 
of the COIs, MOEs, MOSs, and MOPs: 
1. COI – Is the R2C2 system able to provide sufficient communication capability  
for RCC? 
1.1 MOE – Satellite link capability 
1.1.1 MOP – Average signal range 
1.1.2 MOP – Call completion rate 
1.1.3 MOP – Average file transfer time over a network 
1.1.4 MOP – Proportion of communications link capacity utilized 
1.2 MOE – Organic sensors link capability 
1.2.1 MOP – Average signal range 
1.2.2 MOP – Call completion rate 
1.2.3 MOP – Average file transfer time over a network 
1.2.4 MOP – Proportion of communications link capacity utilized 
1.3 MOE – Network planning and control 
1.3.1 MOP – Average time to establish communications 
1.3.2 MOP – Average time to acquire terminals 
1.4 MOE – Receiving capability 
1.4.1 MOP – Message Completion Rate (MCR)  
1.4.2 MOP – Proportion of received reports acknowledged 
1.4.3 MOP – Proportion of uninterrupted communications 
1.4.4 MOP – Message accuracy 
1.4.5 MOP – Average time to acknowledge report 
1.5 MOE – Transmission capability 
1.5.1 MOP – Proportion of files transferred over a network 
1.5.2 MOP – Average data Message Completion Time (MCT) 
1.5.3 MOP – Average transmission backlog 
1.5.4 MOP – Average duration of transmission wait 
1.5.5 MOP – Proportion of retransmitted messages 
 
2. COI – Is the deployability of the R2C2 system satisfactory for the mission 
accomplishment? 
2.1 MOE – Physical robustness 
2.1.1 MOP – Maximum height of a drop that the R2C2 system can 
 withstand without functional failure 
2.1.2 MOP – Intensity of vibration that the R2C2 system can withstand 
 without functional failure 
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2.1.3 MOP – Duration of vibration that the R2C2 system can withstand 
 without functional failure 
2.1.4 MOP – Mean time to critical failure in sandy environment 
2.1.5 MOP – Mean time to critical failure in humid environment 
2.2 MOE – Responsiveness 
2.2.1 MOP – Mean time to marshal the R2C2 system 
2.2.2 MOP – Mean time to set up the R2C2 system at the operating site 
2.2.3 MOP – Mean time to breakdown the R2C2 system 
2.3 MOE – Transportability 
2.3.1 MOP – Dimension of the R2C2 system 
2.3.2 MOP – Weight of the R2C2 system (per case) 
2.3.3 MOP – Number of modules 
 
3. COI – Is the R2C2 system interoperable with other legacy systems and with the 
communications systems of other friendly forces and the host country? 
3.1 MOE – Communication capability with inorganic sensors 
3.1.1 MOP – Duration of connection without interruption 
3.1.2 MOP – Average time to establish connection 
3.1.3 MOP – Average data exchange time 
3.1.4 MOP – Proportion of successful data exchanges 
3.1.5 MOP – Reasons for failure to exchange data 
3.1.6 MOP – Proportion of data files useable without modification (i.e.,  
the ratio of the total number of data files useable without 
modification to the total number of data files received) 
3.2 MOE – Communication capability with other R2C2 systems 
3.2.1 MOP – Duration of connection without interruption 
3.2.2 MOP - Average time to establish connection 
3.2.3 MOP – Average data exchanged time 
3.2.4 MOP – Proportion of successful data exchanges 
3.2.5 MOP – Reasons for failure to exchange data 
3.2.6 MOP – Proportion of data files useable without modification (i.e.,  
the ratio of the total number of data files useable without 
modification to the total number of data files received) 
3.3 MOE – Reach back capability RCCs 
3.3.1 MOP – Duration of connection without interruption 
3.3.2 MOP – Average time to establish connection 
3.3.3 MOP – Average data exchange time 
3.3.4 MOP – Proportion of successful data exchanges 
3.3.5 MOP – Reasons for failure to exchange data 
3.3.6 MOP – Proportion of data files useable without modification (i.e.,  
the ratio of the total number of data files useable without 
modification to the total number of data files received) 
3.4 MOE – Communication capability with coalition partners 
3.4.1 MOP – Duration of connection without interruption 
3.4.2 MOP – Average time to establish connection 
3.4.3 MOP – Average data exchange time 
3.4.4 MOP – Proportion of successful data exchanges 
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3.4.5 MOP – Reasons for failure to exchange data 
3.4.6 MOP – Proportion of data files useable without modification (i.e.,  
the ratio of the total number of data files useable without 
modification to the total number of data files received) 
3.5 MOE – Communication capability with civilian organizations 
3.5.1 MOP – Duration of connection without interruption 
3.5.2 MOP - Average time to establish connection 
3.5.3 MOP – Average data exchange time 
3.5.4 MOP – Proportion of successful data exchanges 
3.5.5 MOP – Reasons for failure to exchange data 
3.5.6 MOP – Proportion of data files useable without modification (i.e.,  
the ratio of the total number of data files useable without 
modification to the total number of data files received) 
3.6 MOE – GIG access capability 
3.6.1 MOP – Duration of connection with NIPRNet and SIPRNet 
 simultaneously without interruption 
3.6.2 MOP – Duration of connection with NIPRNet and CENTRIXS 
     simultaneously without interruption 
3.6.3 MOP – Duration of connection with SIPRNet and CENTRIXS 
 simultaneously without interruption 
 
4. COI – Is the R2C2 system able to provide situational assessment to RCCs? 
4.1 MOE – Organic sensors to the R2C2 system operator 
4.1.1 MOP – Footprint (diameter) of supporting area 
4.1.2 MOP – Frequency of information update 
4.2 MOE – Inorganic sensors to the R2C2 system operator 
4.2.1 MOP – Footprint (diameter) of supporting area 
4.2.2 MOP – Frequency of information update 
4.3 MOE – R2C2 to RCC 
4.3.1 MOP – Average time to filter data after collection 
4.3.2 MOP – Average time to compile data after collection 
4.3.3 MOP – Frequency of information update 
 
5. COI – Does the R2C2 system provide a sufficient level of information security for 
successful mission accomplishment? 
5.1 MOE – Data security 
5.1.1 MOP – Proportion of completed unauthorized file accesses (i.e.,  
the ratio of the total number of completed unauthorized file 
accesses to the total number of attempted unauthorized file 
accesses) 
5.1.2 MOP – Proportion of correct security classifications (i.e., the ratio  
of the total number of files/documents properly marked by 
the system to the total number of files/documents 
generated) 
5.1.3 MOP – Average adequacy ratings of access control procedures  
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(i.e., the average ratings of the adequacy of control 
procedures or processes to prevent unauthorized access to 
a system) 
5.1.4 MOP – Average adequacy ratings of controls to confirm user  
access (i.e., the average ratings of the adequacy of controls 
to confirm user access to authorized information in  
a system) 
5.2 MOE – Network security 
5.2.1 MOP – Proportion of completed unauthorized network accesses  
(i.e., the ratio of the total number of completed 
unauthorized network accesses to the total number of 
attempted unauthorized network accesses) 
5.2.2 MOP – Average adequacy ratings of procedures for networks and  
communications security (i.e., the average ratings of the 
procedures or processes to provide for networks and 
communications security of a system) 
5.2.3 MOP – Proportion of completed unauthorized logons (i.e., the ratio  
of the total number of completed unauthorized logons to 
the total number of attempted unauthorized logons) 
5.3 MOE – Physical security 
5.3.1 MOP – Average adequacy ratings of physical security (i.e., the  
average ratings of the adequacy of physical security of a 
system.  Individual ratings can range from 1 (completely 
disagree that security is adequate) to 9 (completely agree 
that security is adequate) 
5.3.2 MOP –Average adequacy ratings of plans, training, and personnel  
procedures for security:  The average ratings of adequacy 
of the unit’s Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), 
personnel security, training, and the Program Manager’s 
security plan for a system. 
 
6. COI – Is the R2C2 system flexible enough to support various types of mission? 
6.1 MOE – Modularity 
6.1.1 MOP – Number of different types of missions that the R2C2  
system can support 
6.2 MOE – Scalability 
6.2.1 MOP – Maximum number of operators that the R2C2 system can  
support 
6.2.2 MOP – Maximum area of operation that the R2C2 system can  
support 
6.3 MOE – Sustainability 
6.3.1 MOP – Number of operators/scouts 
6.3.2 MOP – Total R2C2 system operating hours (restricted by power 
 capacity) 
6.3.3 MOP – Level of logistic support for the R2C2 system crew 
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7. COI – Does the R2C2 system meet the reliability needs for successful mission 
accomplishment? 
7.1 MOS – Mission success 
7.1.1 MOP- Satellite link-up availability 
7.1.2 MOP –Number of spare parts 
7.1.3 MOP – Maximum hours of generator run time 
7.1.4 MOP – Availability of other supporting infrastructure 
7.2 MOS – High quality components 
7.2.1 MOP – Mean Time Before Critical Failure (Critical Failure = Main 
 Operating Laptop failure) 
7.2.2 MOP – Mean Time Before Major Failure (Major Failure = Organic 
 sensor failure) 
7.2.3 MOP – Mean Time To Repair 
 
8. COI – Is the R2C2 system easily maintained by its intended users? 
8.1 MOS – Built in test (BIT) 
8.1.1 MOP –Proportion of diagnosable failures (i.e., the ratio of the total  
number of possible system failures to the total number of 
diagnosable failures) 
8.2 MOS – Ease of repair 
8.2.1 MOP – Mean time required to repair 
8.2.2 MOP – Tools needed for repair 
8.3 MOS – Availability of repair parts 
8.3.1 MOP – Proportion of the R2C2 system component that is  
commercially available 
 
9. COI – Are the R2C2 team members able to fully utilize the capability of the 
R2C2 system? 
9.1 MOS – Ease of operation  
9.1.1 MOP – The proportion of R2C2 system critical tasks attempted  
(i.e., the ratio of the total number of system critical tasks 
attempted by the test players to the total number of tasks 
presented) 
9.1.2 MOP – The proportion of R2C2 system critical tasks finished (i.e.,  
the ratio of the total number of system critical tasks the test 
player believe they have finished to the total number of 
tasks attempted) 
9.1.3 MOP – The average usability ratings of R2C2 system critical tasks  
(i.e., the average ratings of system critical task 
characteristics given by test players at the end of each task 
trial, based on the ease-of-use or task difficulty) 
9.1.4 MOP – The average time required to successfully complete system  
critical tasks (excluding timeouts for breaks or 
interruptions) 
9.1.5 MOP – The reasons that R2C2 system critical tasks were not  
completed (i.e., insufficient manpower, poor display, poor 
control arrangement, or poor training) 
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7.2.4 Developing Hierarchy 
 Previously identified COIs, MOEs, MOSs, and MOPs served two purposes.  First, 
they provided a starting point of developing the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) 
of the R2C2 system in the near future.  The second purpose, and the one chosen for our 
use, was to provide a baseline to generate the hierarchy of comparison criteria for the 
AHP.  Each COI, MOE, MOS, and MOP was reviewed and transformed into the 
comparable criteria.  Some of them were implemented directly as one of the comparison 
criteria and some of them were implied. 
As shown in Figure 40, this model was comprised of three levels of criteria.  The 
first-level criteria were Operations Capabilities, Technical Performance, and  
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS). 
The second-level criteria were developed for each criterion defined at the first 
level.  For Operations Capabilities, the criteria were Interoperability, Flexibility,  
Ease of Operations, Information Security, Deployability, and Situation Assessment.  For 
Technical Performance, the criteria were Local Communications and Long Haul 
Communications.  For ILS, the criteria were Reliability, Maintainability, Spares Support, 
Training, and Support Test Equipment. 
Finally, the third-level criteria were developed where necessary.  For 
Interoperability, the criteria were Civilian Networks, Coalition Network, and  
GIG Access.  For Flexibility, the criteria were Modularity, Scalability, and Sustainability.  
For Ease of Operations, the criteria were Standardized Controls and Layout and Visual.  
For Information Security, the criteria were Network Security, Data Security, and  
Physical Security.  For Deployability, the criteria were Weight, Physical Dimension, 
Setup Time, and Extraction Time.  For Situation Assessment, the criteria were  
Organic Sensor footprint of supporting area, Organic Sensor refresh rate,  
Inorganic Sensor footprint of supporting area, and Inorganic Sensor refresh rate. 
Under Technical Performance, the third-level criteria for Local and Long Haul 
Communications were Bandwidth, Range, Refresh Rate, Storage Capacity, Power,  
Link Reliability, and Link Availability.  For ILS, the third-level criteria were defined 
only for Maintainability; they were Self Test and Ease of Repair. 
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Figure 40:  An Overview of R2C2 Analytic Hierarchy Process 
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7.2.5 AHP Results and Analysis 
 In this section, we present the results of the AHP process, using the AHP-based 
software, Expert Choice, to develop the multicriteria decision-making process and arrive 
at our conclusions.  Given that a sample size of 30 were required to achieve a statistical 











Figure 41:  Survey Participant Profile 
The raw data was first analyzed using Minitab software to determine whether 
there was any statistical difference between the inputs from the four groups of 
participants.  It was assumed that the 30 samples were independent and identically 
distributed.  However, with a small sample size for each group, normality could not be 
assumed.  Hence, the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by 
rank was used for the analysis.116  The null hypothesis was that there were no differences 
in the pair-wise judgment between groups.  P-values less than 0.1 were an indication that 
at least one of four groups’ weighting was different from the other three. 
Data scaling was performed on the raw data by subtracting 1 if the criterion Ci 
was more important than criterion Ci, and adding 1 if criterion Cj was more important 
                                                 
 116 Condon et al., “Visualizing Group Decisions in the Analytic Hierarchy Process Models,” 
Computers and Operations Research, 2003, pp. 60-63. 
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than criterion Ci.  With this modification, the scale for each pair-wise comparison ranged 
from −8 to 8.  The results of the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis for the first- and 
second-level pair-wise comparison judgment between the various groups was tabulated in 
Table 19.  The results showed that statistically there were no significant differences  
(p ≥ 0.1) for the pair-wise judgment between the groups.  However, it was observed that 
the Kruskal-Wallis test on Interoperability versus Information Security comparison 
yielded a p-value of 0.1, which is a borderline situation. 
Description of Pair-Wise Comparison p-value
First-Level Hierarchy 
Operations Capabilities vs. Technical Performance 0.871
Operations Capabilities vs. ILS 0.896
Technical Performance vs. ILS 0.184
Second-Level Hierarchy – Operations Capabilities 
Interoperability vs. Flexibility 0.175
Interoperability vs. Ease of Operations 0.578
Interoperability vs. Information Security 0.100
Interoperability vs. Deployability 0.303
Interoperability vs. Situation Assessment 0.657
Flexibility vs. Ease of Operations 0.968
Flexibility vs. Information Security 0.420
Flexibility vs. Deployability 0.732
Flexibility vs. Situation Assessment 0.626
Ease of Operations vs. Information Security 0.696
Ease of Operations vs. Deployability 0.959
Ease of Operations vs. Situation Assessment 0.582
Information Security vs. Deployability 0.772
Information Security vs. Situation Assessment 0.626
Deployability vs. Situation Assessment 0.778
Second-Level Hierarchy – Technical Performance 
Local Communications vs. Long Haul Communications 0.908
Second-Level Hierarchy – ILS 
Reliability vs. Maintainability 0.515
Reliability vs. Spares Support 0.551
Reliability vs. Training Requirements 0.261
Reliability vs. Support Test Equipment 0.533
Maintainability vs. Spares Support 0.271
Maintainability vs. Training Requirements 0.113
Maintainability vs. Support Test Equipment 0.145
Spares Support vs. Training Requirements 0.291
Spares Support vs. Support Test Equipment 0.670
Training Requirements vs. Support Test Equipment 0.645
Table 19:  Results of the Kruskal-Wallis One-Way Analysis 
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The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis concluded that the AHP could be further 
analyzed considering the 30 survey samples as a homogenous group.  There are two 
approaches to compute the combined weights for the hierarchy:  weighted arithmetic 
mean or geometric mean of the individual judgments.117  If weight pk is assigned to 
decision maker k, then the weighted arithmetic mean is given by 
cij = p1cij1 + p2cij2 + … + pncijn. 
 Using the geometric mean approach, the individual judgments of the n 
participants are combined to produce 
cij = [ cij1 x  cij2 x … x cijn] 1/n. 
 The geometric mean was adopted for the analysis as it preserved the reciprocal 
property when each participant was assigned equal weight.118  The geometric mean was 
also found to be the most common approach used by groups to set priorities.119  Using this 
approach, the geometric mean of the 30 survey samples for each pair-wise comparison in 
the R2C2 AHP was computed and input into the Expert Choice software. 
Figure 42 shows the weights of the first-level comparison criteria.  As can be 
seen, the computation of the survey resulted in the weights attained in  
Operation Capability (0.481), Technical Performance (0.348), and ILS (0.171) in order of 
highest to least importance. 
                                                 
 117 Bolloju, N., “Aggregation of Analytic Hierarchy Process Models Based on Similarities in  
Decision Makers’ Preference,” European Journal of Operational Research, 2001, pp. 12-15. 
 118 Aczel et al., “Procedures for Synthesizing Ratio Judgments,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 
1983, pp. 4-10. 
 119 Condon et al., “Visualizing Group Decisions in the Analytic Hierarchy Process Models,”  


















Operation Capability Technical Parameters Integrated Logistic
Support
1st Level Criteria Weights
 
Figure 42:  First-Level Criteria Weights 
Similarly, pair-wise comparison results from the survey were computed and 
weights for the second-level criteria were attained.  The results are shown in Figures 43, 
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Figure 45:  Second-Level Weights – ILS 
Lastly, results of the third-level comparison criteria under each second-level 
criterion were computed from the survey results and compiled in Table 20, with their 
respective weights in parentheses: 
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Second-Level Criteria Third-Level Criteria 
Interoperability (0.084) Civilian Networks (0.019) 
 Coalition Networks (0.028) 
 GIG Access (0.037) 
  
Flexibility (0.060) Modularity (0.016) 
 Scalability (0.017) 
 Sustainability (0.027) 
  
Ease of Operations (0.053) Standardized Controls (0.023) 
 Layout and Visibility (0.03) 
  
Information Security (0.125) Network Security (0.053) 
 Data Security (0.042) 
 Physical Security (0.03) 
  
Deployability (0.075) Weight (0.014) 
 Physical Dimensions (0.018) 
 Setup Time (0.026) 
 Extraction Time (0.018) 
  
Situational Assessment (0.084) Organic Sensor Footprint (0.028) 
 Organic Sensor Refresh Rate (0.022) 
 Inorganic Sensor Footprint (0.019) 
 Inorganic Sensor Refresh Rate (0.016) 
  
Local Communication (0.214) Bandwidth (0.035) 
 Range (0.031) 
 Refresh rate (0.023) 
 Storage capacity (0.018) 
 Link Reliability (0.059) 
 Link Availability (0.047) 
  
Long Haul Communication (0.134) Bandwidth (0.023) 
 Range (0.022) 
 Refresh Rate (0.013) 
 Storage Capacity (0.011) 
 Link Reliability (0.035) 
 Link Availability (0.029) 
  
Maintainability (0.037) Self Test (0.012) 
 Ease of Repair (0.025) 
Table 20:  Third-Level Criteria 
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 To check for inconsistency in the ranking process, each stage of the hierarchy was 
subjected to the consistency check.  Figure 46 is a screenshot of the Expert Choice 
program displaying the consistency index of 0.01 for the second-level criteria of 
operation capability.  According to Saaty, acceptable inconsistency index should be 
below 0.1.  None of the ranks in our AHP exceeded the inconsistency index of 0.1. 
 
Figure 46:  Screenshot of Expert Choice – Inconsistency Index 
7.2.6 Comparisons of Three Systems 
These weightings, developed from inputs from the survey, formed the basis for 
the evaluation of the three systems:  JSIC EC2, System Y, and R2C2.  The EC2 was 
developed in 2003 by JSIC to provide RCCs and JTF commanders the capability to host 
services on classified and unclassified networks when they were away from headquarters 
to maintain situation assessment.120  The package consists of laptops, routers, and other 
pieces of equipment that can be easily packed in a hard case and rolled into a car, 
airplane, helicopter, or “humvee.”121  System Y is a proposed proprietary system under 
                                                 
 120 Sgt. John Cupp, USA, USJFCOM Public Affairs, “Ainsworth Honored as Command’s Joint Junior 
Officer of the Quarter,” 2 March 2006, http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2006/pa030206.htm.  
Last accessed in May 2006. 
121 Sgt. John Cupp, USA, USJFCOM Public Affairs, “New Suffolk Facility to Provide Warfighter 
Rapid Solutions,” 10 September 2004, http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2004/pa091004.htm.  
Last accessed in May 2006. 
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the contract of RRK, therefore the name of the company and the detailed information of 
the system will remain anonymous. 
The problem statement of the project was to examine the possibility of a rapidly 
deployable, C2 system that met the needs of RCCs in providing situational and 
communication capabilities through the range of military operations.  Such a system 
would maximize the use of existing military systems, COTS systems, and coalition 
systems.  The end objective was to develop a standardized, integrated, modular and 
scaleable Joint Command, Control, and Collaboration system.  The system would have a 
small footprint to be utilized by first responders that were both interoperable and flexible. 
In particular, the BAA had directed for a standalone, lightweight system capable 
of being transported by one or two persons as checked luggage on commercial or military 
transport aircraft.  The desired functional capabilities were: 
• Provide capability to connect to two GIG-accessible, crypto-covered 
networks at once (e.g., NIRPRNET, SIPRNET, CENTRIXS) 
• Provide secure wireless to clients 
• Utilize Everything over Internet Protocol (EoIP) 
• Provide Net Centric operations to the maximum extent possible 
• Demonstrate multimode (data, video, and voice) operations 
• Provide a minimum of four Voice over IP (VoIP) telephonic instruments 
• Must be able to use thin or thick clients, and must support five clients 
(threshold)/15 clients 
• Provide radio with 1.024 Mbps threshold; 4.196 Mbps objective  
per network 
• Provide reliability, maintainability, availability, built-in test and logistic 
support as an objective 
7.2.6.1 Assessment on Operational Capabilities 
In terms of operational capabilities, all three systems were rated as equal 
with regard to civilian networks.  The reason being that as COTS systems, they would 
have equal access to the Internet and hence, no particular system would have an 
advantage over the other with regard to this criterion. 
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The same could not be said for other forms of networks such as the 
coalition networks and having GIG access.  Both System Y and R2C2 had direct access 
to CENTRIX and SIPRNET, hence they had greater interoperability as compared to EC2. 
By virtue of its lightweight nature, its less complex architecture, and 
having fewer components, EC2 was assessed to fare better than its counterparts in the 
areas of weight, dimension, ease of transportability, and setup and extraction time.  In 
contrast, R2C2 had the lowest score in these criteria, as it was designed with a  
Local Communications Suite and portable power generator for greater mission capability 
and sustainability.  Table 21 is a summary of the considerations used in the evaluation of 




Civilian Networks All had equal capability that allowed access to Internet. 
Coalition System Y and R2C2 were ranked better than EC2 because they had access to 
CENTRIX, the coalition network. 
GIG Access System Y and R2C2 fared better than EC2 because EC2 does not have 
SIPRNET access. 
Modularity All three systems were modular in design. 
Scalability Modular design allowed hardware scalability.  System Y fared better because it 
allowed three simultaneous networks access, which meant more people could 
connect up at any one time.  R2C2 with two simultaneous networks was ranked 
second, followed by EC2. 
Sustainability R2C2 was better than System Y and EC2 because R2C2 was equipped with 
portable generator power. 
Standardized Controls All systems were on equal footing because they used COTS technology which 
was driven by industry standards. 
Layout and Visibility All systems were ranked equally because they used COTS technology, driven by 
industry standards. 
Network Security All systems were ranked equally because they provided VPN tunnel and NSA 
type 1 security features. 
Data Security System Y and R2C2 had data encryption; hence they were ranked better  
than EC2. 
Physical Security All three systems were designed to have checkable cases and carry on cases, 
hence the level of physical security were comparable. 
Weight and Dimension EC2 was ranked the best, followed by System Y.  R2C2 fared the worst because 
of additional cases for generator and local communication suite for  
added capability. 
Setup Time EC2 was likely to be faster with a simple architecture while System Y and R2C2 
were comparable. 




R2C2 had a Local Communication Suite compared to EC2 and System Y, hence 
a larger footprint for the supporting area. 
Organic Sensor  
Refresh Rate 
With a Local Communication Suite, situation assessment update for R2C2 was 
faster than System Y and EC2. 
Inorganic Sensor 
Footprint 




All three systems had not designed for this feature, so they were given  
equal preferences. 
Table 21:  Operational Capability Considerations 
7.2.6.2 Assessment on Technical Performance 
Since both EC2 and System Y have no local communications capability, 
the preference was given to R2C2.  Further considerations for the evaluation of  




Bandwidth System Y and R2C2 used the same satellite system (Swedish) which was 
more capable than INMARSAT, i.e., 4 Mbps duplex versus 128 Kbs. 
Range All systems were ranked equally as satellite communication coverage  
were similar. 
Storage Capacity All systems were rank equally as similar COTS technologies were used. 
Refresh Rate, Link Reliability, 
and Link Availability 
The three systems were comparable in performance because they were GEO 
stationary satellites and the mode of operations was primarily stationary. 
Table 22:  Technical Performance Considerations 
7.2.6.3 Assessment on ILS 
This was one area where the system with the simplest architecture fared 
better.  The three systems were generally assessed to be comparable given the fact that 
they have been built on tried and trusted COTS technology.  However, given the more 
austere operating conditions, it was assumed that the system with the smallest logistic 
footprint would fare better than one that continually relied on logistic support to sustain 
its operations.  In this respect, EC2, with a simpler setup and less complex equipment and 
architecture, would fulfill its mission with fewer reliability issues.  With fewer 
components and a simpler architecture, the overall reliability of such a system would be 
higher than a complex system with many components, each imposing a logistic and 
reliability strain on the overall system performance.  This same reasoning was applied to 
the training aspect, where a system with fewer components would be easier to train 
personnel as compared to a system with greater capability and complexity.  A summary 
of the ILS considerations are annotated in Table 23. 
 
Subcriteria Assessment 
Reliability System Y and R2C2 used similar COTS technologies and the similar GEO satellite 
systems; hence, they were assessed to give comparable reliability figures.  However, 
the reliability of EC2, with similar COTS technologies and fewer modules, was 
assessed to be slightly better. 
Self Test Due to the lack of information for assessment, the three systems were ranked equally.
Ease of Repair Due to the lack of information for assessment, the three systems were ranked equally.
Spares Support The number of spares to cater was assessed to be comparable for all three systems as 
they used similar COTS technologies.  However, R2C2 with its power generator and 
local communication suite would mean slightly more spares support was required.  
EC2, having the fewest components, was ranked the best. 
Training Based on the number of modules in each system, training requirement was assessed to 
be more demanding for R2C2, followed by System Y and EC2.  Hence, EC2 fared the 
best, followed by Sys Y and R2C2. 
Support Test 
Equipment 
Due to the lack of information for assessment, the three systems were ranked equally.
Table 23:  ILS Considerations 
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7.2.6.4 Overall Synthesis 
 As shown in Figure 47, R2C2 was found to be the most suitable system 
with the highest weight of 0.427.  R2C2 had a clear lead over the other two alternatives.  
Because System Y and EC2 weights were close with 0.29 and 0.284, respectively, it was 
necessary to carry out a sensitivity analysis of the alternatives, with respect to the criteria. 
 
Figure 47:  Overall Syntheses 
7.2.7 Overall Sensitivity Analysis Graph 
 A sensitivity analysis of the alternatives, with respect to the criteria, was carried 
out.  This would establish how sensitive the alternatives were to the criteria and provide 
additional insights into the model.  In particular, we would focus on the criteria that 
would result in alternative reversals.  Figure 48 shows the sensitivity analysis as a result 
of changing the Operational Capability weight.  The original decision outcome is 
displayed in Figure 47 with the rankings being:  R2C2 (0.427), EC2 (0.290), and  
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System Y (0.283).  As a result of increasing the weight (from 48.1% to 57.5%) on 
Operational Capability, it was observed that R2C2 still managed to retain its top ranking.  








Figure 48:  Sensitivity Analysis of Alternatives – Change in Operational Capability Weight 
Increase weight in 
Operational Capability 
from 48.1% to 57.1%. 
The outcome of the change in 
Operational Capability weight.  
Notice the change in ranking of 
EC2 and System Y. 
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Likewise, the weight of Technical Performance and ILS were varied to assess if it 
resulted in a change of ranking or rank reversals of the original decision outcome.  It was 
noted that variation of the three main criteria of Operational Capabilities,  
Technical Performance, and ILS did not result in rank reversal for R2C2.  It remained the 
first choice among the three alternatives in all weights for the main criteria.  However, for 
the other two alternatives of EC2 and System Y, the changes in weights did result in rank 
reversals.  Tables 24, 25, and 26 show the amount of “perturbations” in  
Operations Capabilities, Technical Performance, and ILS, respectively, which resulted in  
alternative reversal. 
Criteria Original Weights 
Weights Resulting in 
Alternative Reversal 
(Increasing Weights of 
Operations Capability)
Ranking 
(Original % in 
Parentheses) 
Ops Capabilities 48.1% 57.5% R2C2 – 42.1% (42.7%) 
Technical 
Performance 
34.8% 28.5% EC2 – 28.9% (29.0%) 
ILS 17.1% 14.0% System Y – 29.0% (28.3%)
Table 24:  Changes in Weights of Operational Capabilities Resulting in Alternative Reversal 
Criteria Original Weights 
Weights Resulting in 
Alternative Reversal 




(Original % in 
Parentheses) 
Ops Capabilities 48.1% 36.6% R2C2 – 46.3% (42.7%) 
Technical 
Performance 
34.8% 50.4% EC2 – 26.8% (29.0%) 
ILS 17.1% 13.0% System Y – 26.9% (28.3%)
Table 25:  Changes in Weights of Technical Performance Resulting in Alternative Reversal 
Criteria Original Weights 





(Original % in 
Parentheses) 
Ops Capabilities 48.1% 31.5% R2C2 – 35.8% (42.7%) 
Technical 
Performance 
34.8% 22.8% EC2 – 35.8% (29.0%) 
ILS 17.1% 45.7% System Y – 28.4% (28.3%)
Table 26:  Changes in Weights of ILS Resulting in Alternative Reversal 
 R2C2 rated well in the various criteria in the AHP and changes to the weights of 
the main criteria of Operations Capability, Technical Performance, and ILS did not result 
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in rank reversal.  This pointed to a robust decision outcome and indicated that R2C2 was 
a clear “winner” in the overall assessment based on the criteria developed. 
 For the other two systems, EC2 scored well in the area of ILS, as it had inherent 
advantages that place it ahead of System Y.  As a result, an increase in the weights (and 
hence, importance) of ILS would serve to raise EC2 to a higher level, comparable to that 
of R2C2.  However, it was unlikely that ILS would be accorded a weight of 45.7% to 
place it above Operations Capabilities. 
7.2.8 AHP Conclusions and Recommendations 
 The survey and its feedback, the problem statement, and the COIs developed for 
R2C2 enabled the team to develop an AHP to identify the important factors for 
consideration in the analysis of alternatives.  As a result of going through the set process 
of pair-wise comparisons and overall synthesis of results, the academic evaluation of the 
three possible candidates for the communication systems yielded R2C2 as the favorable 
system to adopt based on the criteria drawn up. 
Though this serves as an illustrated academic example of the possibilities, the 
exercise could serve as a useful baseline or starting point for more elaborate studies or 
field tests to assess the performance of competing communication systems. 
7.3 REQUIREMENTS TRAFFIC LIGHT CHART ANALYSIS 
 In addition to the AHP assessment of the JSIC EC2, System Y, and R2C2 system, 
each requirement was investigated to determine whether each system met the given 
requirements.  There were three sets of requirements given for this project:  CPD 
requirements, BAA requirements, and R2C2 team-generated requirements.  For each 
requirement, all three systems were evaluated and color coded with green, yellow, or red.  
Green indicated that the system met the requirement.  Yellow indicated a need for small 
modifications in order to accommodate the requirement, and red indicated a need for 
significant modification of the system.  Table 27 shows the requirements that were met 
by all three systems.  CPD requirements are written in red, BAA requirements are written 
in black, and R2C2 team-generated requirements are written in blue. 
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 JSIC EC2 System Y R2C2 
State of the art, agile, and self-contained       
Small footprint (physical)       
Transportable in commercial and military aircraft       
Collaboration via reachback       
Two-person transportable       
Marshall in 30 minutes       
Operational in 30 minutes       
Local physical storage (on one or more laptops)       
Transportable by commercial air or ground by two people       
Operable on standard electrical power       
Provide data and voice communications       
Support and training document    
Connect to commercial Internet       
Provide secure means (physical security, data security, and 
network security) of passing tactical information to 
supported commander for situation assessment.       
Provide compact, rugged, and mobile packaging.       
Provide flexibility for mission-dependent software and 
hardware configurations.       
Table 27:  Traffic Light Chart (Accommodated) 
Table 28 shows a set of requirements that were not met by one or more systems. 
 JSIC EC2 System Y R2C2 
Satellite connectivity       
Able to operate in austere locations       
Two simultaneous data networks       
Secure wireless (objective)       
Utilize EoIP to include VTC       
Multi-mode operations (voice, data, and video 
simultaneously)       
Provide 1.024 Mbps threshold per network (4.196 Mbps 
objective)       
Provide capability of local and long haul communications.       
Provide means of collecting data from organic or  
inorganic assets.       
Provide self-supporting power supply in addition to 
capacity of operating on standard electrical power.       
Provide capability for operators to receive, display, 
analyze, filter, and pass simultaneous data from organic or 
inorganic assets.       
Table 28:  Traffic Light Chart 
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Table 29 is a compilation of rationales behind the traffic light chart ratings in 
Table 28. 
Satellite Connectivity 
JSIC EC2 does not have a portable satellite dish.  A
minor modification of adding a satellite dish  
is needed. 
Able to operate in austere 
locations 
JSIC EC2 and System Y do not have a portable 
generator. A minor modification of adding a power 
generator is needed. 
Two simultaneous data networks 
JSIC EC2 is not capable of accessing CENTRIX 
and SIPRNet.  A significant modification to its 
network architecture is needed. 
Secure wireless (objective) 
JSIC EC2 does not support a wireless capability.  A 
minor modification to add wireless components  
is needed. 
Utilize EoIP to include VTC JSIC EC2 does not have a VTC device.  A minor modification of adding the VTC devices is needed. 
Multimode operations (voice, data,
and video simultaneously) 
JSIC EC2 does not accommodate video data.  A 
minor modification of adding video camera  
is needed. 
Provide 1.024 Mbps threshold per 
network (4.196 Mbps objective) 
JSIC EC2 only utilizes INMARSAT satellite  
(L-band).  L-band is not capable of 1.024 Mbps.  A 
minor modification of utilizing Ku-band capable 
satellite dish is needed. 
Provide capability of local and 
long haul communications. 
JSIC EC2 and System Y do not have any local 
communication devices as a part of the system.  A 
minor modification of adding a local 
communication module is needed. 
Provide means of collecting data 
from organic or inorganic assets. 
JSIC EC2 and System Y do not have organic data 
collecting devices.  A minor modification of adding 
data collecting devices is needed (i.e., camera, 
video camera). 
Provide self-supporting power 
supply in addition to capacity of 
operating on standard  
electrical power. 
JSIC EC2 and System Y do not have a portable 
generator.  A minor modification of adding a power 
generator is needed. 
Provide capability for operators to 
receive, display, analyze, filter, 
and pass simultaneous data from 
organic or inorganic assets. 
JSIC EC2 and System Y do not have data 
collecting personnel and local communication 
capability to wirelessly transmit the data to the 
operators.  A significant modification is needed. 
Table 29:  Traffic Light Chart Considerations 
In addition to ranking the three systems, this analysis was conducted to ensure 
that the R2C2 system met all of the CPD, BAA, and R2C2 team-generated requirements 
and that no vital aspects were left unanalyzed.  The traffic light chart results were 
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consistent with the AHP analysis of the three systems that the R2C2 was again the most 
suitable system.  R2C2 met 27 out of 28 requirements.  System Y was ranked after R2C2 
by meeting 22 out of 28 given requirements, and JSIC EC2 was ranked last by meeting 
only 16 requirements.  A noticeable difference in the result between the AHP ranking and 
the traffic chart ranking is a change of place between the JSIC EC2 and System Y.  This 
difference is due to slightly different criteria and weight assigned to each criterion.  AHP 
covers the ILS aspect of the system that the requirement traffic light chart does not 
address.  Moreover, each criterion of AHP is weighted based on their importance to the 
system, unlike equally weighted traffic light chart analysis. 
While conducting the traffic light analysis, we discovered a few conflicting 
requirements.  The first one addresses the number of operators.  The CPD states that the 
system shall be operated by 4 operators, expanding up to 10; however, the BAA states 
that the system shall be operated by 5 clients, expanding up to 15.  In order to resolve this 
conflict, the R2C2 team traced back to the scenario and investigated how many operators 
will be needed.  Based on the scenario and operational experience of the R2C2 team 
members, the team concluded that 7-11 personnel are required for normal operations, 
including 3 security personnel to guard the system from physical intrusion and  
4-8 operators in working in 6-hour rotations. 
The second conflicting requirement concerned satellite communication capability.  
One of the CPD requirements states that DJC2 “shall provide limited Rapid Response 
communication capability to include SHF SATCOM, UHF TACSAT, INMARSAT, and 
handheld global satellite phone.”  The first noticeable redundancy in this requirement is 
the coexistence of INMARSAT and UHF TACSAT.  UHF ranges from 300MHz to  
3 GHz and includes P-, L-, and S-band.  In order to provide low propagation attenuation 
and high tolerance of antenna pointing errors, INMARSAT also operates within the  
L-band.  Employing INMARSAT when UHF TACSAT is available appears to be an 
unnecessary redundancy.  The second questionable aspect of this requirement involves 
the addition of low-band UHF, which does not even meet the required minimum 
bandwidth of 1.024 Mbps.  UHF might have been included by the requirement generators 
in order to increase overall communication link reliability by exploiting its higher 
tolerance of antenna-pointing errors and better propagation properties than SHF, or a 
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requirement to be interoperable with legacy systems.  However, the R2C2 system satellite 
dish will be stationary and antenna-pointing accuracy will not be difficult to achieve.  
Moreover, in order to accommodate UHF capability into the system, another larger 
satellite dish will be required, and consequently will increase the weight and size of  
the system. 
In summary, both INMARSAT and UHF TACSAT were concluded to be 
unnecessary capabilities of the system.  SHF SATCOM was more than capable of 
handling what INMARSAT and UHF were designed to do without adding extra weight.  
A handheld global satellite phone will be utilized to provide a redundant SATCOM link, 
in addition to the SHF SATCOM for the purpose of increasing the overall link reliability 
of the system. 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
 In the systems analysis phase of the SE process, time-critical R2C2 system 
architecture selected from the modeling phase was assessed for its suitability by using the 
AHP and traffic light comparison analysis.  In the AHP, the analysis group identified 
critical issues R2C2 system will face in various operating scenarios and converted them 
into comparable criteria.  Each criterion was then assigned a weight, based on the survey 
results, in order to signify its importance.  The survey takers’ profession did not affect the 
how he/she weighted each criterion and it was proven through the Kruskal-Wallis  
one-way analysis of variance.  Hence, the 30 samples were considered to be from a 
homogenous source and overall results were computed.  Such weights will provide 
valuable insights to the DJC2 program office on the relative importance of numerous 
criteria for this type of system.  The R2C2 system was then compared with JSIC EC2 and 
System Y using the AHP and traffic light comparison.  In both analyses, R2C2 was 
ranked as the most suitable system and one that met all but one requirement, as shown in 
Table 30. 
 AHP Traffic Light Matrix 
R2C2 0.427 27/28 
System Y 0.283 22/28 
EC2 0.290 16/28 
Table 30:  Result of Three-System Evaluation 
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In summary, the analysis process provided the following valuable information: 
• COIs, MOEs, MOSs, and MOPs to be used as a basis for future TEMP of 
the system. 
• Relative importance between multiple criteria to be utilized to evaluate a 
rapid response C2 system. 
• Proof that the R2C2 system was the best system to address present 
capability gaps and requirements for a rapid response C2 system. 
• Analysis of existing requirements and modification suggestions to as-is 
and proposed systems. 
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APPENDIX A:  SCENARIO COMPARISON 
Scenario 
Comparison  
   
Respond  
Time User expectation 
  
General  
Goals Scenarios Examples 
1. Adequate  
(> 1 day) 
2. Average  
(< 1 day) 
3. Short  
(< 12hrs) 
input 












3. short, due to 
plans to attack U. 
S. interst, intel is 
neede for counter-
offensive attacks 





Civil Unrest  
(eg., Ivory Coast) 
3. Time is critical.  
Tensions are 
increasing and 
intel is needed to 
determine scope of 
operations 
High/Very High High/Moderate High/Moderate 
Strikes/Raids 
Show of forces 
Counterterrorism 
Peace Keeping 
POT Deter War and Resolve Conflicts 
Counterinsurgency 
Counter-terrorism
(eg., terrorism off 
southern phillipines)
1. adequate, 
caution must be 
taken to prevent 
detection 
high/high moderate/moderate high/moderate 
Anti-terrorism  




3. time is critical, 
need to be inserted 













Promote Peace,  




(eg., Bird Flu) 
1. Adequate. 
Should have ample 


















1. Small (2 px) 
2. Medium (platoon) 
3. Large (company 
and beyond) 










3. Medium 2. Tension 3. Hostile 3. Hostile 1. Supported 1. Low 3. Widespread (this war will involve other nations)
3. Large  





on UN troops 
2. Regional UN 
involvement and former 
French colony with  
French interest 
2. Medium 3. Hostile 3. Hostile 2. Tension 3. Poor 3. High 1. Localize 
2. Medium 1. Peaceful 2. Tension 1. Peaceful 3. Poor 3. High 1. Localize to disaster site
2. Medium 1. Peaceful 1. Peaceful 1. Peaceful 1. Supported 1. Low 
3. Widespread (virus may 
spread from  
human to human) 
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1. Short (<1 wk) 
2. Med (<1 mth) 
3. Long (>1 mth) 
1. Not required 




3. Lots of resources/efforts 
Coalition 1. Supported 
2. Med (initial SA and intel 
should be sufficient 
depending on Country X’s 
time line) 
3. Necessary (best place to set up 
and location of leadeship) 
If no Middle Easterners 
available to conduct mission 




2. Supplementary hazardous 
conditions in Northern 
region (roadblocks, check 
points…) 
1. Short intel is critical 
before follow on troops will 
be deployed to support  
the government 
3. Necessary for air drop to the 
North and rebel locations 
Local support would be  
a bonus 
3. Coalition 2. Supplementary 
2. Med (determining location 
of terrorist may take a  
few weeks) 
2. Is a bonus ( the more we have 
the less time to  
complete mission) 
The level of complexity is 
high, terrorist protection may 
cause additional complexity 
3. Coalition (include 
various countries 
coming to help) 
3. Poor 3. Long (till host is  self-sustain) 
3. Necessary (pt of insertion, 
factors that affect ops plan, has 
situation stabilise) 
Potential of being sabotage in 
“peaceful” environment, 
3. Coalition (include 
various countries 
coming to help) 
1. Supported 3. Long (till the pandemic gets contain) 
3. Necessary (preventive 
measures prior insertion) intel 
need to safe guard operators 
(inserted troop) 
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APPENDIX B:  R2C2-RELATED UJTLS 
OP 2.2 Collect and Share Operational Information 
 
To gather information from operational and tactical sources on operational and 
tactical threat forces and their decisive points (and related high-payoff targets such as 
CBRNE weapon production, infrastructure and delivery systems). It also includes 
collection of information on the nature and characteristics of the operational area 
(including area of interest). Locating and reporting captured or isolated personnel falls 
under this task. In addition, collection of data to support combat assessment is included in 
this task. The sharing of collected information within the multi-Service intelligence 
communities can consolidate return of information, promote fusion, and prevent retasking 
of scarce assets. This task applies in peace and war and those MOOTW. It includes the 
sharing of collected information among all DOD organizations and non-DOD agencies in 
support of Homeland Security. All intelligence activities will be executed in accordance 
with Intelligence Oversight. 
 
OP 2.2.1 Collect Information on Operational Situation 
 
To obtain operationally significant information on enemy (and friendly) force 
strengths and vulnerabilities, threat operational doctrine, and forces (land, sea, and air and 
space). Threat includes threat allies, and, in MOOTW, insurgents, terrorists, illegal drug 
traffickers, belligerents in peace support or peace enforcement situations, and other 
opponents. It also includes collecting information on the nature and characteristics of the 
area of interest, to include collecting battlefield damage assessment, munitions effects, 
medical assessments, and hazards, such as CBRNE contamination to conduct mission 
assessment. The nature and characteristics of the area include significant political, 
economic, industrial, geospatial (e.g., aeronautical, hydrographic, geodetic, topographic), 
demographic, medical, climatic, and cultural, as well as psychological profiles of the 
resident populations. This task includes collecting counterintelligence information to 
protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations 
conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign 
organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities. 
 
OP 4 Provide Operational Logistics and Personnel 
Support 
 
To provide logistics and personnel support activities required to sustain the force 
in campaigns and major operations within the joint operations area. The logistic concept 
should support theater activity by properly organizing support from the CONUS base to 
the combat zone. At the theater operational level, specific considerations include 
identification of operational requirements and establishment of priorities for the 
employment of the resources provided. This theater of operations/joint operations area 
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sustaining base, which includes the communications zone (COMMZ), links strategic 
sustainment to tactical CSS. In military operations other than war, the activities under 
operational support also pertain to support of US forces, other USG agencies, and forces 
of friendly countries or groups being supported by US forces. Operational support 
includes sustaining the tempo and the continuity of operations throughout a campaign or 
major operation. This task includes obtaining sustainment support from sources other 
than Military Services and includes the following: host-nation support, logistic civil 
augmentation, DOD civilian support, and captured materiel. 
 
OP 5.1.9 Coordinate Information Assurance (IA) 
Procedures 
 
To coordinate IA procedures established by the JFC for forward  
deployed operations. 
 
SN 1 Conduct Strategic Deployment and Redeployment 
 
To conduct the relocation of forces to desired theaters and their return in 
accordance with national military strategy and OPLANs to include within CONUS in 
support of Homeland Security missions. This task focuses on the movement of forces and 
resources from a point of origin to a specific operational area. Strategic deployment 
encompasses relocation of forces, equipment, and supplies to a theater from CONUS, or 
from one theater to another, for subsequent reception, staging, onward movement, and 
integration (RSOI). This task applies to mobilization and non-mobilization situations. 
Forces include air, land, and sea forces, as well as special operations forces. 
 
SN 1.2 Conduct Deployment and Redeployment 
 
To move forces and cargo in accordance with both national strategic and theater 
strategic requirements and in conformance with the supported commander’s concept of 
operations. 
 
SN 2.2 Collect Strategic Information 
 
To exploit sources of strategic information and to deliver the intelligence obtained 
to the appropriate processing organization for use in producing strategic intelligence. 
Strategic surveillance and reconnaissance are related to this task as is counterintelligence. 
 
SN 2.4.1 Evaluate, Integrate, Analyze, and Interpret 
Information 
 
To appraise information for credibility, reliability, pertinency, and accuracy 
(evaluate). It includes forming patterns through the selection and combination of 
193 
processed information (integrate). The task further includes reviewing information to 
identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation (analyze). Finally, the task is to 
judge the significance of information in relation to the current body of knowledge 
(interpret). 
 
SN 3.3.6.1 Assess Critical Infrastructure (CI) Impacts to 
Operational Capability 
 
Determine the operational impacts resulting from the loss, disruption, and/or 
degradation of mission critical infrastructure. 
Note: This task includes identifying the critical infrastructure and assets that are 
components of systems supporting all assigned missions; analyzing the potential 
consequences of a global event; assessing potential impacts to critical infrastructure and 
assets supporting assigned missions; and reporting results of the analysis and assessment. 
 
SN 4.4 Reconstitute National Forces and Means 
 
To reconstitute the Armed Forces of the United States that will counter any 
emerging global threat. National reconstitution involves forming, training, and fielding 
new fighting units. This task includes initially drawing on cadre-type units and laid-up 
military assets, mobilizing previously trained or new manpower, and large-scale use or 
employment of the industrial base. This task also involves maintaining technology, 
doctrine, training, experienced manpower (military, DOD civilian, and contractors), and 
the innovative approach necessary to retain the competitive edge in decisive areas of 
potential military competition. This task includes providing the support required for 
reconstituting a host-nation's forces in military operations other than war. 
 
SN 5.1.2.1.4 Provide Global Communications and Networks 
for Video Services 
 
To provide global video service capabilities, ranging from network delivery of 
video of live events and real time video communications sessions among people who are 
geographically dispersed to delivery of video from prerecorded video files. 
 
SN 5.1.2.1.5 Provide Global Voice Communications  
and Networks 
 
To provide global voice services through telephone networks and satellite-based 
personal communications systems. 
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SN 5.1.2.2.3 Provide Collaborative Applications and 
Services 
 
To provide collaborative tool applications to enhance simultaneous access to  
real-time information and enable two or more operational users to simultaneously 
collaborate without the need to be co-located. 
 
SN 5.1.2.3.4 Provide Data Storage 
 
To provide and administer data storage for both classified and unclassified 
environments. 
 
SN 5.1.2.8 Operate Computing Centers, Applications, 
Services, Systems and Networks 
 
To administer and operate computing centers, systems and networks to satisfy the 
needs of the warfighter. 
 
SN 5.5.2 Conduct Defensive Information Operations 
 
To perform authorized actions to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, 
and respond to unauthorized activity within national security 
information systems and computer networks. (Executive Order 12333, 
Chairman’s Memorandum, CM- 573-88, National Security Directive, 
National Policy for the Security of Telecommunications  
and Information) 
 
SN 6 Conduct Mobilization 
 
To expand the Armed Services by assembling and organizing national resources 
to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. This task brings the 
Armed Services, or part of them, to a state of readiness for war or another national 
emergency. This task includes advising the Secretary of Defense on mobilization. It 
includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components (RC), as well as assembling 
and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. This task is performed when the 
Secretary of Defense initiates a selective, partial, full, or total mobilization. Mobilization 
tasks of combatant command components are included under this joint task. For example, 
US Army Pacific (USARPAC), a component command of US Pacific Command 
(USPACOM), has mobilization responsibilities. These mobilization responsibilities are 
analyzed under the national strategic level (rather than a theater strategic task) because 
USARPAC performs these responsibilities as a major Army command (MACOM). Thus, 
USARPAC is considered to be performing national military functions. However, 
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USARPAC reports mobilization status through the combatant command as well as  
the Service. 
 
SN 6.2 Alert Forces for Mobilization 
 
To transition the force from reserve to active duty status with available personnel 
and facilities, and to complete all administrative and processing actions. The alert phase 
begins when units or individuals receive notice of pending order to active duty and ends 
when the unit enters active Federal service. 
 
SN 6.2.1 Alert Units and Individuals of Pending 
Mobilization 
 
To provide readiness for action—the period of time during which troops standby 
in response to an alarm. This task includes any form of communication used by Service 
headquarters or other competent authority to notify National Guard and Reserve unit 
commanders that orders to active duty are pending. 
 
SN 8.1.7 Coordinate Information Sharing 
Arrangements 
 
To arrange for the selected release and disclosure of unclassified and classified 
information in support of multinational operations and exercises. This task may involve 
coordination with national intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies (down to the 
state and local levels), and the Department of State. 
 
ST 5.1.6 Establish Information Assurance (IA) 
Procedures 
 
To establish information assurance procedures for deployed operations. This task 
includes developing IO appendices including defensive IO and IA for all deliberate plans 
and operations orders as required. IA may be used to ensure information and information 
systems availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This 
includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, 
detection, and reaction capabilities. 
 
ST 6.2.6 Establish and Coordinate Security Procedures 
for Theater Forces and Means 
 
To enhance freedom of action by reducing the vulnerability of friendly joint 
forces to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. This task includes measures to protect forces 
from surprise, hostile observation, detection, interference, espionage, and sabotage. This 
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activity also includes protecting and securing the flanks in joint operations and protecting 
and securing critical installations, facilities, systems and air, land, and sea LOCs. It 
includes antiterrorism to protect the morale of the force and enhance the legitimacy of 
host-nation forces. 
 
ST 6.3 Secure Theater Systems and Capabilities 
 
To protect friendly systems and capabilities by identifying threats and reducing or 
compensating for vulnerabilities. 
 
ST 6.3.3 Supervise Communications Security 
(COMSEC) 
 
To supervise the protection resulting from all measures designed to deny 
unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and 
study of telecommunications. COMSEC includes crypto security, transmission security, 
emission security, and physical security of communications security materials and 
information. 
 
ST 6.3.5 Protect Theater Information Systems 
 
To coordinate theater-wide activities to protect and defend information and 
information systems. This task includes integrating and synchronizing indigenous and 
joint force capabilities for defensive IO, ranging from technical security measures (such 
as INFOSEC) to procedural measures (such as counterintelligence, physical security, and 
hardening of communications nodes). Information assurance includes producing the 
theater policies and procedures designed to ensure availability, integrity, authenticity, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation of information. Information system defense includes 
defensive measures, detection and reporting of attacks or intrusions, and the initiation of 
restoral and response processes. 
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APPENDIX D:  SATELLITE SYSTEMS 










(single unit)Sat System 
X Ku Ka lbs # of cases inches Mbps Mbps min W AC 
MIL-STD 
estimate iDirect Licenses 
Norsat 
Globetrekker Optional Yes Optional <50 1 19.5 x 27x 13.2 4 4 <10 480 $100,000.00 Supports 
Pending  
(none) estimate 
Norsat U.P. 5200 Optional Yes Optional 46/46 2 16 x 11 x 25/ 16 x 11 x 25 8.448 8.448 10 480 $100,000.00 Supports 
Pending  
(FCC, Intelsat) $100,000.00 
SWE-DISH IPT-i 






IPStar, Shin Sat, 
AsiaSat FCC 
$100,000.00 
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